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CARBON-EMISSIONS CONTROL AND THE  
RULES OF LEGISLATIVE JOINDER 
DAVID A. SUPER† 
Climate change is no ordinary policy problem.  Its regulation certainly is 
no ordinary policy initiative.  No one should be surprised, therefore, that reach-
ing principled choices about its substantive scope requires more than routine 
policy analysis.  A purely political calculus will likely result in legislation that 
ignores urgent human needs while providing environmentally counterproduc-
tive subsidies to current polluters. 
Pending legislation to address carbon-emissions includes large subsidies for 
existing emitters.  These subsidies make little sense economically or politically.  
Worse, they divert resources needed to address two crucial issues that the pro-
posed legislation largely ignores:  the impact of raising carbon costs on low-
income people and the effects of the pending legislation on the massive structur-
al federal deficit. 
A carbon tax or cap-and-trade system would substantially increase costs 
not only for transportation but also for food and housing.  With poverty levels 
rising even before the current economic downturn, the consequences of these 
price increases could be dire.  Even without the pending legislation, the struc-
tural deficit will require deflationary tax increases or spending cuts.  Combin-
ing carbon regulation with these measures could do severe damage. 
Although few challenge their merits, these proposals may nonetheless fail if 
a consensus emerges that they are extraneous to climate change legislation.  
 
† Professor of Law, University of Maryland.  The author is grateful for the in-
sightful comments of M. Rebecca Lopez, Bob Percival, Rena Steinzor, and Anthony 
Vitarelli; for the superb research of Alice Johnson, Janet Sinder, and Steve Wagner; 
and for the careful and perceptive editing of Michael Carlson, Marsha Chien, and Kris-
tin Sageser.   
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Overly complex legislation often bogs down, and we lack coherent normative 
principles for “issue joinder” in public policy debates.  Such principles can be 
derived and can counsel how we address both low-income subsidies and deficit 
reduction as part of climate change legislation. 
Another challenge is finding efficient means to deliver subsidies without 
disrupting incentives to conserve.  Energy companies are likely to divert pro-
posed allocations for this purpose to writing off bad debt.  Funding energy-
assistance programs will similarly crowd out existing resources.  Prior piecemeal 
efforts to address high energy costs provide invaluable lessons on designing a 
system that offsets rising carbon costs without distorting consumers’ incentives.  
The large majority of proceeds not needed for low-income subsidies should be re-
served for deficit reduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In legislation, as in litigation, the outcome springs from two sepa-
rate choices.  First, the system must determine which issues will be 
joined for decision.  Second, it must decide them.  In both legislative 
and judicial lawmaking, the second of these choices receives far more 
attention.  We only occasionally note which claims or parties the trial 
court excluded from a case that became prominent in an appellate 
court.  Similarly, we focus on the final legislation enacted, or perhaps 
on the bill defeated, not on the process by which a particular set of is-
sues came together in a single bill. 
The focus on ultimate decisions in part reflects their more obvious 
finality.  Their binary character, as well as the more-accessible substan-
tive grounds that ostensibly drive them, also contributes to the ten-
dency to focus on final decisions at the expense of preliminary deci-
sions formulating the issues for resolution.  Questions of which issues 
to join for decision, by contrast, are handled relatively inconspicuous-
ly:  in litigation, through dry motion practice; in legislation, through 
backroom negotiations. 
Issue and party joinder in litigation results from both strategic 
considerations and normative rules.  Parties seek or oppose joinder to 
confuse or focus a jury, to broaden or simplify discovery, to exhaust 
opponents’ resources or to husband their own, and for a host of other 
strategic reasons.  Procedural rules and trial judges’ discretion restrict 
joinder based on normative considerations. 
Party joinder in legislatures is controlled constitutionally.  Except 
in rare cases where a member’s misconduct or qualifications are at is-
sue, the identities of the parties are as fixed as those of the adjudi-
cators within the legislative process—because the two groups are the 
same.  Legislative issue joinder reflects the same mix of parties’ stra-
tegic judgments and the system’s normative concerns that guide issue 
joinder in litigation.  Legislators and the interest groups advising 
them make strategic judgments about which aggregation of issues will 
best advance their agendas.  The system imposes normatively driven 
constraints on their ability to pursue their chosen strategies.  As with 
litigation, these external constraints consist of a combination of expli-
cit rules and discretionary choices.  The mix of rules and discretion 
varies by legislative body:  many state legislatures have rules effectively 
limiting each bill to a single object, while others either lack or ignore 
such rules.  Congress allows particularly freewheeling issue joinder.  
Congress’s joinder rules offer numerous means for burdening oppo-
nents’ proposals with unpopular or distracting riders.  As a result, a 
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common way of favoring a particular substantive outcome, such as def-
icit reduction or closing military bases, is to establish special rules li-
miting the issues that may be joined to such initiatives. 
A paucity of ex ante principles for legislative issue joinder is par-
ticularly important because discretion over those matters is exercised 
not by impartial judges but rather by the same partial legislators that 
will ultimately decide the fate of the legislation.  Debate in the broad-
er political arena, however, can circumscribe legislators’ ability to 
serve their own strategic interests on joinder questions.  For example, 
voters may punish legislators for voting against joinder of a proposal 
they favor, not understanding that joinder could have brought down 
an underlying bill that they also support.  And in the broader political 
arena, no formal rules constrain joinder of either parties or issues.  
Voters and even journalists are far less savvy about how alternative ag-
gregations of issues will influence ultimate outcomes.  The norms that 
guide these groups’ judgments about which interests, and which 
claims, are sufficiently related to deserve to be heard as part of a par-
ticular debate can therefore have a powerful impact on ultimate policy 
outcomes. 
Many of the same norms that limit joinder in litigation also guide 
joinder in the legislative process.  Both arenas permit joinder to avoid 
duplicative and inconsistent decisionmaking but seek to guard against 
legislation (or litigation) becoming so cumbersome that it delays reso-
lution of the core dispute or risks confusing the decisionmaker.1  
Some may conceptualize this balancing in essentially utilitarian terms:  
finding the degree of aggregation that maximizes economies of scale.  
Others, however, temper these calculations with judgments that some 
claims have an intrinsic right to be joined with closely related claims 
regardless of the consequences. 
The myopic focus on ultimate decisions leaves students of legisla-
tion oddly flat-footed at crucial times.  With legislation, as opposed to 
judge-made law, playing an ever more dominant role in the U.S. legal 
system, the inability to understand principles of legislative joinder is 
the rough equivalent of being unable to anticipate the precedential 
implications of a new constitutional or common law decision.  For ex-
ample, a fundamental change in the politics of an issue may indicate 
 
1 An additional concern in legislative joinder that is absent in litigation is that de-
cisions are all-or-nothing.  Legislative joinder can thus force a majority to adopt subs-
tantive positions it does not support.  The most common examples involve swing 
members extracting funding for pork-barrel projects that have little legislative support.  
See also infra text accompanying note 12. 
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that some legislation is likely.  Without understanding legislative joind-
er, however, observers cannot begin to estimate the likelihood that 
this substantive consensus will produce a broad response, a narrow re-
sponse, or unexpected gridlock:  Will agreement on large issues carry 
along a host of more contestable measures on smaller points?  Will the 
legislature insist on keeping the legislation “clean,” disallowing con-
sideration of distracting side issues to ensure quick approval of a nar-
row initiative?  Or will enough disputed side issues be joined to frac-
ture the apparent majority for the underlying initiative and yield no 
legislation at all?2 
The lack of a coherent theory of legislative joinder also hobbles 
judicial interpretation of statutes.  Most theories of interpretation be-
gin with an inquiry into actual or hypothetical intent.3  Courts often 
assert that those who enacted the statute in question had some partic-
ular intent.  Einer Elhauge posits that the polity enacting a statute 
would want interpreting courts to consider legislative history because 
such interpretation maximizes the polity’s influence on subsequent 
public policy.4  He assumes that a court can determine which of the 
possible interpretations would have been most likely to have been 
enacted had they been presented to the legislators that created the 
statute at issue.5  Others have made similar claims.6  Yet as Kenneth 
Arrow has demonstrated, under many common arrangements of pre-
ferences, this question may be unanswerable without knowing the or-
 
2 Joinder disputes have played a major role in slowing health care reform legisla-
tion.  Some have advocated a narrow package of insurance reforms while others have 
found persuasive the insurance companies’ arguments for joining universal coverage 
to prevent adverse selection.  Opponents have tried to distract or fracture the majority 
by joining controversial issues, such as abortion, to the initiative. 
3 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 16-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
4 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES:  HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION 116 (2008) (arguing that legislatures would support a default rule direct-
ing courts to look to legislative history when a statute’s meaning is unclear).  
5 See id. at 119-21 (arguing that courts can minimize legislative dissatisfaction with 
their interpretation of a statute by choosing the plausible interpretation that would 
have had the greatest probability of being enacted had it been presented to the  
enacting polity). 
6 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226-30 (1979) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (urging the Court to consider the legislative history of Title VII and po-
siting that the history “irrefutably demonstrates” Congress’s intent); Roscoe Pound, 
Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907) (arguing that statutory inter-
pretation can require imagining the position of the lawmaker and thus divining “his 
intention with respect to the particular point in controversy”). 
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der in which the proposals come up for decision.7  Even more com-
monly, which choice a legislature would have made depends on 
joinder decisions—especially when the actual legislation relied on 
strategic votes from legislators who never actually supported the dis-
puted provision. 
New Textualists, most prominently Justice Antonin Scalia, dispa-
rage this inquiry on several grounds, including the impossibility of as-
certaining a unitary intent among the scores of people whose assent 
was required to enact the legislation and the risk that judges will dis-
guise the pursuit of their personal policy preferences as a search for 
legislative intent.8  Yet in the New Textualists’ search for what the 
words of a law mean, they consider a kind of hypothetical intent, ask-
ing, “What would someone using this language mean?”9  Although this 
inquiry does not depend on what a particular legislature meant on a 
particular occasion, it nonetheless relies on a sense of how the legisla-
ture typically speaks.  For example, a New Textualist may find an inter-
pretation “wrong if it does not fit with the use of [the term] through-
out the Act.”10  Such a conclusion implicitly assumes a joinder process 
that produces a coherent whole.  Textualist and nontextualist judges 
alike may read statutes on related subjects in pari materia, applying in-
terpretations from one to another.11  Yet if the two are separate be-
cause legislative joinder rules prevented them from being enacted to-
gether, merging them at the interpretive stage may effectively defy the 
legislature’s choice. 
 
7 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 
1963) (noting the inherent difficulties with ascertaining collective preferences through 
a voting system). 
8 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
9 See id. at 17 (“The evidence suggests that . . . we do not really look for subjective 
legislative intent.  We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasona-
ble person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of 
the corpus juris.”). 
10 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 722-23 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This is not an uncommon view:   
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by 
one general purpose and intent.  Consequently, each part or section should 
be construed in connection with every other part or section to produce a 
harmonious whole.  Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one 
section to be construed. 
2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:5, at 189-201 (7th ed. 2007).   
11 See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (concluding that courts should 
interpret statutes in the context of the body of laws of which they are a part).   
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Perhaps the most famous modern example of the pivotal role of 
joinder is the prohibition of sex-based employment discrimination in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Looking at the overall political climate at 
the time, virtually no one would believe that this country was prepared 
to enact such sweeping legislation.  In fact, the ban on sex discrimina-
tion might never have had sincere majority support in Congress.  It 
entered, and remained in, the legislation on the strength of a coali-
tion of sincere supporters—a distinct minority—and virulent racists, 
who saw the sex discrimination ban as a “poison pill” whose joinder 
could defeat the legislation as a whole.12  The lack of majority support 
for the provision on the merits has posed severe subsequent chal-
lenges for intentionalist judges seeking to interpret it.13 
More recently, opponents of a bankruptcy overhaul with over-
whelming congressional support (reflecting the campaign contribu-
tions of credit card companies), managed to stall action for several 
years in large part by joining abortion to the debate.14  Opponents of 
the bankruptcy bill demanded that the legislation deny bankruptcy 
relief to damage awards against persons obstructing access to abortion 
clinics.15  Once they achieved joinder, the two sides in the abortion 
debate each became determined not to allow the bill to pass without 
treatment of the issue that they favored.16 
 
12 See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-16 (1985) (providing a his-
torical account of these tactics).  
13 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-30 (1987) (relying on 
congressional intent with regard to race as a guide to resolving a gender discrimina-
tion case). 
14 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.), 
was proposed to work several major changes to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Frustration 
over controversial and highly peripheral amendments designed to stall the bill is evi-
denced in the legislative history.  See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1855 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (calling an abortion-related amendment to the Act 
a “poison pill”).   
15 See Stephen Labaton, Bankruptcy Bill Set for Passage; Victory for Bush, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 9, 2005, at A1 (describing the defeat of an amendment to the BAPCPA that would 
have prevented protesters at abortion clinics from using bankruptcy laws as a shield in 
civil lawsuits). 
16 See id. (reporting that the amendment “had threatened to derail the legisla-
tion”); see also 146 CONG. REC. 26,355-57 (2000) (remarks of Sen. Torricelli) (reporting 
that the Senate Republican leadership would not allow the bill to proceed with an 
amendment making damage awards for abortion-clinic violence undischargeable); id. 
at 26,352-55 (remarks of Sen. Durbin) (insisting that, despite his support for the un-
derlying bill, he would support a filibuster against it if the abortion-clinic amendment 
were not included). 
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The failure to account for legislative issue joinder also calls into 
question the assumptions about institutional competence that under-
lie much contemporary constitutional theory.  Even if one believes 
that the legislature is better at making certain kinds of ultimate deci-
sions once the issues are properly framed,17 if the legislature’s joinder 
rules prevent pivotal choices from coming up for a vote, then those 
superior capacities may never come to the fore.  Hence, the legisla-
ture’s hypothetical ability to make those choices will be irrelevant to 
the extent of judicial deference properly afforded.  Distortions result-
ing from joinder rules, like those flowing from the disproportionate 
leverage of concentrated interest groups,18 can prevent the median 
legislator’s will from prevailing and, for analogous reasons, might jus-
tify a more searching form of judicial review.19  Indeed, because prob-
lematic joinder rules defeat rather than merely distort the will of the 
majority, they may be more compelling candidates for offsetting re-
ductions in judicial deference.20 
 
17 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 226 (Yale Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (“[Legislatures] are, indeed, the forum for clashes of inter-
ests, contests of power, which produce sometimes a winner and a loser, and sometimes 
a compromise.”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 56-58 (1980) (arguing 
that “popular input on moral questions” might make legislators better at making moral 
judgments than the dispassionate judiciary).  See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT 
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(discussing various methods of statutory interpretation and offering an influential 
formulation of “legal process” theory). 
18 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-57 (1971) (discuss-
ing how small interest groups may gain disproportionate leverage over larger groups 
whose members may not share the same incentives).  
19 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 
72 (1985) (advocating “marginally more searching” review because of the influence of 
factional pressures on legislatures). 
20 The recent health care reform debate offers a case in point.  When the Senate 
took up the legislation in the fall of 2009, the median senator probably preferred a 
plan emphasizing regulation of the private insurance market over direct state provision 
of health insurance.  See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Leader Shows New 
Interest in Public Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at A1 (describing polls showing grow-
ing support for the public option).  The inability to marshal sixty votes to defeat a po-
tential Republican filibuster could force the Democratic leadership to invoke special 
“reconciliation” procedures that would disallow filibusters and allow passage with fifty-
one votes.  The joinder rules for reconciliation, however, disallow most regulatory pro-
visions, allowing only tax and spending changes.  See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A) (2006) 
(designating as extraneous any provision of a reconciliation bill or resolution that does 
not produce a change in outlays or revenues).  This would effectively force the legisla-
tion to rely on public health insurance by taking regulation in the private market off 
the table.  To be sure, such legislation would only pass if it won majorities in both 
houses.  But the result would be more statist than most members of Congress would 
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Rarely have the legal, political, and ethical difficulties surrounding 
legislative joinder been more important than in the current climate 
change debate.  The election of a President committed to action on 
climate change, with apparently comfortable congressional majorities, 
led many to believe that the enactment of legislation was assured.21  
But a close vote in the House and delayed consideration in the Senate 
have exposed the political difficulties of the issue.22  What has remained 
largely unappreciated is how the scope of legislative joinder will deter-
mine both the content and the long-term consequences of that legisla-
tion. 
 
likely prefer.  One could reasonably ask whether that result deserves the same judicial 
respect as an unconstrained majority choice might. 
 Joinder difficulties defeated health care reform in 1994, the last time it was in the 
public spotlight.  See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 266-73 
(2001) (describing President Clinton’s ambitious health care plan and its ultimate 
failure to be enacted).  The congressional Republican leadership opposed Democratic 
proposals; many believed Republicans wanted no legislation at all.  Id. at 272.  Given 
the broad public support for health care reform, however, Republicans had to tread 
lightly.  Id.  As a result, several Republicans, including the House and Senate Minority 
Leaders, introduced legislation that would expand health insurance coverage far 
beyond what current law then or now provided.  See, e.g., Affordable Health Care Now 
Act of 1993, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong. (1994) (as introduced by Rep. Michel) (providing 
a Republican alternative to the Democratic health care plan); S. 2374, 103d Cong. 
(1994) (as introduced by Sen. Dole) (same).  An overwhelming majority of representa-
tives and senators cosponsored at least one sweeping reform bill.  See H.R. 3080 (show-
ing that the Michel bill had 142 sponsors); S. 2374 (showing that the Dole bill had 2 
sponsors); Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act, S. 1807, 103d Cong. 
(1994) (11 sponsors); Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong. 
(1994) (57 sponsors); Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993) (30 sponsors); 
Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, S. 1770, 103d Cong. (1993) (22 
sponsors); Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1994, S. 1743, 103d Cong. (1993) 
(25 sponsors); Managed Competition Act of 1993, S. 1579, 103d Cong. (1993) (4 spon-
sors); Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993) (104 sponsors); American 
Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong. (1993) (92 sponsors).  It was the 
Democratic leadership’s inability to formulate workable joinder principles, rather than 
defeat on the substance of any proposal, that prevented meaningful action on the floor 
of either chamber and resulted in an outcome—preservation of the status quo—more 
restrictive than almost any member professed to prefer.  See Jonathan Paul Yates, Over-
reaching Killed the Health Bill, BALT. SUN, Oct. 18, 1994, at 15A, available at 1994 WLNR 
860572 (“The emphasis on social engineering rather than health-care reform doomed 
the effort.”). 
21 See Margaret Kriz Hobson, The Senate’s Climate-Change Dealmakers, NAT’L J., Oct. 
31, 2009 (describing efforts to pass climate change legislation after the election of 
President Obama). 
22 See id. (describing the political difficulties as including Congress’s preoccupa-
tion with health care reform and contentious points of disagreement such as coal and 
nuclear power). 
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Three important classes of claims have competed for inclusion in 
the climate change debates and proposed legislation.  First, current 
carbon emitters have sought compensation for the increased costs 
that emissions reductions will impose on them.23  Second, advocates 
for low-income consumers have sought offsets for higher prices, to 
prevent their clients from being driven deeper into poverty.24  And 
third, people across the political spectrum have advocated using the 
proceeds of emissions-permit sales to reduce the soaring federal defi-
cit.25  Although a wealth of polling shows that the electorate has by far 
the strongest feelings about reducing the deficit,26 this is the one set of 
claims whose joinder with the climate change debate seems to have 
been most decisively rejected.  By contrast, compensating existing 
emitters (the set of claims with the greatest potential to undermine 
the core goal of carbon emission reductions and the one that, at least 
as applied to industrial emitters, likely has the least public support) 
has taken a dominant position in the debates and legislative process.  
Some of this is a familiar public choice tale of the effectiveness of 
small, concentrated interest groups, particularly those with enormous 
wealth.  Another part of the explanation, however, lies in unarticu-
lated conceptions of which kinds of claims are too tangential to merit 
inclusion in a particular debate.  Understanding how these concep-
tions regulate legislative joinder is crucial both to improving environ-
mental, antipoverty, and fiscal policy in the near- and long-term and 
to developing a theory of legislative joinder applicable across substan-
tive areas. 
Receiving huge allocations of carbon permits free of charge would 
provide an enormous windfall to energy companies, far exceeding any 
losses they might experience due to the reductions in permissible 
 
23 See Ronald Brownstein, Region or Nation?, NAT’L J., Apr. 18, 2009 (reporting the 
efforts of legislators from “coal states” seeking relief from cap-and-trade regulations). 
24 See CLIMATE EQUITY ALLIANCE, PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF LOW 
AND MODERATE INCOME WORKERS, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES WITHIN GLOBAL 
WARMING LEGISLATION (2009), available at http://www.greenforall.org/what-we-do/ 
working-with-washington/climate-equity/download (proposing principles designed to 
mitigate the financial impact of climate change legislation on low- and middle-income 
workers and families).  
25 See, e.g., Avery Palmer, Without Cap-and-Trade Revenue in Resolutions, Chairmen 
Have Leeway, CONG. Q. TODAY, Mar. 25, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 5975140 (report-
ing on the myriad proposals for spending revenue generated by cap-and-trade, includ-
ing deficit reduction). 
26 See John Harwood, Tossing and Turning over the Federal Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2009, at A11 (noting that fifty-two percent of Americans would like the government 
to reduce the federal deficit). 
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emissions.  Further, the debate concerning these allocations has large-
ly crowded out distributional and fiscal concerns.  Policies increasing 
the cost of energy will disproportionately affect low-income people, 
who pay a larger proportion of their budgets in energy costs than 
more affluent households.  Prominent proposals for regulating cli-
mate change include large subsidies for existing carbon emitters;27 the 
vast majority of these subsidies would accrue to the relatively affluent 
owners of these companies, further exacerbating the regressive impact. 
Climate change regulation will have major fiscal implications.  
Even after the current recession-induced surge in the deficit subsides, 
the continuation of current policies will condemn the United States to 
a long-term fiscal imbalance estimated at around three percent of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) annually.28  A gap of this size 
cannot be closed without considerable economic pain.29  Emissions 
reduction, through a carbon tax or an auction of carbon-emissions 
permits, is one way to close a large part of this gap while structuring 
that pain in a socially constructive manner.  Conversely, the economy 
may suffer serious harm if it must absorb both the disruption of car-
bon-emissions curbs that do not reduce the deficit and separate defi-
cit-control legislation.  Restraining environmental waste while com-
mitting fiscal waste would be a grim irony indeed.  And, as the 
political winds shift, the failure to join a major deficit-reduction initia-
tive to climate change legislation may prove politically, as well as ethi-
cally, disastrous. 
This Article fills these important gaps in the climate change de-
bate while taking a modest first step toward offering a more general 
theory of joinder in the legislative process.  It contends that the cli-
mate change debate needs to be expanded from its current exclusive 
focus on environmental and business concerns to consider distributive 
justice and fiscal policy.  In particular, it criticizes proposals to give 
away valuable emissions permits as the irresponsible product of indus-
try’s rent seeking.  Instead, it urges that any permitting regime should 
auction off emissions permits and devote the proceeds to aiding low-
 
27 John M. Broder, Senate Global Warming Bill Is Seeking to Cushion the Impact on In-
dustry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at A16. 
28 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 7 (2009) (calcu-
lating the federal fiscal gap using projections of annual revenue and spending). 
29 Michael Boskin, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to the first 
President Bush, noted that “[t]he impact of raising taxes for budget balance could be 
severe.”  Michael J. Boskin, Economic Perspectives on Federal Deficits and Debt, in FISCAL 
CHALLENGES:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 141, 152 (Eliza-
beth Garrett et al. eds., 2008).  
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income people, to funding basic research likely to lead to alternative 
energy sources and greater energy efficiency, and to reducing the 
structural federal deficit.  In the process, it develops principles for de-
lineating the bounds of other social policy debates over issues with po-
tentially complex, far-flung interactions. 
Part I provides an overview of the politics and economics of cli-
mate change policy.  It does not rehearse the scientific arguments for 
action; that has been done elsewhere with far more power and elo-
quence than this Article could hope to match.  It does, however, high-
light the distributional and fiscal components of the climate change 
problem that public discourse to date has largely ignored.  It then 
demonstrates that the heavy corporate subsidies in emerging climate 
change proposals are neither politically nor economically justified. 
Although some environmental groups have shown a laudable sen-
sitivity to distributional issues, many have argued that any broadening 
of the terms of the debate increases the risk of impasse and failure.  
Few environmentalists have shown much willingness to admit fiscal 
concerns to the debate.  Starting from the premise that the pending 
arrangement is not inevitable, Part II seeks to derive principles for de-
termining when additional constraints, such as the distributive and 
fiscal concerns offered here, should be admitted to a policy debate 
over the existing participants’ objections.  These principles must find 
a plausible middle ground between heedless, narrow-minded policy-
making that causes serious ancillary damage to other important social 
values, on the one hand, and miring important social initiatives in the 
complexities of extraneous issues, on the other.  Applying these prin-
ciples to the present debate, Part II finds strong reasons to include 
distributional and fiscal considerations in the climate change debate. 
Part III explores the extent to which climate change regulation can 
address this country’s long-term fiscal imbalances.  It also offers prin-
ciples to guide the design of a program that offsets the impact of higher 
energy costs on low-income people.  It then draws lessons from existing 
antipoverty programs to suggest specific terms for such a program. 
I.  CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN CONTEXT 
To date, most media coverage of the climate change debate has 
focused on science.  This choice reflects in part industry’s and the 
Bush Administration’s dogged denial of the broad scientific consensus 
on the issue.  The media’s choice to focus on science also reflects the 
availability of compelling images:  collapsing ice shelves, vanishing  
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islands, and anxious polar bears.  The complexities of formulating a 
policy to reduce carbon emissions may be less photogenic but are 
equally pivotal to achieving change.  This Part provides a broad over-
view of climate change regulation, focusing on those aspects produc-
ing its distributional and fiscal effects.  Section I.A describes the two 
main competing regulatory structures for reducing carbon emissions:  
taxation and cap-and-trade programs.  Section I.B examines how re-
stricting carbon emissions could exacerbate the growing income in-
equality in the United States.  It also assesses the large, structural fed-
eral budget deficit.  Section I.C then explores and rejects economic, 
political, and moral arguments for including—as most current pro-
posals do—large subsidies for current emitters in climate change legis-
lation. 
A.  Market-Based Emissions-Reduction Legislation 
In the past, when government wanted to control consumption of a 
scarce commodity, it often resorted to rationing.30  It commonly im-
posed price controls to prevent “profiteering” while limiting the quan-
tities individuals and businesses could purchase with ration cards.  
This put the government into the costly, inefficient, and thankless po-
sition of allocating consumption.  It also spawned illicit markets, with 
high prices, in which the commodity could be purchased in excess of 
a consumer’s assigned ration.31  This was inevitable because the con-
trolled prices kept demand for the commodity higher than the availa-
ble supply. 
Apart from a few small groups that regard excessive carbon emis-
sions as a moral wrong that should not be licensed, no one is propos-
ing to reduce carbon emissions through old-fashioned rationing.  In-
stead, all major plans discourage consumption through price 
increases.  A price increase could be arranged in either of two ways.  
First, the government could tax carbon emissions directly.  Second, 
the government could require permits for emissions and set a finite 
cap on the number it would issue.  Recipients of these permits could 
then sell them to others desiring to generate more emissions than 
their present stock of permits would allow.  In this “cap-and-trade” sys-
 
30 See RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 110-11 (10th ed. 1993) (providing the 
example of the United States rationing gasoline during a shortage in the 1970’s and 
during World Wars I and II). 
31 See id. (explaining how rationing, by creating the opportunity for a seller to buy 
a product at the government-dictated low price and selling at the market-dictated 
higher price, creates the opportunity for an underground market to emerge). 
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tem, the government would specify the total amount of emissions but 
the market would determine how those emissions would be distri-
buted, with the most economically productive users presumably out-
bidding and supplanting low-value emitters.  To date, cap-and-trade 
has held the upper hand in political debates. 
B.  Distributional and Fiscal Consequences of Emissions Controls 
With the possible exception of sweeping health care reform, cli-
mate change control is likely to be the most economically important 
legislation in at least a generation.  It will leave no sector of the econ-
omy untouched.  This has already produced a flurry of rent-seeking 
and special-interest pleading.  Furthermore, carbon-emissions regula-
tion will profoundly affect three aspects of macroeconomic perfor-
mance:  growth, the distribution of income and wealth, and fiscal bal-
ance.  Only the first of these has received prominent attention to date.  
Subsection 1 identifies the particular vulnerability of low-income 
people and people of color to increases in carbon costs.  Subsection 2 
describes the severe long-term imbalance in the federal budget. 
1.  The Impact of Emissions Restrictions on Low-Income  
People and People of Color 
The gap between rich and poor in the United States is growing 
rapidly.  This can be seen from changes at both ends of the income 
scale.  The income of the top one percent of households rose 61.8% 
during the last economic expansion, from 2002 to 2007; during the 
same five years, the income of the bottom ninety percent of house-
holds rose just 3.9%.32  That left the top one percent with the highest 
share of national income since 1928:  over one in five dollars of in-
come went to these households in 2007.33  More than three-quarters of 
all income gains during the last expansion went to the top ten percent 
of households.34  Income inequality has been growing for the past 
three decades, in sharp contrast to the thirty years after World War II, 
when income gains were widely shared and inequality dropped.35  In 
 
32 AVI FELLER & CHAD STONE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TOP 1 
PERCENT OF AMERICANS REAPED TWO-THIRDS OF INCOME GAINS IN LAST ECONOMIC 
EXPANSION 2 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-9-09pov.pdf.  
These figures have been adjusted for inflation. 
33 Id. at 2. 
34 Id. at 1 fig.1. 
35 Id. at 3. 
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2008, in the early stages of the recession, the poverty rate jumped to 
13.2%,36 with almost fifty-four million people living below or near the 
poverty line.37  Much larger increases are likely for 2009 and 2010. 
Disproportionate energy costs are already taking a heavy toll on 
low-income families.  Families forced to prioritize heating bills are cut-
ting back on food and other necessities.38  When energy prices rose 
42.1% from 2000 to 2005, families with annual incomes between 
$15,000 and $30,000 reduced their food spending by 10%.39  High 
energy costs have wide-ranging impacts on the well-being of low-
income families:  children in homes where energy costs consume a 
high share of income are more likely to be in poor health, have a his-
tory of hospitalization, be at risk for developmental problems, and 
have insufficient food.40 
Most proposals to reduce carbon emissions have regressive-
income and cost implications.  A carbon tax, or an equivalent carbon-
permitting system, would raise the costs of some forms of economic 
activity, such as basic manufacturing, that disproportionately provide 
relatively unskilled jobs for which low-income people can compete.  
Higher carbon costs would have much more moderate effects on 
high-skilled workers and, indeed, would lead to job growth in many 
engineering and related fields. 
In addition, research finds that African-Americans are especially 
vulnerable to increases in the costs of carbon emissions.  Although 
African Americans as a group generate about one-fifth less carbon 
emissions than whites per capita,41 on average they spend a higher 
proportion of their incomes on energy than the rest of the popula-
tion.42  Part of the reason is that energy costs consume a larger share 
 
36 See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2008, at 14 tbl.4 (2009), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf (showing an increase 
from 12.5% in 2007).   
37 Id. at 17 tbl.5. 
38 See CHILDREN’S SENTINEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (C-SNAP), FUEL 
FOR OUR FUTURE:  IMPACTS OF ENERGY INSECURITY ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH, 
NUTRITION, AND LEARNING 3 (2007), available at http://www.childrenshealthwatch.org 
/upload/resource/fuel_for_our_future_9_18_07.pdf (describing the situation facing 
low-income families as “heat or eat”).  
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. at 4. 
41 CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND., INC., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:  
AN UNEQUAL BURDEN 68 (2004), available at http://www.rprogress.org/publications 
/2004/CBCF_REPORT_F.pdf.  
42 Id. at 79 fig.2.16. 
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of the income of impoverished households, and African Americans 
are much more likely to have low incomes.43  Even controlling for in-
come, however, African Americans spend a higher share of their in-
comes on energy.44  This may reflect the wealth inequality of African 
Americans, which is even greater than their income inequality:45  Afri-
can Americans are far more likely than whites to rent, and landlords 
are far less likely than homeowners to invest in weatherization and 
energy-saving appliances.46 
2.  The Long-Term Fiscal Imbalance 
Although the news media has made much of the short-term defi-
cits resulting from efforts to reverse the recent recession, the longer-
term budget outlook is far worse.  This is partially due to the fiscal im-
pact of the baby boomers’ retirement, with Social Security costs rising 
from the current level of 4.8% of GDP to more than 6% by 2030.47  Far 
more serious is the impact of health care inflation on Medicare and 
Medicaid spending.48 
Deficits of this size are unsustainable.  At some point, investors be-
come unwilling to buy any more public debt, which may force the 
government to finance its operations by printing money and igniting 
inflation.49  Even before that point is reached, government deficits 
crowd out private investment by consuming the available capital 
 
43 Id. at 36. 
44 See id. at 71-74 (attributing African Americans’ higher energy expenditures par-
tially to factors such as living in buildings made of poorer stock and owning appliances 
that are less energy efficient). 
45 See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE 
WEALTH 91-125 (1995) (examining the wealth disparity between African Americans 
and whites by comparing assets such as savings and investments).  
46 See CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND., INC., supra note 41, at 74.  
47 BD. OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED. DISABILITY 
INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE 
TRUST FUNDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-41, at 12 (2009), available at http:// 
www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TR/2009/tr09.pdf. 
48 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. 3085, THE LONG-TERM 
OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING, 5-16 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdf (analyzing the impact of rising health 
care costs on government health care spending). 
49 See Boskin, supra note 29, at 153 (noting historical examples of hyperflation in 
countries with highly indebted governments). 
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supply, and they slow the economy by raising interest rates.50  To put 
this into perspective, in 2008, before the depth of the recent recession 
was clear, the Center of Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that ba-
lancing the budget in 2016 while continuing the 2001 and 2003 tax 
cuts would require cutting Social Security by 41%, cutting Medicare by 
53%, cutting defense by 61%, or cutting every other program in the 
federal budget—from aid to education to school lunches to national 
parks to overseas embassies—by 29%.51 
Any measures to narrow the deficit would increase drag on the 
economy.  In addition, taxes inevitably have behavioral effects, raising 
the costs of some activities relative to others.52  Most taxes negatively 
affect socially desirable behavior, such as work and savings.  A carbon 
tax, or an auction of emitting permits, offers a rare revenue-raising 
opportunity whose behavioral effects are desirable.  Thus, such a tax 
or auction system would mitigate the deflationary effects of deficit re-
duction more efficiently than other available means.  These effects are 
not wholly benign:  as noted above, they would dampen economic ac-
tivity and cost jobs in many industries.  Raising the cost of carbon 
emissions nonetheless is far superior to other plausible means of re-
ducing the deficit. 
By contrast, if the federal government spends or rebates the 
proceeds of a carbon tax or permit auction, it will have to layer on an 
additional round of tax increases or spending cuts to cope with the 
deficit.  The Republican Party’s defining opposition to taxes and the 
Democratic Party’s skittishness on the subject make a second round of 
tax increases unlikely.  In addition, if the proceeds of carbon-emissions 
regulation are to be spent at the same time that other programs are be-
ing cut to reduce the deficit, the net effect will be to shift spending 
from existing programs to those the climate change legislation favors. 
This country’s massive structural deficits have important distribu-
tional implications.  In the simplest terms, deficits transfer wealth 
from the nation as a whole to bondholders, a disproportionately afflu-
ent group.  More broadly, programs that serve groups lacking political 
 
50 See id. at 158-62 (illustrating the crowding effects of government borrowing on 
private investment and noting the potential for increased government debt to drive up 
interest rates). 
51 See Bob Greenstein, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Slide Presentation:  Back-
ground on the Federal Budget and the Return of Budget Deficits 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.gistfunders.org/documents/greenstein.ppt. 
52 See Boskin, supra note 29, at 161 (discussing the effect of behavior-distorting 
taxes on current and future deadweight losses). 
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power, such as low-income children, are disproportionately affected 
by budget-cut legislation;53 budgetary procedures ensuring that this is 
the case have won bipartisan support.54  One of the major political 
parties is doggedly defending almost all tax preferences for the afflu-
ent; its opponent supports many of those same tax preferences and is 
also ambivalent and selective in its defense of spending programs that 
benefit low-income people.  The one large new tax sometimes dis-
cussed in the context of deficit reduction—a consumption or value-
added tax—would be sharply regressive.55  This dynamic ensures that, 
if this issue is left alone, low-income people are likely to be asked to 
pay a disproportionate share of the costs of deficit reduction. 
Large deficits also transfer wealth between generations.  The stan-
dard political rhetoric about “burdening our children with debt” is 
too simplistic:56  of course we also bequeath them all of the positive 
developments of the current generation.  Accumulating debt so that 
we can cure disease or make other productive social investments is en-
tirely consistent with a conscientious regard for future generations; 
most obviously, future generations depend upon us for their educa-
tion, which is costly.57 
Passing on huge debt incurred to finance contemporary con-
sumption is another matter.  Our forebears produced much of our 
current wealth, likely intending it to benefit all of their successors ra-
ther than just our current generation.  Leaving future generations an 
economy incapable of rewarding their efforts to the same degree that 
the economy did ours breaches a fiduciary duty we owe to our des-
 
53 See ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, HOUSE CHILD 
CREDIT LEGISLATION NOT FISCALLY RESPONSIBLE:  BILL MORE LIKELY TO HARM 
CHILDREN THAN TO ASSIST THEM 3 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/6-11-
03tax.pdf (“With low-income children being one of the nation’s weakest political con-
stituencies, programs to assist them will likely suffer from the deep budget cuts . . . .”). 
54 See ROBERT GREENSTEIN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, PUTTING THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE:  SENATE BUDGET BILL INDICATES 
INTENTION TO PAY FOR TAX CUTS BY SWEEPING CUTS IN PROGRAMS FOR MIDDLE- AND 
LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 4-6 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-2-
06tax.pdf (noting that budgetary and tax cuts on domestic programs, which would dis-
proportionately affect low- and middle-income families, had won support in the House 
and Senate). 
55 See Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the 
Twenties:  The 1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373, 
386 (2006). 
56 See Boskin, supra note 29, at 162 (pointing out that “the economic effects of def-
icits are not automatically to help current citizens at the expense of future taxpayers”).  
57 See id. at 164 (observing that public debt can finance education, an “important 
aspect[] of generational equity”). 
SUPER FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  9:53 PM 
1112 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1093 
cendents on behalf of our ancestors.  Many environmentalists rely on 
similar arguments of intergenerational equity to criticize the wasteful 
exploitation of natural resources.58 
C.  The Weak Case for Large Corporate Subsidies 
The stampede to include large corporate subsidies in any climate-
control legislation is unwise and unnecessary.  This Section shows why.  
Subsection 1 rebuts the perceived political inevitability of including 
large corporate subsidies in climate change legislation.  Subsection 2 
demonstrates that compensating business owners for their losses due to 
carbon-emissions regulation is neither possible nor desirable and that 
any attempt to do so could seriously distort laudable economic signals. 
1.  The Politics of Corporate Subsidies 
Including large corporate subsidies in climate change legislation 
is politically unnecessary.  Although opponents of regulating green-
house gases will seek to retain leverage over the final policy by refus-
ing to formally concede, they have decisively lost the public debate— 
and they know it.  They do not need to be bought off:  both major-
party nominees in the 2008 election espoused strong carbon-emissions 
controls.59  In this regard, a crucial distinction exists between issues 
that can only be addressed during fleeting periods of public sa-
lience—such as poverty, which quickly dropped from the public con-
sciousness after Hurricane Katrina60—and those with an entrenched 
place in the public agenda.  Because the effects of global warming are 
so numerous and widespread and because they implicate numerous 
widely shared middle-class values, the issue faces little risk of receding 
from the political agenda.  The political explosion ignited by rising 
gasoline prices not only counsels a measured phase-in of the new reg-
 
58 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 
59-96 (2006) (arguing for intergenerational equality of natural resources); Michael 
Wallack, The Minimum Irreversible Harm Principle:  Green Inter-Generational Liberalism (“A 
key element in the problem of justice between generations is the discontinuity between 
the benefits received by present generations from some technologies and the costs of 
the unintended consequences . . . for future generations.”), in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
AND ENVIRONMENTALISM 167, 167-68 (Marcel Wissenburg & Yoram Levy eds., 2004). 
59 See James Kanter, The Trouble with Markets for Carbon, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, 
at C1. 
60 See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:  Democratic Experimentalism and the 
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544-45 (2008) (describing the Katrina 
disaster as a moment of “heightened passion” that did not lead to lasting changes 
in policy). 
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ulatory regime but also is likely to transform attitudes toward conser-
vation:  within a few years, the number of voters with Hummers and 
SUVs will shrink to political insignificance.61 
Procedurally, proponents of climate change regulation have little 
need to fear obstructionism from a minority loyal to rent-seeking 
business interests.  Budget-process rules allow a simple majority to 
pass–-and limit committees’ ability to obstruct—legislation that would 
raise substantial revenues, as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime 
would.  Proponents therefore need not offer the business subsidies to 
purchase the Senate supermajority that progressive initiatives com-
monly require.62 
The failure of climate change legislation on the Senate floor in 
2008 does not change this calculus.  With the House leadership show-
ing no interest in considering the bill should it pass, and President 
Bush poised to veto it, senators had no reason to expend political cap-
ital on a merely symbolic vote. 
In fact, excluding large corporate subsidies could actually improve 
the prospects for meaningful legislation that aims to control climate 
change.  A fiscally prudent proposal that is sensitive to distributional 
effects could broadly expand the coalition of support.  Since the end 
 
61 See Ken Bensinger, The Sedan Is Again King of the Car Lot, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 
2008, at 1 (noting that consumer preferences are shifting toward smaller automobiles 
as a result of high gas prices). 
62 Once it has cost estimates for climate change legislation from the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation, a simple majority sup-
porting that legislation can craft a congressional budget resolution that compels the 
committees with jurisdiction over the legislation to produce those increased revenues 
with minimum revenue levels and a reconciliation instruction.  2 U.S.C. §§ 632(a)(2), 
(b)(2), 641(a)(2) (2006).  The budget resolution is immune to Senate filibusters and 
requires only a simple majority to pass.  Id. § 636(b)(1).  Once such a budget resolu-
tion is adopted, any amendments that would lower the legislation’s revenue yield be-
low the specified levels by diverting funds to subsidize emitters would be subject to a 
point of order that only sixty senators’ votes could overrule.  Id. §§ 641(d)(2), 
642(a)(2)(B), 644(b)(1)(B).  Moreover, the reconciliation instructions would compel 
the committees of jurisdiction to report out legislation achieving the specified reve-
nues or subject themselves to a privileged amendment by the chair of the Budget 
Committee to modify their bill to correct any shortfall.  Id. § 641(b)(2).  The resulting 
“reconciliation” bill is itself immune from filibusters, requiring only a bare majority of 
the Senate.  Id. § 641(e)(2). 
 This discussion focuses on the Senate because only its rules permit filibusters that 
require a supermajority to extinguish.  The House leadership can limit debate by spe-
cial rule, passing both the rule and the underlying legislation by a simple majority.  
Except in the case of the budget resolution and budget-reconciliation legislation dis-
cussed in the text, however, Senate rules almost always allow senators to postpone votes 
indefinitely with extended debate, which requires sixty votes to terminate. 
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of the New Deal era, the progressive agenda in this country has be-
come increasingly fragmented, divided between those with domestic 
orientations and those looking internationally, between those with 
substantive agendas and those with proceduralist commitments, and 
across a plethora of issue areas.  Environmentalism has secured a justi-
fiably privileged place on that agenda, but diversifying its support to 
include the antipoverty movement and “good government” advocates 
of fiscal rectitude could significantly reduce competition for progres-
sive political capital and financial support.  A key to strengthening po-
litical environmentalism is establishing its relevance to low-income 
people hard-pressed by problems that seem more immediate.63  Con-
versely, environmentalism needs to avoid the perception that it is a so-
cially or racially insensitive agenda of the affluent.64 
2.  The Economics of Corporate Subsidies 
The economic case that industries make for building large corpo-
rate subsidies into a regime of climate change regulation is startlingly 
weak.  Thus, it is a worthy companion to the junk science that the 
same industries have funded to dispute the relationship between 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 
First, increasing prices for carbon-based energy consumption 
through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade permitting regime will only 
modestly impact emitters’ profitability.  These regimes reduce de-
mand for this form of energy and thus the sales of the companies 
producing it.  The extent of the profits foregone on these sales, how-
ever, is a complicated question.  Many producers may have marginal 
costs that rise at such a rate that the last several units sold provide al-
most no profits.  For example, the new regime may cause companies 
to abandon marginally profitable efforts to extract oil and gas from 
the sea bed.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that 
fully compensating existing emitters for losses under a carbon-
emissions-control regime would require less than fifteen percent of 
 
63 See John Barry, From Environmental Politics to the Politics of the Environment:  The 
Pacification and Normalization of Environmentalism?  (suggesting that one way to advance 
environmentalist issues is to “fit or attach . . . ecological aims” to existing social devel-
opment concerns), in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 58, at 
179, 183-84.  
64 See Andrew Light, The Urban Blind Spot in Environmental Ethics (noting that the 
environmentalist movement has historically been associated with “nativism, if not rac-
ism,” and an anti-urban bias), in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7, 20-21, 
27 (Mathew Humphrey ed., 2001).  
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the proceeds of a carbon tax or of the emissions permits issued under 
a cap-and-trade system, a small fraction of what they would receive 
under most current proposals.65 
Even this estimate, however, is likely overstated.  Many companies 
producing energy from fossil fuels also have holdings in non-carbon-
based energy sources or in technologies to increase energy efficien-
cy.66  These holdings will appreciate significantly in the new regime, 
offsetting any losses from the companies’ carbon-based businesses.  
Even those companies not currently active may be well positioned—
for example, with distribution and marketing networks—to seize 
commanding positions in those markets.  Depending on a particular 
company’s portfolio, the new regulatory regime may bring it net gains, 
net losses, or little change at all in value.  Subsidizing all existing emit-
ters with free permits or tax cuts would thus provide windfalls to some 
companies that would already be profiting from the change.  Yet any 
effort to limit subsidies to those companies actually losing money 
would punish other firms for making prudent, and socially beneficial, 
investments. 
Moreover, compensating those actually losing money because of 
climate change policy is impossible.  As scientific evidence, public 
concern, and political will around global warming strengthened, the 
chances of regulation increased and the markets reduced the value of 
emitters’ stocks accordingly.  Those that sold stock since this process 
began already absorbed some of the emitting companies’ expected 
losses before the regulatory regime was even in place.  Identifying the 
companies and calculating their losses would be infeasible and point-
less:  the risk of government regulation, like the risks of changing con-
sumer tastes, increased competition, and environmental catastrophe, 
is just one more factor affecting profitability that the markets handle 
quite efficiently.  Indeed, markets can handle regulatory risk with par-
 
65 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2 
EMISSIONS 5 (2007). 
66 Chevron’s slogan as of the printing of this Article, for example, is “The Power of 
Human Energy:  Finding Newer, Cleaner Ways to Power the World.”  Chevron Corp. 
Home, http://www.chevron.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  Chevron’s website re-
ports that “[a]t Chevron, we are working to . . . expand our energy supply portfolio” 
and boasts of extensive research into a wide range of alternative energy sources and 
carbon-capture technologies.  Chevron, Climate Change, http://www.chevron.com/ 
globalissues/climatechange (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  Similarly, BP reports that “[i]n 
response to increasing demand for energy with a lower-carbon footprint, we have made a 
major commitment to develop low-carbon sources of energy.”  BP, SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2006, at 33 (2007), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet 
/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/B/bp_sustainability_report_2006.pdf.  
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ticular efficiency because regulatory regimes take shape relatively 
gradually and transparently, allowing investors plenty of opportunity 
to respond.67  Risk-averse investors protect themselves by diversifying 
their portfolios; risk-loving investors stand to make windfalls if events 
turn out to favor their investments, and they therefore have no special 
claim to sympathy when the winds blow the other way. 
Conversely, those holding shares in a given emitter at the time the 
regulations take effect will include many that bought in at discounted 
prices after the prospect of regulation became clear.  They have no 
plausible claim to compensation when the expected regulatory regime 
does in fact come about:  the prospect of that regime allowed them to 
buy into the company cheaply.  Providing free permits to historical 
emitters would give these investors unmerited windfalls.  As suggested 
above, some of the companies that stand to lose the most are those 
that have failed over the years to diversify into cleaner energy sources.  
All current stockholders in such companies either owned stock when 
those decisions were made—and may have benefited in the form of 
larger dividends—or bought in later, after the companies’ policies 
were established (and presumably reflected in market prices).  Nei-
ther group has any claim to be rescued from the effects of its invest-
ment decisions. 
More generally, distributing valuable commodities to businesses 
free of charge puts the government in the position of picking winners 
in the market.  That is rarely a prescription for an efficient result.  
When a national government allocates corporate subsidies arbitrarily 
among its businesses, it distorts competition both domestically and in-
ternationally:68  even if our trading partners also give away permits, 
they will be doing so with different stringency or through different sys-
tems altogether.  Legislation inevitably will distribute permits based on 
what companies’ emissions were (because that amount will be known), 
not on what they would have been in the affected years absent regula-
 
67 By contrast, most people have difficulty comprehending low probabilities of 
great harm, such as the risk of sudden natural disasters.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, 
CATASTROPHE 9 (2004) (“The human mind does not handle even simple statistical 
propositions well, and has particular difficulty grasping things with which human be-
ings have no firsthand experience.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:  Emotions, 
Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 62-63 (2002) (describing the human tendency to 
focus on possible adverse outcomes regardless of the low probabilities of those out-
comes actually occurring). 
68 See Dietrich Brockhagen, Inhomogeneous Allocation and Distortions of Competition in 
the Case of Emissions Trading in the EU (arguing that “differences in allocation may lead 
to distortions in competition” among EU countries), in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 309, 
309-15 (Michael Bothe & Eckhard Rehbinder eds., 2005). 
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tion.  Some emissions permits will prop up inefficient companies that 
were failing in the market.  Conversely, some fast-rising, highly inno-
vative companies will be placed at a competitive disadvantage by an 
allocation of permits that fails to reflect their trajectories.  To be sure, 
they can purchase additional permits to sustain their growth, but re-
quiring them to pay for what their less-efficient competitors get for 
free will distort the results of market competition.69 
Perhaps most importantly, establishing the political precedent 
that polluters must be held harmless in any new regulatory regime will 
do long-term harm to environmental quality.  The economics of cli-
mate change regulation make that feasible; in other important envi-
ronmental contexts, it may not be.  At a time when the Court’s ex-
panding definition of regulatory takings of real property is frustrating 
environmental land-use controls,70 it is difficult to understand why en-
vironmentalists would want to establish a de facto principle of com-
pensation for profits lost because of emissions limits.  Even in the 
land-use context, amortization—allowing a prior usage a number of 
years to phase out—is accepted as obviating the need for just compen-
sation, despite the financial losses that remain.71  All serious proposals 
would phase in restrictions on carbon emissions, providing the same 
sort of relief to current emitters that takings law offers to those losing 
important interests in land.72  Similarly, international climate control 
regimes would have little prospect of effectiveness if they had to com-
pensate currently high-emitting countries for potential limitations on 
their lifestyles.73 
 
69 See id. at 315-21 (discussing the potential distortion effects of allocating emis-
sions permits based on historic emissions). 
70 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394 (1994) (requiring a reasona-
ble relationship between land-use regulations and a legitimate state interest); Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 (1992) (finding a regulation that deprives 
a parcel of land of all value to be a taking); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 831 (1987) (finding an uncompensated, permanent public easement to be a tak-
ing).  
71 See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Ark. 1977) (accepting 
an amortization provision as an acceptable method of eliminating nonconforming use 
when a city is acting pursuant to its police power).  
72 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARKET-BASED GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL:  
SELECTED PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH CONGRESS (2009), available at http://opencrs.com 
/document/R40556/2009-05-27/download/1013 (providing a summary of major 
congressional proposals controlling greenhouse gas emissions). 
73 See Raúl A. Estrada-Oyuela, Equity and Climate Change (“Equity is the fundamen-
tal condition to ensure compliance of any international agreement.”), in ETHICS, 
EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 36, 37-38 (Luiz Pin-
guelli-Rosa & Mohan Munasinghe eds., 2002). 
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In fact, the contrary principle—that environmentally damaging 
lines of business risk regulatory interventions—is far more desirable.  
The limits of the political process ensure that many significant envi-
ronmental hazards will go unregulated, under-regulated, or belatedly 
regulated.  Industry and investors, however, cannot reliably predict 
which will be regulated and, if regulated, how.  If regulation would 
bring uncompensated costs, this uncertainty would reduce the ex-
pected profitability of environmentally damaging activities.  A compa-
ny deciding between two possible fields for expansion—one of which 
engenders environmental harms, one of which does not—would be 
more likely to pursue the “greener” line of business because it would 
face less risk that its investment would prematurely cease producing 
returns.  Similarly, the market would reduce the value of the securities 
of firms engaged in environmentally problematic activities.  The effect 
is similar to that which causes companies to hesitate to put money into 
countries with recent histories of violent insurrections for fear of los-
ing their investments. 
Deterring environmentally unsound investments is highly effi-
cient, both economically and politically.  It weeds out environmental 
harms with the fewest offsetting benefits.  This incremental degrada-
tion of value to reflect regulatory risk is not contingent on the arbi-
trary line-drawing in any specific regulatory regime, thus escaping 
both a common source of economic inefficiency in regulations and 
the dangers of industry capture of a particular regulatory agency.  Fur-
thermore, by clearing away the harms with the least compelling eco-
nomic rationales, this deterrence frees the environmental movement 
to focus its political capital on restricting hazards associated with more 
economically productive activity.  Holding current emitters harmless 
for economic losses under any climate change policy dissipates this 
desirable regulatory uncertainty:  companies and investors can con-
tinue to pursue environmentally hazardous practices with the expecta-
tion that they either will be allowed to continue those activities or will 
be compensated—perhaps even overcompensated—for any required 
cessation. 
The adverse consequences of carbon emissions have long been 
well-known.  If one were to approach this problem as one of corrective 
justice, surely the argument that past emitters should bear the costs of 
the environmental harm they caused is far more compelling than any 
argument that they should be compensated for being restrained from 
doing still more harm in the future. 
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II.  DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE 
Discrediting the currently popular arguments for corporate subsi-
dies does not guarantee that distributional and fiscal considerations 
will help shape climate change policy.  Any legislation likely to win 
enactment inevitably will neglect many important issues with clear 
connections to climate change.  No policy initiative can respond to all 
legitimate and important social problems.  Bills that seek to address 
numerous, marginally related concerns are derided as “Christmas 
trees”; they often aggregate the complexities, side disputes, and ene-
mies of their various pieces and collapse.  On the other hand, we in-
creasingly hear about the supposed “law of unintended conse-
quences,” typically when someone devises an initiative focusing 
myopically on only a subset of its implications. 
For example, vast sums are needed to repair the nation’s bridges, 
tunnels, rail beds, schools, and other physical infrastructure.  Climate 
change likely is exacerbating this problem, subjecting structures to 
stresses that their designers did not anticipate.  Yet devoting the 
proceeds of a carbon tax or permit sales to infrastructure repair will 
rule out significant deficit reduction and could crowd out low-income 
offsets.  Advocates need some principle by which to convince sincere 
policymakers sympathetic to claims for infrastructure spending to 
nonetheless privilege protecting low-income people and the public 
fisc in climate change legislation.  In other words, this Article’s pro-
posals must not only establish their cardinal merit as worthy public 
policies but must also show their ordinal superiority to other worthy 
policies in a competition for scarce space on the climate change 
agenda.  Resolving this kind of ordinal question requires tools beyond 
those commonly employed in analysis of public law problems.74 
This problem will not solve itself.  Some environmentalists have 
embraced addressing fiscal rectitude—and in particular, distributive 
justice—in climate change legislation.  Others, however, may have lit-
tle interest in privileging these social concerns because they adhere to 
 
74 Of course, private law is no stranger to ordinal questions.  Commercial law and 
bankruptcy routinely weight the relative priorities of parties, all of whom have valid 
claims.  See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2005) (providing a hierarchy of priority for persons with 
claims against a given piece of collateral).  In a prototypical case of ordinal competi-
tion in public law—crafting funding priorities—courts apply one of the most deferen-
tial versions of minimum rationality analysis.  See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) 
(finding that Congress’s need to prioritize claims on public funds requires great judi-
cial deference).  Commentators are not so meek, yet even they typically limit their ar-
guments to extolling their proposal’s virtues or denigrating its competitors; public law 
discourse only rarely seeks to assess the relative strengths of meritorious claims. 
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a nonanthropocentric ethic,75 whatever the political cost.76  Pragmatic 
environmentalists have learned from hard experience the importance 
of compromising with industry,77 and they are loath to walk away from 
such a strategy.  Still others see climate change legislation as a once-in-
a-lifetime source of dedicated support for a host of projects that would 
struggle for funding in the appropriations process.  Absent a clear, 
principled basis for privileging the protection of low-income people 
and deficit reduction over these important claims indigenous to the 
environmental-advocacy community, low-income people and the pub-
lic fisc are unlikely to receive meaningful attention. 
This Part seeks a principled basis for determining whether climate 
change legislation’s sponsors and other supporters should privilege 
admission of distributional and fiscal considerations into the debate.  
This inquiry into political joinder will attempt to discern defensible 
norms without becoming disconnected from actors’ practice in the ac-
tual world.78  This avoids the difficulties inherent in making the case 
for a particular arrangement without explaining how entrenched in-
terests can be compelled to submit to the redistribution necessary to 
achieve it.79  Section II.A seeks to understand the process by which the 
political system decides which arguably related issues to admit to a po-
litical debate, such as the debate concerning climate change, and de-
rives normative rules to guide those decisions.  Next, Section II.B ap-
plies those criteria to show that concerns about distributive justice 
have a powerful claim for inclusion in climate change policy debates 
in particular.  Finally, Section II.C applies these principles again to 
demonstrate that fiscal probity also ought to play a major role in de-
signing climate change regulation. 
 
75 See Light, supra note 64, at 8-12 (“[E]nvironmental philosophy has been domi-
nated by a concern with more abstract questions of value theory, primarily focused on 
the issue of whether nature has ‘intrinsic value,’ or some other form of non-
instrumental value.”).  
76 See Avner de-Shalit, Ten Commandments of How to Fail in an Environmental Cam-
paign (arguing that environmentalists should reject “the radical language of biocen-
trism” in communicating their positions to a general audience), in POLITICAL THEORY 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 64, at 111, 118-19. 
77 See id. at 112-17 (noting that the radical, uncompromising tactics used by many 
environmental activists have failed to produce positive results). 
78 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 7-11 (1977) (arguing that po-
litical philosophy must be both normatively and intellectually coherent as well as sensi-
tive to the practical realities of governance). 
79 See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 202-10 (1977) (criticizing 
Rawls’s theory for paying “so little attention to the institutional arrangements by means 
of which [his] redistribution is to be carried out”). 
SUPER FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  9:53 PM 
2010] Carbon-Emissions Control and Legislative Joinder 1121 
A.  Policy Issue Joinder in a Complex World 
In recent years, students of the political process have paid increas-
ing attention to questions of framing.  Proposals framed in one man-
ner may draw broad acclaim even though, presented slightly different-
ly, they might be ignored or actively scorned.  Kenneth Arrow has 
demonstrated that association with other proposals is one of the most 
important forms of framing, showing that the inclusion of a third op-
tion can shift the results of a debate between two alternatives.80  Pro-
ponents of the original legislation may legitimately fear that inclusion 
of any new proposals in the debate may change its fate even if prefe-
rences concerning the original proposal do not change.81 
This Section analyzes the conflict over which issues may be joined 
with which others, either formally in a legislative body or informally as 
part of a public debate.  It seeks to derive broadly acceptable prin-
ciples both from analysis of the politics of issue joinder and from ana-
logous bodies of law.  Subsection 1 begins with an examination of 
groups’ motives for seeking to join two public policy proposals into a 
single initiative.  Subsection 2 explores the forms that conflict between 
groups over the joinder of policy proposals can take.  Subsection 3 
surveys legislative bodies’ rules on issue joinder, finding most concep-
tually underdeveloped and normatively unappealing.  Subsection 4 
seeks to draw analogies to joinder rules in litigation, particularly to 
those in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Subsection 5 looks at 
the reasons that initiatives’ sponsors commonly decline to broaden 
policy debates into directions they favor substantively.  Finally, subsec-
tion 6 proposes a set of principles for issue joinder in public policy 
debates adapted from those in civil litigation to address the different 
motives for and consequences of joinder in the policy arena. 
1.  Motives for Seeking to Join Policy Issues 
Sometimes political actors’ reasons for seeking to merge a second 
issue with one already under consideration have nothing to do with 
 
80 See ARROW, supra note 7, at 2-3 (illustrating the “paradox of voting”).  For ex-
ample, three children seeking a new pet should always be able to reach a majority pre-
ference between a dog and a cat.  On the other hand, if their parents offer them a 
third option—a bird—the children may become incapable of reaching a stable prefe-
rence.  Two may prefer a bird to a cat, a different two may prefer a cat to a dog, and 
still another two may prefer a dog to a bird.   
81 See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 188-93 (1982) (explaining 
how the introduction of an alternative can open up an entirely new set of political pos-
sibilities). 
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the merits of the proposed amendment.  An initiative’s sponsor may 
insert an unrelated provision to expand the initiative’s popularity.  
This is the essence of logrolling.  Conversely, legislation’s opponents 
may seek to add a “poison pill” that will destroy its political viability.82  
Both of these strategies depend on reaching a point at which the fo-
rum’s rules will force an up-or-down decision and the entire package 
either advances or fails; without such decisional rules, neither would 
accomplish much.  As a result, where either of these motives is at 
work, joinder of policy issues looks fundamentally different from 
joinder in civil or criminal litigation, for which the rules generally al-
low for split judgments.  To the extent that the theoretical literature 
has considered issue joinder in the policy world at all, it has largely 
been with regard to these two motives.  Legislative bodies’ joinder 
rules largely address the degree to which members may logroll or in-
sert poison pills. 
Two other motives, however, may animate joinder efforts.  One re-
lates only to the merits of the proposed amendment; the other con-
cerns the interrelationship between the subject of the proposed 
amendment and the underlying initiative.  These raise much more 
complex issues.  Both of these additional motives are important to de-
termining the scope of climate change legislation. 
a.  The Struggle for Salience 
A large number of issues arise in our complex social and econom-
ic environment, but only a tiny fraction have the characteristics to 
achieve political salience.83  The competition among nascent issues is 
akin to Darwinian competition for scarce resources.84  Issues typically 
have extremely short life spans within which to affect social change or 
face extinction.85  Issues fail when they lose public attention, either 
immediately or after achieving modest gains.86  Only the rarest of issues 
is able to reorder the political system to give itself long-term salience.87 
 
82 See HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER art. XII, § 56 (Rachel Vixman 
ed., 1967) [hereinafter ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER] (“Sometimes the enemies of a 
measure seek to amend it in such a way as to divide its friends, and thus defeat it.”). 
83 Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, On the Evolution of Political Issues, in 
AGENDA FORMATION 151, 151-52 (William H. Riker ed., 1993). 
84 See id. (comparing the evolution of political issues, which compete for limited 
attention in the political arena, to biological evolution). 
85 Id.  
86 See id. at 157 (noting that such issues are typically linked to particular events and 
observing that these issues lose their salience as the events “fade in public memory”). 
87 Id. at 157-58. 
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Proponents of issues that have been unable to garner prominence 
on their own may become desperate.  Attaching their initiative to 
another that has achieved salience may seem vital to avoid political ob-
livion.  Riding along with an already-viable proposal may require less 
political capital, both because the amendment can enter the policy-
making process in midstream88 and because the underlying proposal’s 
champions are likely to continue working to move it forward. 
On the other hand, sponsors of the initiative subject to amendment 
have strong reasons to resist amendments that lack logrolling potential.  
Issues fail to move public policy when they become associated with, and 
mired in, longstanding conflicts that have no clear winner.89 
b.  Responding to Externalities 
Inevitably, a great deal of policymaking is one-dimensional.  The 
health department inspects restaurants with single-minded determina-
tion to prevent food-borne illnesses; the inspector does nothing to en-
sure that the restaurant is paying its taxes.  In our increasingly com-
plex and interconnected world, however, more and more policies 
have multiple effects.  The value of these policies is the sum of their 
many effects, which may include both positive and negative ones.  A 
major focus of several contemporary legal intellectual movements has 
been to highlight previously neglected ancillary effects of policies.90  
Failing to address those side effects in the legislation that gave rise to 
them gives those effects a head start toward causing harm and risks 
the political process losing interest before it enacts a corrective. 
Yet even if an initiative’s supporters recognize its problematic side 
effects, they may nonetheless oppose incorporating corrective meas-
ures.  The more complexity they admit into their initiative, the more 
 
88 For example, a successful floor amendment avoids the committee process alto-
gether.  Even an amendment in committee frees its sponsor from the need to motivate 
the chair to call a meeting on the proposal.  Some legislative bodies have rules seeking 
to deny initiatives any opportunities for late entry into the deliberative process.  Con-
gressional rules prohibit conference reports from including items that appeared in 
neither the House nor Senate bill.  Some states have deadlines for introducing bills 
that are to be considered in a given legislative session.  
89 See Carmines & Stimson, supra note 83, at 156-57 (arguing that the capacity of new 
issues tied to existing conflicts to influence the political system is “sharply curtailed”). 
90 For example, economists highlight rent control’s consequences for the rental 
housing stock’s maintenance.  See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 13-14.  Similarly, fe-
minists identify the subjugating effects of policies built around male models of inter-
personal relations.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF 
THE STATE 160-64 (1989). 
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risk of political or procedural problems.  A fair measure of the 
strength of someone’s commitment to particular goals is ascertaining 
which other claims she is willing to allow to override those goals.91  Re-
cognizing too many claims as sufficient to override an asserted right 
largely vitiates that right.92  Accordingly, champions of a particular 
cause tend to resist admitting new claims into political debates over 
that cause. 
To date, most critiques of heedless policymaking have focused on 
its inefficiency:  selecting policies based on an incomplete accounting 
of their consequences is likely to yield a significant number of mis-
guided calibrations or even erroneous adoptions.  Oblivious policy-
making is also likely to raise significant inequities.  Not all political ac-
tors are equally capable of inducing the political process to think 
exclusively about their concerns.  Majoritarian democracy tends to fa-
vor weak claims held by large numbers over strong claims held by 
small numbers.  Interest group politics often reverses that preference, 
favoring the claims of small, cohesive groups whose individual stakes 
are strong enough to prompt organizing.  Claims held by small num-
bers of people that do not have the means to function as effective in-
terest groups, however, are disadvantaged in both systems.  Thus, re-
sults that fall far short of Caldor-Hicks optimality are possible when 
small, weak groups are strongly affected.  Public interest policymaking 
should take into account these likely distortions in the political 
process’s aggregation of preferences. 
2.  Patterns of Political Conflict over Issue Joinder 
A normative framework for deciding questions of issue joinder in 
policy debates is not absolutely necessary.  The difficulty of designing 
a universally applicable and normatively compelling rule of joinder 
could justify adopting a laissez-faire position.  Those initiating a pro-
posal would invite joinder with other issues that they support on the 
merits or expect to help their ideas prevail.  Initiatives’ opponents 
conversely would seek to join it with divisive or embarrassing ideas but 
keep it apart from popular ones.  Those fearing unpleasant externali-
ties and policy entrepreneurs struggling to achieve salience could try 
 
91 See DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 91-92 (“Collective goals may, but need not, be 
absolute.  The community may pursue different goals at the same time, and it may 
compromise one goal for the sake of another.”). 
92 See id. at 92 (“It follows from the definition of a right that it cannot be out-
weighed by all social goals.”). 
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to claw their way into the debate.  Coalition partners, policymakers, 
journalists, and the public might join or sever issues to improve effi-
ciency of consideration, although they also might manipulate joinder 
to conceal their choices on the merits.  This would lead to considera-
ble ad hoc political bargaining.  For example, if an initiative’s sponsors’ 
resistance to joining another proposal to theirs sufficiently alienated 
late-arriving allies, the latter could threaten to withdraw support. 
In practice, this is likely to lead to considerable miscalculation.  
Some initiatives may fail because of joinder disputes, which may have 
been solvable, despite clear majority support; others may cause pre-
ventable negative side effects because their supporters fear triggering 
an internecine battle if they “open up” the legislation.  More generally, 
political actors seek to assess one another’s good faith when building 
relationships; the paucity of standards for issue joinder in policy debates 
frustrates that process. 
Complicating the problem of determining the scope of a particu-
lar debate is the likelihood that an initiative’s originators may disagree 
with, or value much more lightly, the concerns underlying proffered 
additions to their proposal.  The originators may feel some sweat equi-
ty in their initiative and regard efforts to broaden the debate as an il-
legitimate redistribution of the political capital that they have earned.  
Even if it could somehow be established that expanding the initiative’s 
scope would increase the aggregate wealth of society as a whole, or of 
a broad political community with which the originators may identify 
(progressives, conservatives, libertarians, or some other group), they 
are nevertheless likely to vigorously reject any duty to seek that end.93  
People who are highly altruistic in their personal lives—and whose al-
truism drives their political activism—may feel justified or even com-
pelled to act as egoistical hedonists on behalf of their cause.  Deter-
mining the proper scope of joinder collaboratively, therefore, is likely 
to prove difficult even when the sponsors of the basic initiative and 
the proposed interveners seem to be natural allies. 
In such a case, one might imagine some sort of Coasean bargain-
ing94 in which the would-be interveners would rebate to the origina-
tors some portion of the benefit that their cause would receive from 
 
93 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 286-88 (1986) (questioning whether there 
is a moral duty to act in such a way as to maximize wealth within a community). 
94 For the seminal work on this subject, see generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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being admitted to the debate.95  Such bargaining, however, is imprac-
tical, both because the diffuse coalitions on both sides make transac-
tion costs prohibitively high and because the benefits that the joining 
cause receives come in a form difficult for its advocates to transfer.96  
Even if such a bargain could be struck, it would largely preserve the 
preexisting distribution of political capital.97  In some instances, that 
prior arrangement may strike policymakers as sufficiently unjust to 
call for a forced redistribution, either by their own hand or by allow-
ing the interveners to exercise self-help.  More generally, although a 
policy initiative’s authors may claim proprietary rights, the initiative’s 
success depends on a broader array of supporters whose interests and 
preferences have some claim to recognition.  Further difficulty arises 
when several groups wish to join their proposals with a single initia-
tive.  The initiative might be able to survive the additional complexity 
and controversy resulting from inclusion of any one of the proffered 
amendments but not the cumulative weight of all.  Any that are not 
added, however, will have difficulty gaining salience on their own.  As 
Table 1 suggests, the interaction between advocates seeking inclusion 
of different issues in a policy initiative with apparent momentum can 
be loosely modeled as a game of chicken.98  The best outcome for 
each group is to win inclusion in the initiative while its counterpart 
leaves to mount a new initiative of its own.  Each group’s worst night-
mare, however, is that both tie their fates to the existing initiative and, 
in so doing, overload and collapse it.  If a group is going to pursue an 
independent initiative, it generally prefers that the other group do the 
same.  Doing so allows the prior initiative to win approval more easily 
and leaves more capital unspent in the broader community of shared 
political interests in which the two groups operate.  As a result, each 
group has a strong interest in misleading the other about its inten-
 
95 As in more conventional applications of Coase’s Theorem, this sort of bargain-
ing without transaction costs ultimately would lead to the same results whether the in-
itiatives’ sponsors or would-be interveners were given initial control over joinder.  See 
id. at 6-8 (“[T]he ultimate result (which maximises the value of production) is inde-
pendent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.”). 
96 See DWORKIN, supra note 93, at 279-80 (discussing the difficulty of organizing 
such bargaining to resolve typical common law problems).  
97 See id. at 279 (pointing out that the initial allocation of rights determines which 
groups will become richer or poorer through bargaining). 
98 For simplicity, this model assumes only two would-be interveners; no difference 
between the political appeal of their respective proposals; a political climate in which 
all parties know that the initiative can bear one, but only one, new issue without col-
lapsing; and no role for the originators of the initiative.  Relaxing these assumptions 
would yield a more complex model but not a fundamentally different result. 
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tions:  if one group can persuade the other that it is determined to in-
sist on inclusion, it can scare off the competition and enjoy an easy 
path to enactment.  Obviously, this process is prone to miscalcula-
tions.  It may also produce distributionally undesirable results, with 
groups in more desperate straits less willing to risk certain defeat by 
continuing to struggle for inclusion.99 
 
Table 1:  Strategies for Determining the Scope of a Public Policy 
Initiative (Payoffs Listed for Strategy in Row First) 
 
 Pursue Separate  
Initiative
Insist on Inclusion 
Pursue Separate  
Initiative 
4,4 2,6 
Insist on Inclusion 6,2 0,0
 
A common means of obtaining more cooperative outcomes to po-
litical games is repeated playing.100  Many social causes and political 
organizations—certainly those concerned with the environment, po-
verty, and fiscal discipline—are repeat players.  The vagaries of politics 
make it difficult for many groups to predict whether they will wear the 
originator’s or intervener’s hat the next time the scope of an initiative 
must be determined.  This uncertainty might seem to provide each 
group an incentive to follow the course that, if universally pursued 
over the long term, would maximize aggregate well-being, and to act 
selfishly only when the expected gains of doing so exceed the ex-
pected costs of others acting similarly in future encounters. 
In practice, this approach is likely to produce only modest results.  
First, many groups find themselves in one or another position a dis-
proportionate share of the time.  A group that originates politically 
powerful initiatives most of the time will not sacrifice much to ac-
commodate those that habitually struggle for salience.  Second, the 
stakes of each interaction are not constant.  Varying stakes and varying 
 
99 See RALPH D. ELLIS, JUST RESULTS:  ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 
124-28 (1998) (discussing the consequences of diminishing marginal utility for distri-
butive justice). 
100 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 118-20 (1984) (pro-
viding the well-known description of repeated iterations of a game leading to mutual 
cooperation); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 15-18 (2000) (“[P]eople are 
more likely to cooperate when they expect to have repeated dealings with each other 
than when they expect never to see each other again.”).  
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degrees of transparency tend to undermine the corrective benefits of 
repeated interactions.101  The base initiative’s political strengths, the 
prospective amendment’s chances for achieving salience indepen-
dently, and the initiative’s relative importance to its respective spon-
sors will all vary considerably.  Finally, some groups’ accountability 
structures may place a higher premium on visibly “trying” than on ac-
tually achieving success.102 
Aggregation of preferences among many diverse interest groups is 
likely to be difficult.  Neither extreme position may be stable:  those 
with significant additional concerns will unite to oppose a “clean” bill, 
while none will want it weighed down with so many extraneous items 
that the bill sinks.  Which combination of proposals is admitted will 
depend on the order in which they are advanced and on various 
groups’ strategic judgments about which proposals to tolerate and 
which to oppose.103  Even if a stable equilibrium exists, the participants 
are unlikely to be aware of it, allowing other outcomes to prevail de-
pending on how the agenda is manipulated.104 
Metaphors of community are also unavailing.  Analyses of coali-
tion dynamics among multiple players typically assume that the most 
salient issues can be specified.105  When that is not the case, interac-
tions may become more chaotic.  Discrete political bodies and com-
munities typically have leaders who set their agendas with reference to 
agreed-on criteria of fairness.106  Agenda setting is much more com-
plex for the nation as a whole, for the set of interest groups that lobby 
Congress, and for the subset of interest groups that plausibly claim to 
be pursuing a progressive or altruistic agenda (whatever that may be).  
 
101 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 165 (1991) (indicating that “tit-for-tat”, as devised by Axelrod, is “operable 
only under a highly restrictive set of conditions,” including symmetrical payoffs and per-
fect knowledge of a player’s own matches but not of the outcomes of others’ matches).  
102 This is likely to be true both of membership organizations and of those de-
pending on donors of modest political sophistication.  
103 See RIKER, supra note 81, at 137-43 (suggesting that, if society discourages con-
centration of power, at least two methods of manipulation are always available:  mani-
pulation of agenda and manipulation of outcomes by false revelation of values). 
104 See id. at 170-72 (asserting that because the conditions that preclude manipula-
tion—equilibrium and information about the equilibrium—are not easily fulfilled, 
manipulation is possible under “any method of voting”). 
105 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 285-89 (2003) (discussing coali-
tion theories that presume that political parties have predetermined policies and issues 
that are important to them). 
106 See RIKER, supra note 81, at 170 (“[L]eaders’ control of agenda is ordinarily not 
challenged.  One reason is that most bodies have customary criteria of fairness, and 
most leaders abide by them.”).  
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Communities maintain norms through complex systems of signaling 
that require repeated interactions among the same individuals.107  Co-
operation breaks down when membership in the community becomes 
transient.108  Perhaps some interest groups work with one another so 
regularly that they may evolve agreed-upon practices for amending one 
another’s initiatives.  But amendments seeking to contain initiatives’ 
undesirable externalities will, almost by definition, often come from 
those outside the political community responsible for the initiative. 
3.  Explicit Legislative Regulation of Issue Joinder 
Positive law generally offers little guidance on issue joinder in pol-
icy debates.  Legislative bodies have a wide variety of joinder rules, few 
of which have much normative appeal.  Most take one of four basic 
forms:  extremely permissive joinder,109 extremely restrictive joinder,110 
joinder subject to some test of germaneness,111 or joinder at the whim 
 
107 See ELLICKSON, supra note 101, at 164-66 (describing Axelrod’s tit-for-tat strate-
gy and the development of cooperation through repeated iterations of a game); 
MUELLER, supra note 105, at 119-20 (“[I]f the strategy options are played in sequence 
and the game is played but once, the first player has no means by which to influence 
the second player’s decision at the time the latter is made.”). 
108 See ELLICKSON, supra note 101, at 169 (noting that the hypothesis of welfare-
maximizing norms “does not predict that the norm-making process would lead to the 
evolution of cooperation in a transient social environment”).  
109 For less partisan legislation, the House of Representatives occasionally operates 
under “open rules,” allowing any amendments members wish to offer as long as they 
are in the first or second degree.  For most types of legislation, the Senate ordinarily 
permits any and all amendments.  This allows minority senators to force the majority to 
cast uncomfortable votes on wholly unrelated issues or simply to bog down delibera-
tions as an informal filibuster.  ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER, supra note 82, art. III, § 15, 
require a two-thirds vote to suppress a proposed amendment. 
110 Both House and Senate rules prohibit conference reports from joining any new 
issues to those each chamber has passed.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
R. XXII, cl. 9, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 906-07 (2009); STANDING RULES OF THE 
SENATE, R. XXVIII(2), S. DOC. NO. 110-1, at 52-53 (2008).  As its calendar becomes 
more crowded, the House does a greater amount of business under suspension of the 
rules, which allows no amendments at all.  See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, R. XV, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 662-68.  Similarly, special legisla-
tion prohibits amendments in either house of Congress to resolutions approving the 
closing of military bases.  See 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006) (allowing Congress to either ac-
cept or reject the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s recommended 
actions as a package but prohibiting it from making alterations).  Senators skilled in 
the chamber’s procedures “filled the amendment tree” by offering meaningless first- 
and second-degree amendments to their own legislation, blocking any amendments 
their opponents might have had.  MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 
102-03 (2d ed. 2008). 
111 When considering appropriations legislation or after invoking cloture against a 
filibuster, the Senate allows only amendments that meet arcane germaneness stan-
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of the majority party.112  These rules largely respond to attempts at 
joinder motivated by support for or hostility to the underlying pro-
posal.113  They thus reflect little considered thought about amend-
ments offered to gain salience or to control externalities in the under-
lying bill.  Moreover, those regimes that depend on germaneness—the 
only ones that attempt to balance the interests of both the sponsors of 
the original bill and those of the respective amendment—have had 
great difficulty devising a generally applicable definition.114  Indeed, 
the normative basis and practical utility of the germaneness standard 
is unclear:  under some definitions, it may tend to favor amendments 
that address externalities springing from the underlying proposal, but 
 
dards, which have more to do with clever drafting than substantive interrelationships.  
See GOLD, supra note 110, at 106-07 (describing four circumstances under which Se-
nate rules require amendments to be germane). 
 Many state constitutions prohibit legislation from embracing more than one ob-
ject, leading to voluminous but not especially useful debates about what constitutes a 
single object.  See, e.g., Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1299-1304 (Cal. 1987) 
(pondering at great length whether a piece of legislation encompassed more than a “sin-
gle subject”). 
112 The House of Representatives increasingly relies on closed rules, which allow 
only those amendments that the majority party’s leadership favors.  See Charles Tiefer, 
Congress’s Transformative “Republican Revolution” in 2001–2006 and the Future of One-Party 
Rule, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 233, 256-59 (2007) (describing the use of closed rules by the ma-
jority party to pass “ideological versions of key bills without competition”).  House and 
Senate committees typically have rules allowing only “germane” amendments.  See, e.g., 
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XVI(7), H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 703-
32 (“No motion or proposition on a subject different from that under consideration 
shall be admitted under color of amendment.”); S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 111TH CONG., 
RULES OF PROCEDURE, R. 2(a) (Comm. Print 2009) (“After the agenda for a committee 
meeting is published and distributed, no nongermane items may be brought up dur-
ing that meeting unless at least two-thirds of the members present agree to consider 
those items.”).  In practice, committees in which partisan relations are relatively good 
operate under informal norms allowing much broader joinder.  Their chairs, however, 
can invoke the rules at any time and, in the absence of a system of recorded committee 
precedents, can decide arbitrarily and self-servingly what is germane. 
113 Jefferson noted the British parliamentary practice of allowing amendments so 
antithetical to the underlying bill that even the bill’s sponsors would vote against it.  See 
JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 467 (noting that Parliament “did 
not require an amendment to be germane”), reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S 
MANUAL AND THE RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 
241 (2009).  The House’s germaneness requirements sought to block this strategy.  Id.  
Conversely, states’ single-purpose requirements seek to prevent logrolling.  See Harbor, 
742 P.2d at 1299 (“[T]he primary purpose of the one subject rule is the regulation of leg-
islative procedures:  the avoidance of log-rolling by legislators in the enactment of laws.”). 
114 See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, 
§§ 929–940, at 704-27 (struggling to reconcile subject matter, fundamental purpose, 
and jurisdictional tests; declaring that still other tests may govern; and propounding 
numerous special rules for particular situations).  
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it offers only limited protection against logrolling and almost none 
against cleverly designed poison pills. 
Perhaps the most thoughtful are the Senate’s rules regulating con-
sideration of budget-reconciliation legislation.  Recognizing that the 
goal of fiscal rectitude may motivate votes for broad packages but pro-
vide senators insufficient cover to support particular tax increases or 
spending cuts, these rules generally obstruct the disaggregation of legis-
lation on the floor.115  On the other hand, cognizant of the dangers of 
broad joinder, the rules generally prohibit nonbudgetary matters from 
riding along.116  These rules make sense for single-mindedly accomplish-
ing deficit reduction in that they deliberately inhibit consideration of 
unintended consequences.  Thus, the rules are also difficult to general-
ize to the broad range of policy debates in which most participants are 
willing to consider—and in which a fair estimation of the legislation’s 
value requires evaluating—more than one set of consequences. 
4.  Learning from Joinder Rules for Litigation 
The vast majority of policy analysis focuses on the merits of ques-
tions in a manner analogous to a trial.  Questions concerning the ad-
missibility and persuasiveness of evidence dominate factual inquiries 
in policy debates, with norms instead of rules of law driving the deci-
sion.  A far smaller but still substantial literature has developed re-
garding questions of institutional competency:  these are arguments 
that a particular unit of government should not adopt a substantively 
meritorious policy because it cannot implement it effectively, because 
another public entity has primary responsibility for the problem, or 
because the initiative would violate some broader principle of re-
straint.  These debates are closely analogous to those over the jurisdic-
tion of courts to decide pieces of litigation.  Also familiar are contro-
versies over government transparency, which are the public policy 
counterpart to discovery battles.  More subtly, attempts to drive public 
policy with compelling anecdotes, and complaints that the cited 
events are too rare or atypical, bear more than a passing resemblance 
to efforts to certify class actions.  As noted, however, the literature 
gives relatively little systematic attention to the problem of joinder in 
 
115 2 U.S.C. § 641(d)(2) (2006).  These rules allow simple motions to strike provi-
sions, but a senator who votes for such a motion, with no offset permitted, would be 
seen as “busting the budget.” 
116 See id. § 644(b)(1)(A), (D) (prohibiting provisions in a reconciliation bill that 
do not produce changes in outlays or revenues or that produce small changes merely 
incidental to the nonbudgetary components of the provision).  
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public policy debates, namely, which issues must be decided with 
which others.117 
A laissez-faire approach to joinder, allowing raw political power to 
deny admission to debates without criticism, would be a sharp depar-
ture from civil litigation’s practice.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, “[T]he impulse is toward entertaining the 
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the par-
ties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”118  
Equity jurisprudence has also long recognized the injustices that can 
result from considering only one of a set of related problems:  “He 
who seeks equity must do equity.”119 
Although these rules offer valuable insights into fair principles of 
joinder, litigation differs from policymaking in five crucial respects.  
First, in any judicial or legislative system someone must make a set of 
default choices about joinder.  The obvious choice is the initiator of 
the decisionmaking process.  In the litigation context, prosecutors en-
joy broad power to shape the indictment.  Civil plaintiffs have sweep-
ing authority to frame and amend the complaint.  Similarly, the initia-
tors of proposals in the public policy arena make the first bid for media 
attention and, in many fora, enjoy broad discretion regarding what to 
include in bills.  In the legislative process, however, the role of initiator 
often changes hands, from a bill’s lead sponsor to a subcommittee 
chair, then a full committee chair, then a floor manager, and then 
members of the legislature’s other chamber.  Each of these successive 
initiators can and often does revise the predecessors’ joinder decisions. 
Second, many public policy processes lack a clear equivalent to 
the judge in litigation.120  This could make the default power almost 
absolute unless clear norms with widely accepted legitimacy dictate 
otherwise.  Thus, although litigation rules’ insights about which fac-
tors affect the strength of an argument for joinder are helpful, their 
 
117 The other aspect of how civil and criminal procedure control the scope of liti-
gation—joinder of parties—has no direct analogue in public policy debates because 
interest groups generally do not need permission to enter a policy debate the way they 
do a lawsuit.  As a result, existing participants address concerns about the number of 
contending parties in a policy debate by expanding or shrinking the scope of issues. 
118 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).  
119 SNELL’S EQUITY 93 ( John McGhee ed., 31st ed. 2005). 
120 Many legislative bodies have parliamentarians, who advise the presiding officer 
on procedural matters.  The respect afforded parliamentarians, in addition to their 
degree of political independence and authority to make clearly subjective determina-
tions, varies considerably.  Even if their stature and independence approach those of a 
judge, however, parliamentarians enter the process quite late, after media coverage 
and committee consideration have made many crucial joinder determinations.   
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highly discretionary structure is less helpful absent a unitary, impartial 
entity to exercise that discretion.  Other members of a broader politi-
cal community, sympathetic to both combatants but beholden to nei-
ther, can play this role to a point; absent clear norms, however, their 
decisions are likely to be fragmented and confused. 
Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s joinder rules rely 
heavily upon party status, a concept with no clear analogue in public 
policy debates.  To be sure, those involved with a particular issue know 
with whom they are interacting.  The First Amendment, however, 
prohibits entry barriers of the kind Rule 24 imposes on would-be in-
terveners in civil litigation.121  Thus, adoption of a principle comparable 
to Rule 18,122 allowing any “party” to assert any claim against another 
party, would stimulate many pro forma “interventions” for the purpose 
of expanding that debate.  On the other hand, a group’s ongoing en-
gagement in a debate would strike many as conferring some tentative 
sweat-equity legitimacy on its proposals to broaden that debate. 
Fourth, the denial of a litigant’s effort to join a claim to an ongo-
ing dispute does not typically prevent the litigant from receiving a de-
cision on the merits.123  By contrast, in the public policy arena most 
claims never receive a hearing or decision on the merits.  Exclusion 
from one debate may mean the claim will never be heard at all. 
Finally, and most importantly, joinder decisions in litigation are 
generally partial and provisional.  A court may try two claims or two 
defendants together, but it renders separate judgments.  Thus, joinder 
of claims or parties may have an important impact on the speed of lit-
igation and may risk confusing the jury or judge, but it does not 
change the structure of the decision to be made.124  In litigation, un-
like in policymaking, the decisionmaker never has to make an all-or-
nothing choice concerning joined claims.125 
One of the most fundamental principles of the Federal Rules, and 
a revolutionary contrast to their predecessor codes, is that the scope of 
civil litigation should depend on the scope of the dispute in the real 
 
121 FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
122 Id. R. 18(a). 
123 Scholars have debated whether failure to join “indispensable” parties is a “ju-
risdictional” failing.  See Howard P. Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment 
to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403, 416-21 (1965).  In any event, failure to join can 
sometimes be a fatal defect for otherwise viable litigation.  
124 Indeed, even before judgment, the court has plenary power to sever a party or 
claim.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on 
just terms, add or drop a party.”).  
125 See id. R. 54(b) (governing judgment on multiple claims or parties). 
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world rather than on legal categories.126  Legislative procedure, like 
common law pleading, takes the opposite position:  artificial limits on 
committees’ jurisdictions largely predetermine the scope of resulting 
legislation.  Broader public policy debates occupy a somewhat inter-
mediary position that is influenced, but not absolutely controlled, by 
preconceptions about which issues “go together.” 
Rule 13(a) requires joinder of most counterclaims that “arise[] 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party’s claim.”127  This seeks to include defensive counter-
claims in the same case as the claims to which they respond.  Thus, 
parties the litigation might harm are heard on their pleas for pallia-
tives at the same time as the claims against them are heard.128  As dis-
cussed below, convention in public policy debates is that groups at risk 
of focused losses have a preferred right to participate in those debates 
to redirect or ameliorate those burdens.129  In practice, however, 
courts have often had great difficulty distinguishing between defensive 
and affirmative counterclaims in any principled way.130  Similarly, iden-
tifying those potential legislative harms that are sufficiently focused to 
convey a preferential right to legislative joinder has proven quite diffi-
cult. 
Because the Federal Rules tie the right to raise new issues to party 
status and make achievement of party status contingent on the claims 
one would assert or defend, the rules on joinder of parties provide a 
fair starting point for analyzing issue joinder in public policy debates.  
Rule 24(a)(2) gives the right to intervene when a prospective party 
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to pro-
tect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that inter-
 
126 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 628 (1988) (“[T]he unit of litigation [under the 
Federal Rules] should be the transaction as it occurred in the out-of-court world, and 
not some part of the transaction that might be encapsulated in one or another single 
substantive legal theory.”). 
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A). 
128 See Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 NW. U. L. REV. 
271, 277-78 (1953) (describing a counterclaim as having “practically the same purpose 
and effect as a defense”). 
129 See discussion infra subsection II.A.6.d. 
130 See Green, supra note 128, at 279-81 (“Whenever defendant pleads a denial and 
also a counterclaim smaller than plaintiff’s claim it is impossible to know before trial 
whether the counterclaim will be used offensively or defensively.”). 
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est.”131  This implies a kind of germaneness analysis built around a vi-
sion that litigation’s primary function is characterizing transactions 
and property.  The functions of policymaking are more diverse and 
more plastic to the whims of initiators.  Rule 24(a)(2) also suggests 
strong deference to claims of necessity:  when an interest is unrepre-
sented in litigation and cannot effectively be asserted later, it should 
be admitted.  Rule 24(b)(1)(B) authorizes the court to allow interven-
tion by any party whose claim or defense “shares . . . a common ques-
tion of law or fact” with the main case—an extremely thin connec-
tion.132  Rule 24(b)(3) directs the court to consider undue delay or 
prejudice to the original parties but does not identify the interests of 
the prospective intervener to balance against those concerns.133 
Rule 19’s treatment of mandatory joinder offers considerably 
more insight.134  It even more directly overrides the Rules’ usual defe-
rence to the plaintiff on joinder questions.135  It seeks to balance three 
interests that have analogues in public policy debates:  the interests of 
the present parties, the interests of those currently excluded from the 
process, and the public interest in a decisionmaking process that does 
not become hopelessly bogged down.136  This last interest may take on 
a quite different cast in civil litigation, where the system’s rewards and 
penalties are skewed heavily to favor the broadest possible agglomera-
tions.137  Public policy debates have no such bias in favor of large, 
complex arrays of issues; to the contrary, the primary means of advo-
cacy—media accounts of a few hundred words at most—do not lend 
 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).   
132 Id. R. 24(b)(1)(B). 
133 Id. R. 24(b)(3). 
134 See id. R. 19. 
135 See 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.02[1] (3d ed. 
2009) (noting that the “protection of other parties [in some circumstances] . . . out-
weigh[s] the interest in plaintiff autonomy”); Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative 
Litigation:  Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 826 (1988) (identifying policies recognized in Rule 19 that jus-
tify overriding plaintiffs’ autonomy); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty 
Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 725 n.117 (1976) (“Consolidation, severance, and man-
datory joinder already recognize the need and a willingness to restrict [plaintiff] con-
trol over the party structure.”).  
136 See John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 
327, 330 (1957) (describing these three “classes of interests” that benefit from  
mandatory joinder). 
137 See John B. Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts:  The State of 
the Union of Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REV. 35, 36 (2001) (arguing that the “high 
cost of litigation and strict rules of claim and issue preclusion” encourage joinder and 
discourage the splitting of claims (footnotes omitted)). 
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themselves to sorting out multiple, partially overlapping claims.  This 
difference may reflect different points of departure:  the common law 
forms of action gave a bad odor to limits on joinder in civil litiga-
tion;138 on the other hand, joining too many sets of claims to a single 
public policy debate multiplied the risk of ideological cleavage, which 
was widely viewed as inconsistent with the American political system. 
Rule 19 is the successor to the concepts of necessary and indispen-
sable parties, in whose absence the litigation might reach a result “in-
consistent with equity and good conscience.”139  Scholars criticized this 
formulation for relying on subjective assessments of the desirability of 
the litigation’s result;140 the resulting reformulation offers a clearer 
analogue to the policy realm by focusing on the unfairness of exclud-
ing parties from debates that vitally concern them. 
The present Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) forces the original parties to ac-
cept the joinder of any person who “claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action”141 if excluding that person’s claims or defenses 
would “as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to 
protect the interest.”142  The “impair or impede” standard falls well 
short of necessity; it only requires tangible prejudice.143  Rule 
19(a)(1)(B)(ii) also requires joinder of interested parties if their ex-
clusion creates a “substantial risk” of subjecting one of the existing 
parties to “inconsistent obligations.”144  This is the other side of the 
coin:  just as parties have a right to joinder if they might be unable to 
obtain separate consideration of their claims, parties must be joined if 
they could obtain a later hearing but would unsettle the result of the 
present litigation in the process.  When a party whose joinder is man-
datory cannot be joined for whatever reason, Rule 19(b) requires the 
 
138 See Mitchell G. Williams, Pleading Reform in Nineteenth Century America:  The Joind-
er of Actions at Common Law and Under the Codes, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 299, 301-06 (1985) 
(describing the byzantine common law forms of action and the rules of misjoinder ap-
plied in the 1800s, which were criticized by courts as “meaningless technicalities”).  
139 Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854). 
140 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 362 (1967) (stating that 
Shields v. Barrow “fostered an inward analysis of the nature of the rights asserted rather 
than an outward assessment of the pros and cons” of joining additional parties). 
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B). 
142 Id. R. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). 
143 FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.12, at 612 (5th ed. 2001). 
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
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court to consider dismissing an otherwise proper action.145  This rule 
requires the court to consider prejudice to the absent party, the ability 
to narrow the resolution of the litigation to reduce that prejudice 
(and whether doing so would prevent meaningful resolution of the 
litigation), and whether the original plaintiff “would have an adequate 
remedy if the action were dismissed.”146  This is a familiar balancing of 
the equities, but one of a special kind:  the focus is on the various par-
ties’ abilities to obtain relief, rather than on their burdens of proving 
entitlement to that relief.  The rule’s list is not exclusive, but it strong-
ly implies that the substantive prejudice of not being able to obtain re-
lief overrides any procedural burdens that joinder or nonjoinder 
might entail. 
Once joined, a party may assert any claims it has against other par-
ties, regardless of those claims’ relevance to, or impact on the resolu-
tion of, the underlying litigation.147  This honors the principle that 
parties may not be drawn into litigation to serve the interests of others 
without being given the chance to vindicate their own interests. 
5.  Evaluating the Harm that Joinder Can Cause in the Policy Arena 
Sponsors that oppose joining other proposals to their initiatives 
commonly assert that consideration of other proposals will grievously 
harm those underlying initiatives.  They argue that this harm out-
weighs the adverse side effects or lack of salience that the beneficiaries 
of the proposed intervention would experience if joinder were de-
nied.  This argument could mean any of several distinct things.  First, 
the need for exclusivity may reflect limits of administrative capacity.  
The military often invokes this ground when it insists on a clear set of 
operational objectives.  Destroying an opponent’s weapons or taking 
contested ground may be relatively easy; doing so while avoiding com-
mon side effects of the use of force is far more difficult.  This objec-
tion is most likely to have weight when individuals must make nearly 
instantaneous decisions or when the proposed amendment would add 
responsibilities to an agency that lacks the practical ability to expand 
accordingly.  The objection, however, has no force against proposed 
amendments that would assign new responsibilities to a different enti-
 
145 See id. R. 19(b) (“If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be 
joined, the court must determine whether . . . the action should proceed among the 
existing parties or should be dismissed.”). 
146 Id. R. 19(b)(4). 
147 Id. R. 18(a). 
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ty.  For example, sponsors of legislation giving new duties to the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) may fear that an amendment giving 
the FDA still more duties will dilute the effectiveness of their initiative, 
but administrative concerns would not give them a basis to object to 
an amendment giving new work solely to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. 
Second, the argument to exclude otherwise compelling justifica-
tions for joinder may imply limitations on long-term deliberative ca-
pacity.  Adding more factors to all future deliberations on the issue 
may prevent the achievement of a consensus.  The likelihood of an 
impasse rises significantly as the number of alternatives under consid-
eration increases.148  Indeed, floating alternatives to confuse and di-
vide the coalition behind the dominant proposal is a major method by 
which a sophisticated opponent may organize opposition.149  Objective 
standards for identifying poison pills, however, are elusive:  even die-
hard members of a coalition may differ as to whether an amendment 
improves or politically debilitates their initiative.  Absent such stan-
dards, this principle justifies minimizing the total number of amend-
ments but offers little guidance as to which amendments leaders 
should be compelled to accept. 
Third, leaders may exclude a policy claim with valid arguments for 
joinder because of limited short-term deliberative capacity.  Expand-
ing the set of constraints under which policy is to be formed may 
complicate deliberations sufficiently to prevent the achievement of a 
consensus in time to meet some deadline.  Here again, the gravamen 
is to reduce the number of complicating amendments, with little 
guidance as to which ones to exclude. 
Fourth, leaders may exclude a valid claim if it is insufficiently dis-
tinguishable from other candidate claims and the cumulative effect of 
considering the like claims would be to overtax the system’s legal, 
long-term deliberative, or short-term deliberative capacity.  This is the 
time-honored principle on which a teacher refuses to give cookies to 
any child because she does not have enough for all:  each child’s claim 
for a cookie is reasonable enough, but the teacher cannot accommo-
 
148 See STEVEN J. BRAMS, PARADOXES IN POLITICS 41-43 (1976) (using statistical 
analysis to show that the probability of a voting paradox occuring increases with the 
number of alternatives); FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing court to exclude relevant evidence 
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the 
issues ”).  
149 Cf. id. at 43-45 (noting that “political actors may have an incentive to contrive a 
paradox that exploits an apparent lack of consensus among voters”). 
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date them all.  This concept militates in favor of a “clean bill”; once 
leaders accept some claims to inclusion, they have difficulty excluding 
others.  It applies, however, only if the many claims presented are 
largely indistinguishable.  If one child is about to faint from low blood 
sugar, the teacher can and should give that child a cookie without 
worrying about the rest of the class.  Thus, even if leaders exclude all 
claims proffered in search of salience, they nonetheless could consis-
tently admit claims that seek to mitigate externalities stemming from 
their initiatives. 
Fifth, leaders occasionally exclude a valid claim if they cannot ad-
vance it without hindering vindication of another, more important 
claim.  This is particularly likely if they can achieve the same relief that 
the excluded claim sought by succeeding on the priority claim.  Thus, 
counsel in class action litigation typically designate as class representa-
tives plaintiffs whose claims are especially compelling, denying indi-
vidual attention to class members whose claims would be less likely to 
win on their own.  Similarly, although some segregated schools were 
dramatically worse than others, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund de-
clined to enforce the “separate but equal” doctrine, instead tying the 
fate of students in the worst segregated schools to that of all other vic-
tims of segregated education.150  This idea has little applicability to 
amendments that benefit a different class than that which the base in-
itiative would serve. 
Finally, and most problematically, leaders occasionally reject a va-
lid claim if they believe it would be too divisive.  They declare that “we 
are all in this together” and resist any assertions to the contrary.  Ra-
ther paradoxically, they privilege the value of social solidarity over the 
interests of those making the rejected claim.151  Not surprisingly, lead-
ers expressing indifference toward the proposed interveners’ well-
being while asking those interveners to commit to the well-being of 
those that the leaders represent often fail to persuade the interveners 
to fall into line.  To keep these appeals to community spirit from ex-
hausting their credibility, savvy leaders endeavor to invoke them as lit-
tle as possible, avoid repeated invocations against the same interests, 
and provide relief in another form to mitigate the harm from being 
denied joinder. 
 
150 See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:  THURGOOD 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 116-25 (1994). 
151 See CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 61-
62 (1977) (describing President Kennedy’s sacrifice of civil rights legislation to im-
prove the chance of success for his broader social and economic agenda). 
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6.  Principles for Allowing Joinder of Policy Claims 
The foregoing discussion suggests four principles for overriding a 
sponsor’s preference to exclude an issue from consideration along 
with her initiative.  These principles identify the most compelling 
types of appeals for joinder; many of these are also among those 
where joinder would do the least damage to underlying initiatives.  
The wider political community—those broadly open to both proposals 
on the merits but not specifically aligned with either—will need to 
weigh these arguments for joinder against the costs it could impose, as 
outlined above.  Inevitably, these judgments cannot be entirely inde-
pendent of substance.  For example, concerns that joining an addi-
tional issue will bring down the base initiative with decisional overload 
(the second, third, and fourth concerns in the preceding subsection) 
are more plausible in regulatory matters than in fiscal ones, where 
every decision already implicitly affects every other one.152 
a.  Reciprocity or Estoppel 
The situation of an initiative’s sponsors will rarely be symmetrical 
to that of people seeking admission to the debate.  A narrow, mechan-
ical application of reciprocity norms, therefore, will provide little 
guidance.  Nonetheless, asking sponsors to follow the maxim that one 
who seeks equity must do equity can resolve several kinds of joinder 
problems.  If an initiative’s sponsors have invoked a group’s interests 
to advance their cause, those sponsors would seem hypocritical if they 
brushed aside that group’s interests in another context.  Similarly, 
when those sponsors have tied their cause rhetorically to the one seek-
ing joinder, they may be estopped from objecting to making that con-
junction permanent.  The appeals of a base initiative’s sponsors to a 
political or geographic community to unite in solving a significant 
problem also may estop the sponsors from rejecting the urgent needs 
of other members within the same community.  More broadly, when 
joinder would bring some benefit to the base initiative (even if it also 
brings some risks or complications), joinder seems far less parasitic. 
 
152 See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2560-61 
(2005) (distinguishing fiscal from regulatory federalism by the fungibility of all aspects 
of the former). 
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b.  Necessity 
The strength of the necessity of joining a would-be intervener’s is-
sue to an existing debate should be weighed in any calculation.  In de-
terminations under Rule 19—concerning which parties’ presence is 
required for litigation to proceed—the original initiative’s sponsors 
need only consider procedural necessity.153  Assertions of substantive ne-
cessity—arguments that the proposed amendment is vital public poli-
cy—depend on personal norms and priorities about which no consen-
sus is likely.  Thus, if the degree of substantive necessity determined 
which issues would be included in a policy debate, resolution of 
joinder questions would be based on raw political power. 
On the other hand, the likelihood that a related set of concerns 
cannot otherwise receive a decision on the merits is a powerful argu-
ment for joinder.  This inability could result either because the base 
initiative’s enactment creates irremediable obstacles154 or because the 
proffered amendment could never gain salience on its own.155  In the 
latter case, other political actors can assess whether this is the case 
through an examination of past efforts to press similar concerns.  In 
assessing past failures, they must seek to distinguish between proposals 
considered and rejected on the merits, on the one hand, and those 
that never drew substantive consideration, on the other.  A procedur-
al-necessity doctrine need not be concerned with each excluded pro-
posal’s success but rather with its ability to receive consideration on 
the merits.  If claims seeking admission to a debate never gain the po-
litical process’s attention but do not face particularly strong opposi-
tion on the merits, they have a good case for joinder.156 
 
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (governing required joinder of parties). 
154 For example, if the plans for a construction project do not mitigate the project’s 
environmental effects, no subsequent efforts could restore the destroyed ecosystems.  
155 Thus, Congress commonly addresses the special problems of Haitian immi-
grants together with those of Cubans.  If it passed Cuban-only immigration legislation, 
Haitian immigrants’ concerns likely would never subsequently achieve the salience to 
win similar relief. See Ramón Grosfoguel, Migration and Geopolitics in the Caribbean:  The 
Cases of Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica (describing partially 
successful efforts to link Haitian refugee policy to policy toward Cubans), in FREE 
MARKETS, OPEN SOCIETIES, CLOSED BORDERS? 225, 234-39 (Max J. Castro ed., 1999). 
156 For example, proposals to protect small areas of habitat crucial to endangered 
but unphotogenic species have difficulty gaining salience on their own.  Joinder with 
another, more salient environmental initiative, however, is unlikely to undermine sup-
port for that initiative.  In contrast, gun-control proposals struggle with a lack of sup-
port, not a lack of salience; denying them joinder with an omnibus anticrime bill does 
not deny them a hearing on the merits.  
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c.  Defensive Claims 
A particularly strong claim for admitting a new concern to a de-
bate arises where the base initiative is not only germane to the prof-
fered amendment but also causes affirmative harm to the interests 
that amendment champions.  For the most part, this means that 
amendments seeking to contain the externalities of the base initiative 
would receive preference over those seeking salience.  Some of the 
latter, however, are in fact responses to political externalities.  Al-
though the base initiative does no harm to the substantive interests 
the proposed intervention seeks to advance, the base initiative’s suc-
cess would prevent the would-be interveners from gaining a decision 
on the merits.  This could be because the political process is unlikely 
to give salience to two similar proposals in succession157 or because the 
deals that must be struck to pass the first proposal will leave political 
capital insufficient to prevail on the second. 
Whatever the nature of the harm the base initiative would inflict 
on the interests the proffered amendment seeks to protect, ameliorat-
ing that harm may be seen as a special case of necessity.  Norms of re-
ciprocity may also support the inclusion of defensive amendments.  
Myopic champions of a cause facing a setback might be tempted to op-
pose the base initiative; the fact that they do not, whether because of 
community spirit or self-interested political calculations, confers a bene-
fit on the base initiative that has some claim to reciprocation.  Such am-
icable displays of deference also advance the broader political commu-
nity’s interest in avoiding contention.  Community-regarding norms are 
more likely to take root if those following them often reap rewards. 
d.  Spreading Political Losses 
If the same group continuously finds consideration of its interests 
subordinated to the greater good, its claims for inclusion become 
stronger.  Inefficiencies in the political process, and often systematic 
undervaluation of some kinds of interests, are inevitable.158  The con-
centration of the resulting losses on one group often is not.  A group 
previously asked to subordinate its interests to the greater good has a 
 
157 For instance, Congress might not be inclined to move two public-lands bills in 
rapid succession.  If a sensitive parcel cannot gain inclusion in a conservation bill mov-
ing through Congress, it is unlikely to win protection later.  
158 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting 
that the mechanisms of the regular political process may fail to protect the interests of 
“discrete and insular minorities”). 
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better argument for joinder than one that generally has received deci-
sions on the merits of its proposals.  Compelling the base initiative’s 
sponsors to endure some losses—such as greater complexity and an 
increased risk that their effort will fail—seems fairer than yet again 
wiping out the outside group’s concerns.  Rule 19 embodies this no-
tion of shared burden by asking the trial judge to consider ways of 
narrowing the relief to the parties present in litigation as an alterna-
tive both to dismissing the litigation—fully protecting the absent par-
ty—or granting all the relief the active parties seek.159 
B.  Reasons to Admit Distributive Justice to Climate Change Debates 
Attempts to determine whether climate change legislation should 
offset the effects of increased carbon costs on low-income people by 
identifying which claims are logically or morally superior will be un-
availing.  For example, some argue that ecological claims are ethically 
superior to political, social, or economic ones because society’s con-
tinuation depends on avoiding ecological calamity.160  Others would 
leave the question open for political conflict, arguing that liberal de-
mocracy is a necessary precondition to ecological or distributional 
claims gaining any traction.161  Still others might argue that severe po-
verty is inconsistent with the creation of durable ecological policies or 
a stable liberal democracy because desperate people necessarily have 
short time horizons and are vulnerable to cooptation by illiberal or 
rapacious forces.162  Consensus that any one of these assertions is supe-
rior to the others is unlikely. 
The principles developed in subsection II.A.6, however, strongly 
support including antipoverty concerns in climate change debates.  
First and foremost, claims for low-income offsets are defensive in na-
ture, unlike most other claims seeking inclusion in climate change 
legislation.  Other claims—ranging from compelling proposals to 
fund basic science research and habitat adaptation to appeals for in-
frastructure reconstruction—seek to enhance the response to the un-
 
159 See supra subsection II.A.4. 
160 See John Ferris, Ecological Versus Social Rationality:  Can There Be Green Social Poli-
cies? (describing arguments for the “moral precedence of ecological rationality”), in 
THE POLITICS OF NATURE 145, 145-47 (Andrew Dobson & Paul Lucardie eds., 1993);  
cf. id. at 154-56 (making an ecologically based argument for income redistribution). 
161 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 31-69 (1980) 
(illustrating the importance of liberal political dialogue in ensuring fair distribution). 
162 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 145-46, 280-84 (1996) (dis-
cussing the view that extreme poverty leads to lawlessness and civic disengagement). 
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derlying problem of climate change, not to mitigate harm that rising 
carbon prices would cause.163  The other three principles dictate the 
same result.  As subsection II.B.1 shows, the environmental movement 
has relied heavily on similar moral principles to those at the heart of 
arguments for distributive justice, and climate change legislation 
would benefit substantially from low-income offsets in both the near- 
and long-term.  Subsection II.B.2 makes the case for necessity, show-
ing that if climate change legislation excludes distributive justice con-
cerns, those concerns would be unlikely to win a hearing through 
other means.  Finally, subsection II.B.3 notes that climate change leg-
islation cannot prevent some adverse effects on low-income people, 
strengthening the case for addressing the adverse effects that are with-
in reach. 
1.  Reciprocity and Estoppel 
Ideals of distributive justice have much to offer the environmental 
movement in general and the campaign to check climate change in 
particular.  Their philosophical roots are similar to those of important 
strains of environmental ethics.  Addressing distributive justice effec-
tively would enhance the political legitimacy of the effort to check 
climate change, which is vital to its success.  Vast wealth inequalities 
promote environmental waste by the affluent and impoverished alike 
while complicating the task of regulators.  Thus, the stakes go beyond 
distributive justice.  Some redistributions also improve allocative effi-
ciency.164  As will be explained in Part III, a properly designed system 
of low-income offsets would do just that.  Finally, the environmental 
community’s reliance on environmental justice arguments estops it 
from denying distributive justice’s centrality to environmental con-
cerns such as climate change. 
To be sure, the reverse is also emphatically true:  action on cli-
mate change is very important to low-income people.  They dispropor-
tionately bear the burden of environmental degradation in general.165  
 
163 One major exception is the proposal for subsidies to existing emitters.  As Part 
II shows, however, those claims lack cardinal merit, which makes their ordinal status 
irrelevant. 
164 See MUELLER, supra note 105, at 51-53 (discussing how two parties may be “bet-
ter off” after redistributing land). 
165 See Mohan Munasinghe, Analysing Ethics, Equity and Climate Change in the Sustai-
nomics Trans-Disciplinary Framework (discussing the “disproportionately greater envi-
ronmental damages suffered by disadvantaged groups,” such as “vulnerability to disas-
ters and extreme weather events, crop failures, loss of employment, sickness, economic 
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More specifically, poverty both reduces the ability to adapt to climate 
change and increases vulnerability to its effects.166 
a.  Shared Political and Ethical Foundations 
The environmental movement’s early ancestors showed remarka-
ble insensitivity to racial oppression,167 even when environmental in-
terests and the interests of racial minorities were closely intertwined.168  
The modern environmental movement, however, built itself on the 
foundations of movements for racial and economic justice in the 
1960s and 1970s.169 
Environmentalism and distributive justice share important norma-
tive premises.170  Both place great ethical weight on Locke’s assump-
tion that the right to acquire property is limited by the ethical duty to 
leave enough for others.171  Each seeks to correct Locke’s assumption 
 
shocks, etc.”), in ETHICS, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, supra note 73, at 47, 62-63.   
166 See Rodney G. Peffer, World Justice, Carbon Credit Schemes and Planetary Manage-
ment Authorities (arguing that social justice and environmental ethics are closely 
linked), in POLITICAL ECOLOGY 141, 142-43 (Roger Keil et al. eds., 1998).  
167 See, e.g., MICHEL GELOBTER ET AL., THE SOUL OF ENVIRONMENTALISM:  
REDISCOVERING TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8-9 
(2008), available at http://www.envirojustice.org/docs/Soul_of_Environmentalism.pdf 
(describing this racial insensitivity).  
168 The most striking case of this was the displacement of Native Americans from 
their lands in the nineteenth century.  The Native Americans were far better and more 
respectful stewards of nature than the settlers who replaced them; helping them en-
force their treaty rights to hold onto more land could have done far more good than 
the creation of a few relatively small national parks.  See ROBERT H. KELLER & MICHAEL 
F. TUREK, AMERICAN INDIANS AND NATIONAL PARKS 26-29 (1998) (describing the Na-
tional Park Service’s relative inability to effectively manage and preserve land).  Addi-
tionally, in the South the full liberation of the former slaves would have yielded a class 
of small family farmers far less rapacious than the massive plantations revived after Re-
construction’s collapse.  See ARTHUR F. RAPER & IRA DE A. REID, SHARECROPPERS ALL 
18-46 (1941) (contrasting the difficult conditions endured by poor, African-American 
tenant farmers in the 1920s and 1930s with the conditions of government-subsidized 
large plantations). 
169 See GELOBTER ET AL., supra note 167, at 10 (arguing that modern environmen-
talism was derived from the Civil Rights Movement). 
170 To be sure, the environmental movement “draws its force from a range of ar-
guments whose ethical underpinnings are really quite divergent and difficult to recon-
cile.”  KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE? 254 (1995).  
171 See DAVID WELLS & TONY LYNCH, THE POLITICAL ECOLOGIST 107 (2000) (ex-
plaining “Locke’s proviso” that “while we have the right to create property by mixing 
our labor with the land, we can only do so if we ‘leave enough, and good enough, for 
others’”). 
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of abundance172 to reflect life in modern economies, one with respect 
to natural resources and the other with respect to individual opportu-
nity.  Both seek to reform the early liberal suspicion of government, 
endeavoring instead to put government to work in creating the condi-
tions of individual freedom.173  Not surprisingly, then, a number of en-
vironmental theorists make arguments about distributive justice.  
Many of them focus on harms done to future generations174 or to oth-
er species,175 but some seek to identify ecological preservation as either 
a form of justice in itself or as a necessary condition to the functioning 
of a society capable of doing justice in all other respects.176  Just as 
John Rawls suggested that, in the original position, each individual 
should prefer the allocation of wealth that does best by the least well-
off (accepting only those differences in wealth that are advantageous 
for all, including the poor),177 some of these environmental ethicists 
effectively argue for selecting policies from a still more basic original 
position in which none of us knows what species we will be.178 
 
172 Locke stated, 
[N]o man’s labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment 
consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man . . . to 
intrench upon the right of another . . . who would still have room for as good 
and as large a possession . . . as before it was appropriated.   
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION § 36, at 115 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).  But see 
WELLS & LYNCH, supra note 171, at 127 (questioning “Locke’s mistaken, if historically 
understandable, faith in environmental plentitude over scarcity”). 
173 See WELLS & LYNCH, supra note 171, at 117 (asserting that modern liberals now 
act “not merely to protect rights, but also to act positively to help create those condi-
tions which would allow genuine freedoms to flourish”). 
174 See Terence Ball, New Ethics for Old?  Or, How (Not) to Think About Future Generations 
(examining the ethical duty to minimize environmental impact for the benefit of future 
generations), in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 64, at 89, 89-90. 
175 See TIM HAYWARD, POLITICAL THEORY AND ECOLOGICAL VALUES 146-49 (1998) 
(arguing for a moral obligation to provide justice for, and minimize the suffering of, 
nonhumans as well as humans); Marcel Wissenburg, The Idea of Nature and the Nature of 
Distributive Justice (describing the relationship between humans and other species in 
theories of redistributive justice), in THE POLITICS OF NATURE, supra note 160, at 3, 8-14. 
176 See Wouter Achterberg, Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Environmental Crisis?  
Sustainability, Liberal Neutrality and Overlapping Consensus (explaining how sustainable 
development is consistent with Rawls’s theory of justice), in THE POLITICS OF NATURE, 
supra note 160, at 81, 95-99. 
177 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 154-58 (1971) (making the case for the 
adoption of the maximin rule in weighing competing alternative choices in terms of 
their distributive consequences). 
178 See HAYWARD, supra note 175, at 158-60 (arguing that Rawls’s “difference prin-
ciple” should be expanded to take the well-being of nonhumans into account).   
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b.  Distributive Justice and Political Legitimacy 
Environmental interests and the interests of low-income people 
tend to be underrepresented in political debates for similar reasons.179  
The harms they each seek to avert fall largely outside the view of 
mainstream middle-class society and its media outlets.  These groups 
depend on the uncertain and largely episodic support of altruists, 
many of whom have other commitments.180  Both therefore share a 
strong need for political legitimacy:  without it, some of their suppor-
ters who also believe in “good government” might defect while others 
might engage insufficiently for the cause to achieve salience. 
Improving social equity can strengthen society and better equip it 
to handle the stresses of profound changes of the kind involved in 
climate change regulation.181  Regulation addressing climate change 
will work one of the most profound transformations on society of any 
public act in recent times.  A deliberative process in which environ-
mental groups seek consensus only among themselves may contribute 
to the “further marginalisation of disadvantaged groups and perspec-
tives.”182  If that regulation is crafted without reflecting the interests of 
large numbers of low-income people, political legitimacy is likely to be 
lacking.183 
Pragmatically, a comprehensive response to climate change is im-
possible without addressing distributive justice concerns.  Effective ac-
tion against climate change requires international cooperation, and 
no international agreement that obstructs the economic development 
of poorer nations will win their assent.  Indeed, Article 4.7 of the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recogniz-
es that economic and social development and the eradication of po-
verty are the primary priorities of developing countries.184  Long-term 
 
179 See GRAHAM SMITH, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54-55 
(2003) (arguing that environmentalists and other minority groups are “systematically 
excluded” from the political process).  
180 See Super, supra note 60, at 595 (attributing instability in antipoverty law to the 
unreliability of altruistic support). 
181 See Munasinghe, supra note 165, at 56-57, 61 (arguing that decreases in social 
equity can “reduce the resilience of social systems and undermine governance”). 
182 SMITH, supra note 179, at 59. 
183 See id. at 65 (describing how legitimacy for environmental policymaking can be 
undermined by a failure to “reflect the plurality of environmental values expressed by 
citizens”).  
184 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4.7, opened for 
signature May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 166; see also 
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sales of carbon credits arranged by contemporary elites in developing 
countries may prove unsustainable when those elites lose power if the 
terms are perceived as locking the country into poverty.185  On the 
other hand, allowing those nations to increase their per capita emis-
sions to the current levels of affluent countries would doom efforts to 
restrain climate change.  The political legitimacy that careful atten-
tion to distributive justice brings is therefore crucial. 
Domestically, environmentalists depend on a broader apprecia-
tion of distributive justice’s importance.  Although “greater efficiency 
can go some way toward the goals of saving the environment and slow-
ing resource depletion . . . all but the genuinely poor in the North will 
be required to consume [fewer] resources.”186  Any successful interna-
tional regime, whether based on the Kyoto Protocol or not, therefore 
will have to require emissions reductions in affluent countries while 
allowing some, presumably moderated, growth in emissions in poor 
countries.  That system will face the same nationalistic attacks that 
confronted the Kyoto Protocol.  Apart from the realpolitik of interna-
tional relations—which is both normatively unappealing and all but 
impossible to convey to the lay public—distributive concerns are the 
main justification for such arrangements.  Accordingly, environmental-
ists need to find their collective voice on issues of distributive justice. 
c.  The Environmental Benefits of Reducing Wealth Inequality 
For strategic reasons, even narrowly focused environmentalists 
should care about the distributional impact of climate change and re-
sulting regulatory regimes.  Huge overall wealth disparities are not 
good for the environment.  With highly concentrated wealth typically 
comes highly concentrated political power, which is likely to be 
wielded selfishly to defend lucrative practices despite harm to the en-
vironment.187  At the other end of the distribution, dire necessity moti-
vates many environmentally destructive practices, from slash-and-burn 
agriculture to overlumbering to poaching endangered species.  When 
the survival of someone’s family is at stake, only the most repressive 
and costly enforcement regimes will have any chance of achieving 
 
FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
93 (2004) (discussing this provision).  
185 Cf. YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra note 184, at 156-57 (explaining the United Nations’ 
efforts to build legitimacy for carbon-emissions regulation in developing nations). 
186 Peffer, supra note 166, at 143. 
187 Cf. Wissenburg, supra note 175, at 5 (noting that some attribute the danger that 
humans pose to nature to “capitalism, industrialism, consumerism . . . or individualism”).  
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compliance with environmental rules.  The environmental initiatives 
of elites that threatened the well-being of low-income people have 
been perceived as oppressive and spawned sharp resistance.188  Put in 
more affirmative terms, low-income people are likely to have among 
the highest marginal expected rate of return from additional expendi-
tures such as those on education or safer housing; the pursuit of these 
returns will motivate them to subordinate compliance with environ-
mental regimes.189 
A single regime of incentives will have difficulty working across a 
broad income distribution:  additional costs that the affluent shrug off 
may devastate impoverished families.  This raises both political and 
humanitarian obstacles to effectively deterring the environmentally 
destructive conduct of the affluent.  Offsetting much of their impact 
on low-income people therefore allows calibration of incentives to 
change the behavior of affluent people, who typically consume more. 
Moreover, low-income people may lack the resources to make en-
vironmentally desirable investments even when policy succeeds in 
making those investments financially advantageous.  A family might 
save considerable money over the next decade by insulating its house, 
buying a new, greener heating system, or purchasing a more energy-
efficient car.  But this is simply not an option if the family lacks the 
funds to make those investments and is too poor to have access to af-
fordable credit. 
d.  Institutional Estoppel:  The Environmental Justice Movement 
Over the past couple of decades, the environmental movement 
has received significant support from allies of low-income people 
through the environmental justice movement.  This group has natural 
interests in the distributional aspects of carbon-emissions regulation.  
While mainstream environmentalists seek to reduce aggregate pollu-
tion,190 the environmental justice movement’s focus is distributional:  
 
188 See, e.g., Niraja Gopal Jayal, Balancing Political and Ecological Values (explaining 
the displacement of people as a direct consequence of the creation of national parks in 
India and the people’s subsequent responses of political insurgency, violence, and in-
cendiarism), in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 64, at 65, 72-82. 
189 See Wallack, supra note 58, at 172-73 (describing the problem of overvaluing the 
future harm associated with global warming while undervaluing our obligation not to 
allow present harm, which results in some present needs remaining unmet).  
190 See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:  
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 1-
9 (2001) (using a case study to compare the strategies and goals of modern environ-
mentalists to the goals and strategies of the environmental justice movement).  
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the disproportionate concentration of polluters in low-income com-
munities and, even more, in communities of color.191  The movement 
has attacked both the procedures for selecting these sites, because 
they exclude vulnerable communities’ voices, and the disparate im-
pacts that result from the greater presence of polluters in low-income 
communities.192  In doing so, the movement has brought democratic 
values and the terms of the social contract to the fore of environmen-
tal discourse.193  Although the environmental justice movement’s place 
within the broader environmental movement is by no means uncon-
troversial, most of the broader movement has welcomed this alliance.  
Having accepted distributional arguments that strengthen their agen-
da, a group could seem hypocritical objecting to these concerns’ in-
clusion in climate change debates. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined 
environmental justice as preventing disproportionate effects of nega-
tive exposures.194  Higher prices are a necessary but negative conse-
quence of carbon-emissions regulation, and they will consume a dis-
proportionate share of low-income people’s resources.  That negative 
exposure thus would seem to make this an issue of environmental jus-
tice.  To date, however, the environmental justice movement has re-
mained largely silent.  Instead, it has continued to focus on geograph-
ically distinct communities, rather than on people of color and low-
income people generally.  Cap-and-trade systems’ focus on aggregate 
emissions arouses deep opposition among environmental justice ad-
vocates who have seen past aggregate limits met by reducing pollution 
 
191 See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
4 (2002) (discussing studies finding that a higher proportion of hazardous-waste facili-
ties are situated in predominantly African American communities). 
192 See id. at 3 (noting that the communities most impacted by environmental is-
sues are often excluded from the process of decisionmaking as a result of a lack of re-
sources and specialized knowledge).  
193 See id. at 4 (describing how environmental justice concerns have spurred execu-
tive and administrative action, such as the efforts of the EPA to include community res-
idents in environmental policy decisions). 
194 See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,681, 10,682-83 (2000) (discussing the EPA’s Office of Environmental Justice’s stan-
dard definition of environmental justice); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Frequently Asked 
Questions:  Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/faqs/ 
ej/#faq2 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (“[N]o group of people, including racial, ethnic, 
or socioeconomic groups, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative envi-
ronmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial  
operations . . . .”). 
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in affluent, white areas.195  More generally, some environmental justice 
advocates have become convinced that market-based regulation syste-
matically disadvantages vulnerable communities,196 and they advocate a 
command-and-control model.197  Consequently, many environmental 
justice groups have opposed the basic regulatory concept,198 leaving 
them ill-positioned to influence the design of particular legislation. 
Yet while the environmental justice movement is not engaged, its 
critics may react to proposals to offset the regressive effects of higher 
carbon costs in a manner similar to their reaction to other environ-
mental justice proposals.  Some traditional environmentalists have re-
jected the environmental justice agenda as a special interest displacing 
core environmental concerns;199 they could argue that addressing the 
distributional and fiscal consequences of carbon regulation could slow 
progress toward the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions either 
politically, by complicating the enactment of legislation, or practically, 
by attenuating incentives to conserve.  Legislation often depends on 
“unholy alliances” between environmentalists and industry;200 bringing 
 
195 To be sure, the effects of carbon dioxide emissions are identical regardless of 
their geographic source.  Environmental justice advocates believe, however, that many 
of the largest sources of carbon dioxide also produce “hot-spots” of other pollutants 
with strong local effects.  Shutting down these sources thus would improve the envi-
ronments of affected communities.  See Lily N. Chinn, Comment, Can the Market Be Fair 
and Efficient?  An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80, 
95 (1999) (describing environmentalists’ concern about hot spots forming around fa-
cilities that choose to buy carbon-emissions credits rather than reduce their pollution).  
196 But see Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:  Dis-
proportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1390 (1994) (arguing that 
market dynamics make it likely that low-income people and people of color will live 
near locally undesirable land uses); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 75, 84-87 (1996) (discussing studies calling environmental justice advo-
cates’ concerns over disparate minority impact into question). 
197 See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity:  Do Market-Based Environmental Re-
forms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 162 (1999) (sug-
gesting that command and control are necessary as “safety nets” to ensure the protec-
tion of low-income communities).  
198 See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice:  
Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 268-
83 (1999) (citing Los Angeles’s negative experience with pollution trading as evidence 
that pollution trading can produce “immoral, unjust, and ineffective outcomes”).  
199 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 191, at 5 (presenting the view that the 
environmental justice movement should be seen as representing basic fairness rather 
than a special interest). 
200 See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”:  The Distributional Effects 
of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 813-14 (1993) (noting that commer-
cial interests, perceiving a potential economic advantage, have formed alliances with 
some environmental interests).  
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more interests to the table threatens to disrupt those deals.  The 
broad scope of concerns espoused by the environmental justice 
movement—including opposition to military occupation and oppres-
sion and sweeping support for political, economic, and cultural self-
determination201—has increased traditional environmentalists’ con-
cern that it would draw environmentalists far afield from their core 
concerns and embroil them in most contemporary political debates.  
These fears are likely to work against admitting the consequences for 
low-income people and the federal fisc into climate change debates. 
On the other hand, some critiques of environmental justice have 
little applicability to low-income offsets in climate change legislation.  
Both the direct costs of the consultative processes and uncertainty 
about their outcomes make industry more resistant to regulation, pos-
sibly necessitating concessions on the substantive level of emissions 
reductions.  Directing the proceeds of carbon regulation to low-
income offsets and deficit reduction would not affect the underlying 
regulatory structure or, as a result, industry’s costs.  Others see bu-
reaucratic review processes as dampening citizen activism;202 an effi-
cient system of low-income offsets need not provide such distraction.  
Debates about whether to emphasize ex ante chances or ex post re-
sults203 are also irrelevant to these economic subsidies. 
2.  Necessity of Legislative Response 
The impacts of carbon-cost increases on low-income people are 
far too great to be resolved without legislation.  Aid to low-income 
people in general requires legislation204 because the satisfaction of 
 
201 See FIRST NAT’L PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVTL. LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, PRINCIPLES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1991), available at http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.pdf 
(spelling out seventeen concerns of the environmental justice movement, including 
nuclear testing, cultural self-determination, military occupation, and the United States’ 
treatment of Native Americans).  
202 See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 114-21 (1998) (explaining how public-lobbying activism is 
“more hospitable to formal analysis” than grassroots activism). 
203 See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It?  Environmental Justice and the Sit-
ing of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1031 (1993) (describing 
ex post and ex ante schemes for compensating communities for net losses caused by 
locally undesirable land uses). 
204 Redistribution commonly arises either as a form of insurance to protect those 
currently comfortable against the risk of destitution or in response to norms of fair-
ness.  See MUELLER, supra note 105, at 45-47, 49-51 (suggesting that redistribution aris-
es because, in certain situations where a degree of uncertainty about the future exists, 
redistribution can sometimes be Pareto optimal).  In this model, greater risk aversion 
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helping the less fortunate is a public good that cannot effectively be 
confined to those that pay.205  And just as collective action problems 
doom significant private redistributions of money, so too do they 
hamper redistributions of the political capital needed to win salience 
for antipoverty legislation.206 
The proceeds from regulating carbon emissions could easily dissi-
pate in ways similar to other past programmatic windfalls obtained 
without simultaneous requirements to redistribute the proceeds.  The 
tobacco companies’ vast settlement of their liability to Medicaid for 
tobacco-caused illnesses touched off budgetary feeding frenzies at 
both the federal and state levels.  Both executive officials and legisla-
tors at the federal and state levels struggled to find principles for ad-
judicating the numerous proposals before them.  In the end, Congress 
ducked the issue, ceding its share of the settlement to the states de-
spite the fact that it had paid three-fifths of the costs giving rise to the 
settlement (as well as half of states’ litigation costs).207  State allocations 
of tobacco-settlement funds ranged from visionary to embarrassing.208 
A similar process occurred when states realized large savings from 
the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and the developmentally 
disabled.  Assisted living, habilitation, and outpatient mental health 
services would have cost only a modest fraction of the savings and 
could have made deinstitutionalization an unqualified success.  In-
stead, the savings from the closed facilities disappeared into states’ 
general funds, divided among myriad spending and tax initiatives with 
stronger political support.  Without the needed support, community-
 
can lead to greater redistribution.  See id. at 604 (“Less extreme risk aversion leads to 
less extreme (egalitarian) principles of justice.”).  Nonetheless, low-income offsets for 
rising carbon prices are unlikely to succeed through an insurance model, as the harm 
against which they guard is chronic rather than acute.  
205 See id. at 47-49 (describing the free-riding problem that may occur if redistribution 
is achieved through voluntary charity rather than through government intervention). 
206 These difficulties in achieving salience should not be construed as failures on 
the merits.  Amounts redistributed may be too small for more affluent people to no-
tice.  See id. at 575-76 (noting that individuals are sometimes indifferent to small 
changes in utility). 
207 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d)(3)(B) (2006).  
208 See Derrick Z. Jackson, Op-Ed., The Governor’s Game of Chance, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 22, 2007, at A11 (comparing successful examples of allocating tax revenues for 
purposes like school assistance to state use of the tobacco settlement for purposes “that 
have nothing to do with stopping smoking”). 
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based services could not handle the influx of deinstitutionalized 
people, and many ended up living on the streets.209 
3.  Frequent Disregard of Low-Income People’s Interests 
Policymaking disproportionately disadvantages low-income people 
and people of color because, all too often, low-income people lack the 
political power to block policies that disregard their interests.  The af-
fluent, on the other hand, hold sufficient political power to protect 
their interests.  Moreover, because most policymaking begins from the 
baseline of current policy—current law, last year’s funding level, the 
results of past political battles—the historical disadvantages in policy-
making that low-income people and people of color have experienced 
are compounded.  They have less to offer in exchange for any new ac-
commodations they seek.  Further, they enjoy fewer countermajorita-
rian protections from the Takings Clause,210 and their interests may be 
subject to countermajoritarian threats from tax-limitation rules at the 
state and local level and from federal budget-process rules that disfa-
vor progressive fiscal policies.211 
The process of negotiating climate change policy could easily fol-
low—and compound—this pattern.  Such regulation is, in a broad 
sense, a public good.212  Although providing a new public good fi-
nanced in a distributionally neutral manner does not affect the need 
for redistribution if the public good is a perfect substitute for private 
consumption,213 moderating climate change is unlikely to be such a 
substitute. 
 
209 The much-anticipated “peace dividend” resulting from the end of the Cold 
War is arguably a third example, with programs to fund peaceful employment for Rus-
sian nuclear physicists underfunded even as demands for defense spending plum-
meted.  See Jeff Nesmith, A Case of Russian Roulette?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 15, 1998, 
at B4.  On the other hand, because the United States was running huge budget deficits 
at the time, reductions in defense spending did not free up funds so much as they re-
duced unsupported spending. 
210 See Edward Imperatore, Note, Discriminatory Condemnations and the Fair Housing 
Act, 96 GEO. L.J. 1027, 1038-39 (2008) (noting that the ability of legislators to condemn 
“blighted” areas, broadly defined, has a disparate impact on minorities). 
211 Super, supra note 152, at 2614-40.  Federal budget rules favor the affluent by 
exempting tax expenditures from the automatic reductions they impose to enforce 
budget targets.  See 2 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 902(c)(1) (2006). 
212 For a conceptual discussion of the effect supply of public goods has on income 
distribution, see generally Louis Kaplow, Public Goods and the Distribution of Income, 50 
EUR. ECON. REV. 1627 (2006). 
213 Id. at 1643. 
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Moreover, increasing the cost of energy is likely to adversely affect 
many low-income people in powerful but indirect ways for which no 
ready response is possible.  Over the past six decades, the affluent 
have moved to suburbia, abandoning central cities to low-income 
people.  As the costs of commuting increase, wealthier workers are 
likely to find homes closer to the city center more attractive, bidding 
up housing costs and driving low-income people out of neighbor-
hoods where they have lived much of their lives.  Shortening com-
mutes and increasing population density are sufficiently important 
means of reducing carbon emissions that government policy will 
probably not intervene on low-income communities’ behalf.  Even 
identifying which low-income people suffered from this sudden gen-
trification would be difficult, meaning that these and other indirect 
losses are likely to receive no offset.  All the more urgent, therefore, is 
the offsetting of direct losses that will be felt by low-income people 
when energy costs rise. 
C.  Admitting Fiscal Concerns to the Climate Change Debate 
The case for including major deficit reduction in climate change 
legislation is more complex.  Like aid to low-income people, deficit 
reduction suffers from severe collective action problems in the politi-
cal arena:  many people support it in principle, but few do so with 
enough fervor to engage in concerted political action.  Therefore, 
deficit reduction has little chance to muscle its way into climate 
change legislation.  The principles developed in Section II.A, howev-
er, offer a compelling ethical case for its inclusion. 
A claim for deficit reduction is not defensive in the simplistic 
sense:  no one is proposing climate change legislation that would add 
to the federal deficit.214  Climate change legislation could, however, 
severely undermine deficit reduction politically.  With one major po-
litical party defining itself by its opposition to taxes and the other 
treating the topic gingerly, two major rounds of tax increases are un-
 
214 This is not so at the state and local level:  increasing carbon costs could devas-
tate state and local governments.  Accordingly, compensatory intergovernmental aid 
may be an important component of carbon-emissions legislation.  See Super, supra note 
152, at 2571-74 (describing how the model of federal compensation can be used to re-
duce the negative externalities imposed on state and local governments through fed-
eral regulation).  The claim here, however, is to devote the proceeds of emissions regu-
lation to federal deficit reduction, and that claim is not truly defensive. 
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likely to pass within a few months, or even years, of one another.215  
Enactment of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system perceived to be 
the equivalent of a tax will therefore eliminate one of the two main 
tools for deficit reduction.  Eliminating with spending cuts alone a 
structural deficit of the kind this country had built even before the fi-
nancial crisis would be difficult or impossible and, in any event, would 
almost certainly be highly regressive.216 
Estoppel arguments for deficit reduction will also be controversial.  
Some environmentalists resist attempts to compare environmental 
protection with other values; this concern becomes especially acute 
with regard to monetized nonenvironmental values.217  On the other 
hand, the environmental movement’s effectiveness depends on its 
ability to reconcile groups with sharply differing worldviews,218 and in 
important respects many environmentalists share ethical assumptions 
with deficit hawks.  Both emphasize ethical duties to future genera-
tions219 and the risk of bequeathing to those generations problems 
much more easily solved in our time.  Both groups are broadly critical 
of unbridled consumption.  Thus, devoting most of the proceeds of 
carbon-emissions regulation to reducing the deficit reinforces impor-
tant themes on which the environmental movement depends; declin-
ing to do so could cause some to question the sincerity of the move-
ment’s commitment to future generations. 
Additionally, including significant deficit reduction in the legisla-
tion would bring political benefits, helping to win support among 
conservative Democrats with weak environmental credentials but 
strong concern for fiscal probity.  This support may well not compare 
with what the legislation could garner spreading its proceeds around 
to myriad interest groups.  It would be enough, however, for deficit 
hawks to claim legitimately that they are bringing something to the 
table. 
 
215 Even if a second round of tax increases were politically feasible, they might well 
be devoted to broadening health care coverage rather than reducing the deficit.  
216 To the extent spending cuts would be the result, this analysis converges with 
that in Section III.B. 
217 See SMITH, supra note 179, at 37-40 (“[E]nvironmental and other values are of-
ten incommensurable, and the representation of these different values by . . . [a mone-
tary valuation] is illegitimate.”). 
218 See id. at 21-27 (“We are faced with living alongside people with different pers-
pectives on the significance of environmental values.  But, we need common action on 
enterprises such as protecting the environment.”).  
219 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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Deficit reduction cannot be achieved without legislation.  And as 
noted above, the lack of a large constituency committed to deficit re-
duction contributes to legislative inaction despite the rhetorical sa-
lience of the issue in political discourse and the media.  In deficit-
reduction packages, the appeal of the whole far exceeds that of the 
sum of its parts.  The long odds of passing legislation, coupled with 
the political costs of proposing specific spending cuts or tax increases, 
even absent enactment, keeps most legislators from offering specific 
deficit-reduction proposals.  When deficit reduction does occur, it typ-
ically is in a panicky, ill-considered, and regressive manner.  Thus, get-
ting thoughtful deficit reduction considered on the merits outside the 
context of the climate change legislation, although possible, remains 
quite unlikely. 
Finally, deficit reduction has repeatedly been subordinated to 
other interests, including environmental ones.  President Bush re-
peatedly won support for tax cuts that he argued would stimulate the 
economy.  These cuts, however, eliminated a substantial budget sur-
plus and created large deficits.  President Bush and Congress also ap-
proved dramatic increases in spending for homeland security and 
wars overseas, further exacerbating the deficit.  Significantly, during 
the Clinton administration, arguments about the importance of envi-
ronmental programs played a significant part in blocking domestic 
spending reductions.220  Most recently, congressional leaders won 
House passage of the $700 billion bailout bill for the financial industry 
by incorporating over $100 billion of popular tax cuts in the pack-
age.221  Among these were environmental measures such as tax credits 
for developing alternative fuels.  Postponing deficit reduction again in 
passing carbon-emissions legislation would only confirm its status as a 
political afterthought. 
III.  ACCOMMODATING ENVIRONMENTAL, DISTRIBUTIONAL,  
AND FISCAL CONCERNS 
Even if distributional and fiscal concerns are admitted to the cli-
mate change debate, their success is far from assured.  Both compete 
for funding with numerous other interests, many of which also have 
 
220 See Elaine S. Povich & Martin Kasindorf, A Balance by 2002:  Budget Accord Would 
Wipe Out Federal Deficit, NEWSDAY (New York), May 2, 1997, at A3 (noting President 
Clinton’s repeated invocation of environmental programs in resisting Republicans’ 
budget proposals).  
221 See Maura Reynolds et al., Senate OKs Sweetened Bailout Bill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2008, at 1. 
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legitimate claims to consideration under these same criteria.  Because 
of this country’s massive long-term fiscal imbalance, if deficit reduc-
tion cannot defeat most other claims for the proceeds of a carbon-
emissions regulatory regime, a fiscally responsible climate change pol-
icy will be impossible.  Low-income subsidies are comparatively afford-
able but are conceptually, administratively, and politically more com-
plex.  To avoid causing severe hardship and political resistance to in-
increasing carbon costs, a subsidy system must reach all, or at least the 
vast majority of, people most at risk of being disadvantaged by rising 
energy costs.  Further, it must do so without undermining the larger 
legislation’s incentives for carbon-emissions reduction, without creat-
ing a new bureaucracy that could become a lightning rod for criti-
cism, and without restarting any of the emotional political battles that 
have surrounded antipoverty policy. 
This Part asserts that a fiscally responsible and distributionally sen-
sitive climate change policy can meet those demands.  Section III.A 
shows how many of the supposedly targeted subsidies competing for 
the money that climate change legislation will make available are in 
fact inefficient to the point of futility.  Section III.B shows that the low-
income subsidies in major proposals are also woefully inefficient and 
that existing antipoverty programs are too brittle to be able to prevent 
these new subsidy funds from supplanting their existing resources.  
This Section demonstrates how those programs can nonetheless be 
reorganized and consolidated to provide an effective and well-targeted 
response to the burdens climate change regulation will impose on 
low-income people. 
A.  Fiscally Responsible Climate Change Policy 
A carbon tax makes as much sense fiscally as it does environmen-
tally.  The federal budget faces severe structural imbalances.  Six years 
into the recent economic expansion, at a point in the business cycle 
when the federal government ought to have been accumulating large 
surpluses to pay down the national debt, it was still running large defi-
cits.  The severe structural deficits these figures suggest are far more 
troubling than the cyclical deficits that have emerged during the past 
two years as the economic slowdown reduces revenues and increases 
claims for unemployment compensation and for need-based benefits 
such as food stamps and Medicaid.222  Even more ominously, the con-
 
222 In 2008, Congress renamed food stamps the “Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program” (SNAP).  See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
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fluence of demographic changes and exploding health care costs is 
projected to overwhelm the federal budget once the baby boomers 
begin retiring in large numbers in less than five years. 
Whether Congress addresses these deficits through tax increases, 
spending cuts, or a combination of the two, the effect will be deflatio-
nary.  Put another way, the federal government’s current hyper-
stimulation of the economy is unsustainable.  If increasing the drag on 
the economy is inevitable, doing so in a way that steers us toward low-
er carbon emissions is logical.  Conversely, manipulating climate 
change policy to avoid macroeconomic effects only to recreate those 
same effects a few years later would accomplish little. 
A carbon tax with much of its revenue dedicated to deficit reduc-
tion and debt retirement therefore would be well-timed.  A cap-and-
trade system can be designed to achieve similar effects.  If the federal 
government auctions off, rather than gives away, emissions permits, 
the resulting revenues should be equivalent to those under a carbon 
tax achieving a comparable level of CO2 reductions.  In either system, 
the market will reach equilibrium when prices rise to a level that limits 
aggregate demand to the specified reduced levels.  Under a carbon 
tax, the government will increase those prices directly with its tax. 
A significant part of a fiscally responsible climate change policy is 
fending off the countless suitors for funds raised.  The deficiencies of 
claims to subsidize existing emitters under the guise of compensation 
are discussed above.223  Another major claim on these resources is for 
funding a wide variety of state, local, and private sector activities re-
lated to climate change.  Some involve research and development into 
cleaner energy technologies, techniques for sequestering carbon, or 
methods for helping humans or wildlife adapt to climate change that 
is not now preventable.  Others involve operating subsidies for state, 
local, and private sector efforts at mitigation of or adaptation to cli-
mate change.  Together, these claims could consume all resources, 
and many have been joined liberally in the pending proposals.  
Beyond the aesthetic defects of this interest group feeding frenzy, se-
rious procedural and substantive concerns counsel against granting 
many of these claims. 
Procedurally, the negotiations are taking place among too con-
strained a universe of interests.  The burdens of climate change regu-
 
110-234, § 4001(b), 122 Stat. 923, 1092.  To minimize confusion, this Article follows 
the still-prevalent custom of referring to the program as “food stamps.” 
223 See supra Section I.C. 
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lation will not be limited to ecological interests, and decisions about 
how to manage its fiscal and economic consequences should not be so 
limited.  Issues this fundamental are proper subjects of society-wide 
dialogue.224  Climate change regulation itself will be widely discussed, 
but these spending decisions are being addressed in the fine print of 
this legislation. 
An important feature of the House bill and the emerging Senate 
bill is the creation of dedicated funds devoted to one or another envi-
ronmental purpose.225  Alas, dedicated funds tend to skew public 
priority setting.  They foster the artificial sense that spending up to 
the amount in the fund is costless.  This hinders comparisons between 
the value of projects eligible for the special fund and the value of 
putting the funds to some other public or private use.  The reduced 
political competition can engender sloppy, inefficient public man-
agement.  Rarely is the amount of money raised by the segregated 
revenue stream a good proxy for the sums needed for the designated 
activities.  In practice, these funding arrangements can operate as 
floors:  they ensure that spending will at least equal receipts from the 
specified source but impose little political barrier to the pursuit of 
more from the general fund.  Attempts to divert funds for other prior-
ities are denounced as “raids,” almost as if they were takings of private 
property.226  Some state governments have found their ability to meet 
public needs without taxing at politically untenable levels hampered 
by permanent earmarks, which are often enacted by voter initiatives.227  
Dubious spending from the highway trust fund228 and public confu-
 
224 Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 161, at 4-19 (locating open, mutually respectful di-
alogue at the core of liberal democracy).  
225 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., 
§ 321 (providing for the distribution of emission allowances for certain adaptations); 
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong., § 370 (2009) (pro-
viding allowances to states to perform natural-resources adaptation activities). 
226 At times, skillful political actors have managed to enshrine these limitations 
into contracts with private parties, making them enforceable under the Contracts 
Clause.  See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER:  ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF 
NEW YORK 624-26 (1974) (detailing the effort of Robert Moses to use bond contracts to 
expand the power of New York public authorities). 
227 See Super, supra note 152, at 2617-20 (describing how dedicated funding 
streams can crowd out spending on other basic programs). 
228 See ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, GETTING 
SERIOUS ABOUT DEFICITS?  CALLS TO OFFSET HURRICANE SPENDING MISS THE POINT; 
BALANCED SET OF FIRST STEPS TOWARD FISCAL DISCIPLINE NEEDED 8-9 (2005) (discuss-
ing the more than $22 billion in earmarked projects, many of which are unmerito-
rious, within highway legislation). 
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sion about the meaning of the Social Security and Medicare trust 
funds show that the federal system is not immune to these problems.229 
A general substantive concern with many claims for the proceeds 
of a carbon tax or permit sale is that the claims’ justification assumes 
an unrealistically static baseline.  Proposals for the federal government 
to fund an activity naturally and appropriately give rise to the question 
of why the private sector or other levels of government are not doing 
so.  Absent obvious cases of impossibility (e.g., funding national de-
fense or foreign policy), the most common answer is that, for whatev-
er reason, no one else is in fact providing the needed funding.  If all 
other potential funders’ preferences were fixed, this might be reason-
ably persuasive.  Here, however, it ignores the highly dynamic nature 
of both the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and the underly-
ing process of climate change itself.  For example, although emissions 
reduction clearly would benefit from more research on alternative 
energy sources than is now being funded, emissions regulation will 
make that research far more remunerative for private industry.230 
Similarly, although some may argue that state and local govern-
ments could usefully increase their planning for climate change miti-
gation and adaptation, their failure to do so likely reflects the limited 
salience of climate change as a public concern.  State and local gov-
ernments focus their efforts on activities important to their electo-
rates; as climate change proceeds and emissions restrictions intensify 
their impact, these issues will command more public concern and will 
consume greater shares of state and local planning budgets.  These 
costs will come, perhaps, at the expense of road building or opulent 
holiday lighting.  None of the three major justifications for federal 
subsidization of state and local governments applies broadly here.  For 
the most part, state and local governments have a weak case for fiscal 
compensation, as they are not losing a major source of support, and 
the burdens of climate change and emissions regulations do not fall 
 
229 See HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM:  THE 
GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 51-53 (2001) (describing confusion over the nature of 
Social Security and Medicare reserves stemming from the view that the reserves do 
nothing more than hold “paper” assets). 
230 A technique for reducing consumption that would cost five dollars for every 
gallon of gasoline saved might not seem worth developing in the United States if eco-
nomic conditions are likely to remain as they are.  With emissions regulations sure to 
raise the cost of gasoline well above that threshold, however, this technique is likely to 
draw eager corporate attention. 
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disproportionately on them.231  The federal government enjoys no par-
ticular advantage in funding these activities relative to state and local 
governments (beyond its possession of a generally more efficient rev-
enue structure).232  Furthermore, no special need for federal leader-
ship in the design of state and local programs is evident; if anything, 
states and localities have been well ahead of the federal government 
in responding to climate change.233 
This is not to say that all proposals for spending on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation are premature.  Some market fail-
ures are predictable even in a world addressing climate change far 
more forcefully than ours.  For example, private businesses have great 
difficulty capturing the beneficial effects of basic scientific research 
that could lead to breakthroughs in conservation or clean energy.  
Similarly, improving science education at all levels will facilitate miti-
gation and adaptation in future generations, but its benefits will not 
accrue particularly to the states or localities that provide it.  These 
cases, however, seem more the exception than the rule. 
An additional substantive concern with many proposals is that 
they would have the federal government support activities already un-
derway, or likely to begin soon, at the state or local government level 
or in the private sector.  Shared-financing schemes, although having 
considerable aesthetic and even ethical appeal, tend to be extremely 
inefficient in practice.  When a new donor contributes to an existing 
activity, existing donors will tend to withdraw some of their funds.  
This is true as between committees in Congress, between the various 
levels of government, and between the public and private sectors.  
Thus, devoting proceeds from carbon regulation to many research ac-
tivities is likely to crowd out other funding sources, wasting most of 
 
231 See Super, supra note 152, at 2571-74 (describing the compensatory model of 
fiscal federalism under which the federal government pays states and local govern-
ments for the costs its actions impose).  An exception may be regions heavily depen-
dent on coal mining.  Both the states of the coal belts and the people economically 
dependent on coal mining may need funds to adjust to these economic changes. 
232 See id. at 2574-77 (describing the superior-capacity model in which the federal 
government assists states with functions that their revenue bases are insufficient to 
handle).  For example, most costs associated with climate change mitigation and adap-
tation are either procyclical—becoming worse when the economy is strong and con-
sumers have more money to spend on emissions-producing activities—or noncyclical.  
The federal government’s superior capacity to engage in countercyclical spending is 
thus not implicated. 
233 See id. at 2577-79 (describing the leadership model under which the federal 
government uses its resources to further national priorities). 
SUPER FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  9:53 PM 
2010] Carbon-Emissions Control and Legislative Joinder 1163 
the new federal funds and yielding only a small expansion of the de-
sired activities. 
 At least once initial start-up costs have been covered, the marginal 
benefit of each dollar of funding in most public activities declines as 
funding increases.  In a research program, for example, the first dol-
lars go to the most promising investigations; additional funding allows 
a second tier of somewhat less-valuable projects to proceed, and so on.  
Each rational donor contributes to an activity until the marginal value 
it places on the next increment of that activity ceases to exceed the 
marginal value it places on competing uses for those funds. 
 When multiple donors contribute to the same project, each will 
have a different set of competing uses for its funds and different 
norms guiding its evaluation of those uses.234  Therefore, each will 
place a different value on what could be accomplished by an addi-
tional contribution to its shared project, and each will have a different 
threshold that such contributions must be able to meet to prevail over 
other uses for the funds.  When a new donor begins to contribute to a 
project, its funds support activities that existing donors had not 
deemed sufficiently valuable to support.  If the original donor then 
reduces its contributions, it can divert those funds to other activities 
that it values more highly than the newly funded activity of the shared 
program.  The original donor may reduce its contributions by the en-
tire amount that the new donor provided.  Alternatively, it may allow 
the shared program to experience some increase in income, either to 
induce continued support from its funding partner or because it has a 
limited number of appealing competing priorities for the money that 
it could withdraw. 
Consider a simple example in which two donors are weighing five 
projects, each of which costs the same.235  Table 2 suggests how the re-
spective donors might value the projects’ likely results.  Suppose the 
original donor funds Projects A, B, and C but does not fund Project D, 
valued at 10, because it has another, unrelated activity that it values at 
13 that it can support with the same funds.  When the second donor 
appears, with its different valuations of the possible projects, its only 
question is whether to fund Projects D and E when the other three 
projects are already underway.  If the second donor has no options 
 
234 One locality may think an additional production at the opera company is more 
important than a visiting exhibition at the art museum; another may reverse these 
priorities; and a third may have no opera company or art museum to fund.   
235 Dropping the assumption that the cost of each project is identical adds an ad-
ditional step to the calculations but does not change the results. 
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worth more than 12, it will find it advantageous to provide funds suffi-
cient for one additional activity, namely Project D.  When the original 
donor sees this, however, it may consider cutting its funding by one-
third.  This will reduce total program funding to the level sufficient to 
support three projects, which surely will be A, B, and C.  The first do-
nor’s withdrawal of funding will sacrifice Project D but will enable it to 
fund the unrelated project that it values more. 
The original donor’s withdrawal of one-third of its funding then 
poses a dilemma for the new donor.  Project D is, again, unfunded.  
The new donor may still be spending money elsewhere on activities it 
values less than 12 and hence may be inclined to transfer its funding 
into the joint program to resuscitate Project D.  Doing so, however, 
may induce the original donor to withdraw further funds if that donor 
still has other, outside activities it prefers to Project D.  If the second 
donor resents this, or if the donor measured the cost-effectiveness of 
its funding relative to the program’s operations before it became in-
volved, it will withhold additional funding and may even abandon the 
program altogether.  On the other hand, the second donor may not 
understand the dynamics of the original donor’s behavior or may use 
a more recent baseline and not notice the withdrawal.  If so, this see-
saw process in which the new donor increases its contributions while 
the prior one withdraws funding will continue until either one donor 
has completely exited the program or both donors’ thresholds for ad-
ditional contributions lie between the value to them of the last funded 
activity and that of the first unfunded function. 
 
Table 2:  Donors’ Valuation of Jointly Funded Program  
(Ordinal Consensus) 
 
Project Value to Original 
Donor








This example assumes that both donors apply the same ordinal 
ranking to the program’s activities, even if they assign different abso-
lute values to those activities.  This assumption will hold in many kinds 
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of programs, such as research efforts in which a scientific consensus 
exists or a humanitarian program serving people of varying levels of 
deprivation.  On the other hand, two donors can come to a program 
of common interest with different priorities.  Both, for example, may 
support expanding access to health care, but one may think primarily 
in terms of people with disabilities while another may emphasize 
children.  Table 3 provides a simple example of this:  one project 
(perhaps covering children with disabilities) is a consensus top priori-
ty, another (perhaps serving adults without disabilities) is lowest on 
both donors’ lists, but the two donors rank the three intermediate op-
tions quite differently.  If we again assume that the original donor finds 
it beneficial to fund Projects A, B, and C, but not D, the new donor will 
have a strong incentive to contribute so that Project D, its second priori-
ty, can get under way.  If the first donor is uninformed or naïve, it may 
again seek to withdraw funds, on the assumption that Project D will be 
the loser.  If it does, the program’s managers will face a dilemma.  
Dropping Project D may or may not fit their personal priorities, but it 
certainly seems the best way to induce the second donor to replace the 
funds the original donor has withdrawn.  On the other hand, doing so 
may incense the second donor.  If the second donor understands what 
is going on, it may earmark its contributions for Project D.  If the first 
donor is similarly aware, it may then earmark its contributions for 
Projects B and C, reasoning that project A will be in no real jeopardy as 
the second donor, like the first donor, assigns Project A top priority.  At 
the end of the day, the allocation of funding may be seriously subop-
timal from all participants’ perspectives as one or another player mis-
calculates the other’s moves and intentions.  The program’s funding al-
so is likely to be heavily earmarked, leaving its managers little ability to 
respond to changing needs or new opportunities. 
 
Table 3:  Donors’ Valuation of Jointly Funded Program 
(Ordinal Dissensus) 
 
Project Value to Original 
Donor
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Negotiation may ameliorate some of these problems.  Perhaps the 
two donors will agree to split the cost of Project A and then each fund 
some other activities in shares reflecting the priority each assigns to it.  
The incentives for dissembling in such negotiations, however, are 
quite strong.  In addition, each donor may continually endeavor to 
surreptitiously reduce its real contribution.  For example, one may ar-
range to contribute overvalued assets in kind or to double count 
money it gives the program’s operators for other purposes.  This ten-
dency will create the need for unusually burdensome accounting and 
a periodic need for renegotiations to address new financial gimmicks 
that one or the other donor has devised.  Moreover, any pact is likely 
to collapse any time either donor experiences a substantial increase or 
decrease in available resources or a major change in priorities or 
competing candidates for its funds. 
In translating this model into the real world, additional difficulties 
arise in arranging negotiations and enforcing the results.  When two 
sets of congressional committees try to pool their resources to support 
a common priority, the more nimble committee is generally able to 
leave its counterpart holding most of the bag.  Because they legislate 
annually, appropriations committees typically can outmaneuver au-
thorizing committees.  Thus, when authorizing committees seek to 
supplement an activity with mandatory funds, the appropriations 
committees respond by reducing the program’s discretionary funding 
in subsequent annual appropriations bills.236  Because the appropria-
tions committees act every year and most mandatory programs are 
reauthorized or reviewed only at several-year intervals, they have little 
immediate fear of a tit-for-tat response from the authorizers whose 
contributions they purloined.237  Authorizing committees that wish to 
increase funding for an activity receiving discretionary appropriations 
may have to convert the entire program, or at least clearly definable 
portions of it, to mandatory funding.  This is very costly for them and 
provides a large windfall to the appropriators unless the authorizing 
 
236 Alternatively, the appropriators can cancel the mandatory money each year and 
count the savings to increase their net allocation for discretionary spending:  a so-
called “ChIMP” (Change in Mandatory Programs). 
237 Shared responsibility between two equally nimble committees, such as two ap-
propriations subcommittees, has somewhat better prospects of yielding stable results.  
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committee can persuade the budget committees to reduce the appro-
priators’ allocations correspondingly.238 
When the federal government shares fiscal responsibility with oth-
er levels of government, it typically tries to prevent state and local gov-
ernments from withdrawing resources to offset federal funding.239  
Matching or maintenance-of-effort requirements are common means 
to this end.  These devices are only moderately effective and often en-
gender considerable conflict.240  Alternatively, the federal government 
can attempt to target its funding to one narrowly defined component 
of an activity and leave state and local governments to pay for the rest 
of the program.241  The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the 
precision with which the federal function can be defined, whether 
state or local governments regard the federal function as a substitute 
for the activities they fund, and whether accounting systems can be 
defined that will expose efforts to cross-subsidize other state and local 
activities from the federally supported activity. 
Preventing supplantation when government subsidizes activities 
that have received private support is even more difficult, in part be-
cause of the greater number and variety of private actors and in part 
because accounting restrictions that are politically acceptable when 
applied to other levels of government may be seen as overly intrusive 
if imposed on the private sector.242  An additional difficulty with shar-
ing financing with private for-profit entities—and some public and 
nonprofit ones—is preventing them from expropriating many of the 
 
238 See 2 U.S.C. § 633(a)(1) (2006) (providing for the allocation of spending 
among committees).  The budget committees, with OMB’s concurrence, also could 
make a technical readjustment of the appropriators’ baseline to reflect the fact that 
the latter no longer has responsibility to fund the activity in question.  Needless to say, 
the appropriators, who have several seats on the budget committees and vast power 
generally, vehemently resist such changes. 
239 The reverse, of course, is also true.  Suspicions that policymakers rely on sup-
port that programs receive from other sources in order to limit federal contributions 
can deter some state, local, and private support for programs.  Cf. Quattlebaum v. Bar-
ry, 671 A.2d 881, 890 (D.C. 1995) (en banc) (rejecting a claim that local welfare cuts—
imposed after a debate in which resulting food stamp increases were discussed—
violated federal law prohibiting state and local governments from counting food 
stamps as income to reduce other benefits). 
240 See Super, supra note 152, at 2568-79, 2586-88 (discussing the problems with vari-
ous cost-shifting mechanisms in areas of joint concern to federal and state governments).  
241 See id. at 2568-71, 2589-91 (examining problems with unmatched aid programs). 
242 Although not directly pertinent to the public policy issues discussed in this Ar-
ticle, sharing financial responsibility among private donors is also often complicated by 
the sheer number of donors to be coordinated and by the diversity of their prefe-
rences, financial capacity, and sophistication. 
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benefits that motivated the public financing.  The federal government 
would be unlikely to subsidize an art museum open only to members 
of an exclusive private club.  Yet the government funds a considerable 
amount of research whose resulting intellectual property is closely 
held by private firms or universities. 
B.  Protecting Low-Income People from Regressive Cost Increases 
Once a decision is made to attempt to offset the impoverishing ef-
fects of carbon-emissions controls on low-income people, a host of 
important philosophical and design questions remain.  Although 
some may seem quite technical, they are essential to ensuring the ef-
fectiveness of the offset program, making that program politically via-
ble over the long term, and preventing it from undermining the goals 
of climate change regulation itself. 
Subsection III.B.1 seeks lessons on program design from the un-
even history of energy-assistance efforts over the past several decades.  
Subsection III.B.2 synthesizes those lessons and considerations pecu-
liar to climate change regulation into three principles that should 
guide any system of low-income offsets.  Subsection III.B.3 then draws 
on these principles to propose such a program. 
1.  Lessons from Prior Efforts to Relieve Energy Costs 
We can gain considerable insight from existing policies for help-
ing low-income people cope with high energy costs.  Although this 
country has no coordinated response to this problem, it does have 
four programs worthy of note.  These programs vary widely as to mis-
sion, administration, financing, coverage, benefits, and incentive 
structures.  Comparing these efforts provides valuable insights for the 
design of a new system for offsetting the regressive effects of climate 
change regulation. 
First, the energy crisis of the early 1970s prompted Congress to es-
tablish the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP).243  WAP is a 
relatively small program in the U.S. Department of Energy funded 
with annual discretionary appropriations.  State and local human ser-
vices agencies administer WAP, exercising broad discretion over pro-
gram eligibility and benefits within fixed federal allocations.  Assis-
tance includes installing storm windows, sealing gaps around windows 
 
243 Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-385, §§ 411–
422, 90 Stat. 1125, 1151-58 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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and doors, replacing inefficient heaters and air conditioners, and in-
sulating attics and walls.244  Because of funding constraints, WAP has 
served only sixteen percent of the more than twenty-seven million 
households eligible for aid.245  Federal administrators have sought con-
tributions from states and utility companies, with very limited success.246 
Second, the energy crisis of the late 1970s spawned the Low-
Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).247  Congress 
created what became LIHEAP in 1979 as a temporary stop-gap with 
the proceeds of the windfall-profits tax it enacted on oil companies.248  
Congress subsequently reauthorized LIHEAP as an ongoing block 
grant to states funded through annual appropriations.  States have no 
particular expertise in designing means-tested programs, as the results 
in LIHEAP demonstrate.  Some provide thin, almost irrelevant, subsi-
dies to large numbers of people; others offer more substantial aid but 
only to a tiny fraction of low-income families.249 
Due to this wide variation among states, federal appropriators 
have little idea which kinds of families are likely to benefit from an in-
crease in funding.  Whether for that reason or because the appropria-
tions process has a notoriously short memory for commitments made 
to those without political capital, LIHEAP’s purchasing power has se-
verely eroded over the years (adjusting for changes in home-energy 
costs and the number of people living below the poverty line).  Real 
per-poor-person funding averaged about 80% of the 1980 level from 
1982 through 1987, but then began to fall precipitously—averaging 
60% from 1988 to 1991 before bottoming out at just 35% in 1996.250  
 
244 See U.S. Department of Energy, DOE Weatherization Assistance Program:  His-
tory of the Weatherization Assistance Program, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/ 
weatherization/history.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (discussing the measures taken 
to weatherize the homes of low-income people).  
245 U.S. Department of Energy, DOE Weatherization Assistance Program:  Reduc-
ing the Energy Burden on Needy Families, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/ 
weatherization/reducing.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
246 Id. 
247 Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 288 (1980) (repealed 1981).  
248 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 978 (1979) (codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.).  Congress enacted the windfall-profits tax in response to the combined 
effects of deregulation of oil prices and OPEC’s decision to raise crude oil prices by 
forty percent that summer.  
249 See DIV. OF ENERGY ASSISTANCE, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOW 
INCOME HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM:  REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2003, at 39-40 (2003) (analyzing state allotment schemes). 
250 Author’s calculations are based on federal budget authority by fiscal year, Cen-
sus Bureau estimates of the poverty population by calendar year, and the household-
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Despite the attention that high energy costs have received since the 
outset of the Second Gulf War, LIHEAP’s appropriations have re-
bounded to only 43% of their 1980 purchasing power.251  Since 1981, 
the number of low-income families meeting federal LIHEAP eligibility 
standards has risen from nineteen million to more than thirty-five mil-
lion while the number actually receiving aid has actually dropped, from 
around seven million to five million.252  Although the LIHEAP statute 
seeks to create incentives for states to contribute to the program, such 
contributions provide only a trivial portion of the program’s re-
sources.  This may reflect states’ sense that energy assistance has his-
torically been a federal responsibility or the fact that the sweeping 
flexibility they enjoy under LIHEAP’s block grant structure allows 
them to address their priorities without spending their own funds. 
A third major form of low-income energy assistance in this country 
comes from the federal rental-housing-subsidy programs.  These pro-
grams, the largest and most important of which are public housing, 
project-based Section 8 subsidies, and Section 8 housing vouchers,253 
provide relatively deep subsidies to about five million households, a 
small minority of eligible low-income families with children, elderly 
persons, and persons with disabilities.254  Beginning in the late 1960s, 
 
energy costs component of the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-
U) for October of each year.  
251 This figure is for 2008, the most recent year for which estimates of the poverty 
population are available.  
252 See C-SNAP, supra note 38, at 4 fig. (displaying the widening gap between those 
eligible for LIHEAP and those who actually receive aid). 
253 U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 to 1437z-7 (2006).  USDA’s Rural 
Development division operates similar but far smaller programs, primarily in rural 
areas.  This division operates on a utility allowance system closely paralleling that in 
HUD’s programs.  See 7 C.F.R. pt. 3560 (2008) (setting forth loan grant requirements 
for low-income households); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIRECT SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING 
LOANS AND GRANTS:  FIELD OFFICE HANDBOOK (rev. 2007), available at http://www.rur 
dev.usda.gov/regs/handbook/hb-1-3550/hb-1-3550.pdf (providing a reference of guide-
lines for the disbursement of loans and grants to low-income households in rural areas).   
 A separate program, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), provides ten-
year tax subsidies to developers of low-income housing.  Because it focuses on initial 
capital costs, it has less relevance to energy costs specifically and is of questionable ef-
fectiveness overall.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO STAFF MEMORANDUM:  THE COST 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT COMPARED WITH HOUSING 
VOUCHERS (1992), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=6216&type=1 (dis-
cussing the efficacy of the LIHTC); Janet Stearns, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit:  A 
Poor Solution to the Housing Crisis, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 203, 212-14 (1988) (analyzing 
the “substantive and procedural flaws” of the LIHTC). 
254 See DOUGLAS RICE & BARBARA SARD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
DECADE OF NEGLECT HAS WEAKENED FEDERAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS 9 
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Congress required these programs to limit tenants’ housing costs to 
not more than thirty percent of their incomes.  Because HUD had de-
fined housing costs to include utilities, this made these programs gua-
rantors against high energy costs to those low-income people fortu-
nate enough to gain subsidies.  As the number of people living in 
poverty has increased, the purchasing power of appropriations for as-
sisted housing has decayed.  The number of low-income families HUD 
determined had severe housing-affordability problems increased thir-
ty-two percent from 2000 to 2007, yet beginning in 2004, federal defi-
cit pressures led to eight percent, or two billion dollars, in real cuts in 
the budget for assisted housing.255 
In response to the energy crisis of the late 1970s, HUD ordered 
public housing authorities (PHAs) to convert as many units as possible 
to individual metering.256  This was intended to give tenants incentives 
to conserve energy.  To maintain compliance with the thirty-percent 
limit on overall housing costs, PHAs gave each household a “utility al-
lowance” as a credit against its rent.257  HUD required the utility allow-
ance to represent the “reasonable” utility costs for units in a given 
class.258  Roughly three in five public housing residents and four in five 
housing-voucher holders are in the utility-allowance system;259 the re-
mainder live in buildings that have central heating systems or that are 
otherwise not suitable for individual metering. 
These allowance calculations have posed persistent problems.260  
PHAs have differed in their definition of “reasonableness,” in how re-
liably they update allowances for changes in utility rates, and in which 
factors they consider when determining the allowance for a particular 
unit.261  Even when a PHA endeavors to set utility allowances properly, 
 
fig.5 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-24-09hous.pdf (illustrating where aid 
from major federal low-income housing programs is being distributed). 
255 Id. at 2-6. 
256 24 C.F.R. §§ 965.401–.410 (1993); see also Crochet v. Housing Auth., 37 F.3d 
607, 611 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining the causes and reasoning behind the switch to 
individual metering). 
257 1 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSISTED HOUSING:  UTILITY ALLOWANCES 
OFTEN FALL SHORT OF ACTUAL UTILITY EXPENSES 11 (1991) (describing HUD’s policy 
to include a reasonable amount of utilities in the definition of rent). 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 18. 
260 See, e.g., id. at 33-51 (explaining that, given the differences in rental-housing 
stock, the calculation of allowances is inherently inexact and that many households’ 
actual expenses thus differ from their utility allowances). 
261 See id. at 40-48 (noting that some PHAs intentionally keep allowances too low 
and that PHA practices lead to inequitable treatment of some households). 
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doing so requires difficult calculations about what rates of energy con-
sumption are achievable for various kinds of units.262  In theory, they 
should adjust utility allowances for as many factors as possible other 
than individual effort at conservation.  Merely accounting for the 
number of rooms in a unit and whether it is detached, semi-detached, 
or bracketed by other units will ignore several important sources of 
variability.  For example, a wasteful family in a well-maintained, well-
insulated apartment may use far less energy than a frugal one in a 
drafty, decrepit unit with the same number of rooms.263  This seems 
especially inequitable because the PHA assigns tenants to particular 
dwelling units and is responsible for the repair and insulation of those 
units.  Unusually warm winters can vitiate the utility-allowance system’s 
incentives for conservation; unusually cold weather can leave most te-
nants’ allowances insufficient.264  Because the housing assistance pro-
grams operate under fixed appropriations, PHAs generally lack the 
means to supplement allowances when severe weather strikes.265 
Seasonal variations can cause serious problems for low-income te-
nants even when their PHA establishes an appropriate utility allowance.  
To avoid having to recompute tenants’ rents every month, PHAs gener-
ally provide a uniform monthly utility allowance year-round.266  This re-
quires tenants to save (and to continue conserving energy) during the 
summer months in order to be able to afford their winter bills.267  Low-
income people, by definition, face numerous pressing expenses that 
make saving difficult.268  As a result, many risk utility terminations each 
year.  In theory, budget plans—providing equal monthly bills through-
out the year based on estimates of usage—can eliminate this imbalance.  
In practice, these plans’ reliance on estimates mimicking those the 
PHAs make is error-prone and can present tenants with large supple-
 
262 See id. at 4 (“[A]llowances are generalized estimates of units’ energy consump-
tion characteristics that can vary markedly because of differences in unit construction 
and location.”). 
263 See id. at 36 (explaining that “[a]n older, unrenovated unit may have older, 
energy-inefficient appliances, while a similar unit in the same building may have been 
modernized, and have newer, more energy-efficient appliances”). 
264 See id. at 36-37 (noting that “none of the agencies made adjustments for war-
mer- or cooler-than-normal seasons”). 
265 Id. at 37.  
266 Id. at 39-40. 
267 See id. at 28 (“[H]ouseholds have to budget so that they will have sufficient 
funds to pay utility bills in high consumption months . . . .”).  
268 See id. (“This budgeting may be difficult for lower-income households because, 
by definition, they have less income to pay for living expenses than higher-income 
households.”). 
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mental bills after the year-end reconciliation.269  The plans also atte-
nuate tenants’ incentives to conserve energy and may confuse some te-
nants about how effective their efforts have been. 
The fourth major federal effort to help low-income families meet 
energy costs is even less well-known, although it serves by far the larg-
est number of low-income families.  It is the Food Stamp Program’s 
excess-shelter-cost deduction.  The Food Stamp Program bases benefit 
levels on household size and income.270  In computing a household’s 
income, the program deducts certain largely nondiscretionary ex-
penses that can affect the ability to purchase food.  One of these de-
ductions is for shelter costs exceeding half of the household’s income 
after all other deductions.271  Almost seventy percent of food-stamp 
households’ shelter costs exceed this threshold; almost eight million 
households receive $9 billion per year in additional food stamps be-
cause of this deduction.272 
Like the HUD programs, the Food Stamp Program defines shelter 
costs to include utilities as well as rent or mortgage payments.273  Like 
the HUD programs but unlike WAP and LIHEAP, it provides the same 
level of assistance to households whose utility costs are included in 
their rent.274  Unlike HUD but like LIHEAP, the food-stamp excess-
shelter-cost deduction (“food-stamp shelter deduction”) provides a 
very shallow subsidy, offsetting only a small fraction of energy costs for 
participating households:  its value generally is equal to about thirty 
percent of that fraction of a household’s shelter costs that exceed half 
of its income.275  Paradoxically, it provides little or no aid to the very 
 
269 See id. at 39-40 (explaining that households with payments vastly lower than the 
amount consumed may be unable to satisfy their year-end reconciliation payments). 
270 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(o), 2017(a) (2006) (explaining that the value of allotment 
equals the cost of the food plan, based on household size, reduced by an amount equal 
to thirty percent of the household’s income).  
271 Id. § 2014 (e)(6).  
272 Author’s calculations, based on data in KARI WOLKWITZ & CAROLE TRIPPE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., REP. NO. SNAP-09-CHAR, CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HOUSEHOLDS:  FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 40 tbl.A-9, 41 
tbl.A-10, 42-43 tbl.A-11 (2009). 
273 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(d)(6)(ii) (2008). 
274 See id. § 273.9(d)(6) (treating rent, mortgage, and utility charges alike for the 
purpose of calculating the shelter deduction). 
275 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(6) (providing a deduction in calculating net income 
generally equal to the amount by which shelter costs exceed half of the household’s 
income after allowing for all other applicable deductions); id. § 2017(a) (reducing 
benefits by thirty percent of the amount of net income). 
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poorest households, whose incomes entitle them to the maximum 
food-stamp benefit without the shelter deduction.276 
Unlike any of the other major federal energy assistance programs, 
the food stamp excess shelter deduction is both a budgetary entitle-
ment (not dependent on the annual appropriations process) and a 
responsive entitlement (available to as many people as meet its eligi-
bility criteria and apply),277 guaranteeing that funding will be sufficient 
to meet the claims of all eligible people seeking benefits.278  Because it 
only offsets a minority fraction of marginal housing costs, the excess 
shelter deduction has a relatively modest impact on households’ in-
centives to conserve.  In addition, all states calculate the utility portion 
of households’ shelter costs with a “standard utility allowance” (SUA), 
which approximates reasonable usage patterns.  SUAs are far less indi-
vidualized than PHAs’ utility allowances:  some states differentiate on-
ly between households with and without responsibility for primary 
heating or cooling costs; at most, they may vary by the number of 
people in the household and the region of the state.279  This impreci-
sion has aroused less criticism than PHAs face, in part because of the 
excess-shelter deduction’s lower profile and in part because its status 
as a very partial subsidy lowers the stakes.  Of greater concern has 
been the states’ noncompliance with federal regulations requiring 
them to update their SUAs annually to reflect changing utility rates.280  
In any event, because few food-stamp households’ benefits depend on 
their actual usage, the SUA further reduces the deduction’s impact on 
incentives to conserve or to seek energy-efficient housing. 
 
276 Some 730,000 households with no gross income receive no benefit from the 
shelter deduction.  Most of the 2,690,000 households with high shelter expenses that 
receive the maximum food-stamp allotment benefit from only a part of the deduction 
for which they qualify.  See WOLKWITZ & TRIPPE, supra note 272, at 40 tbl.A-9 (listing 
the distribution of participating households by type of deduction and household con-
sumption, income source, and Food Stamp Program benefit amount).   
277 See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 
652-55 (2004). 
278 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (“Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all 
eligible households who make application for such participation.”).  But see id. 
§ 2027(b) (providing the authority—which the USDA has never exercised—for allot-
ment reductions in case of insufficient appropriations). 
279 A list of SUAs by state is available at the USDA’s website.  See Food & Nutrition 
Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Standard Utili-
ty Allowances as of October 1, 2009, http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/rules/Memo/ 
SUA_Table.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
280 Compare id. (showing that many states are one or two years behind in updating 
their allowances), with 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(d)(6)(iii)(B) (2008) (requiring states to up-
date their standards annually).  
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Four House and three Senate Committees write legislation autho-
rizing these programs; three different Appropriations Subcommittees 
oversee their funding.  Each of these four programs is administered by 
a different federal department; state and local administration is simi-
larly fragmented.  No overarching federal law prohibits households 
from benefiting from more than one of these programs, although 
households receiving HUD subsidies will rarely have shelter costs high 
enough to qualify for the food-stamp shelter deduction.  Questions 
about the relationship among these programs have spawned consider-
able controversy.281 
2.  Principles for Designing Low-Income Subsidies 
Although accepting the importance of offsetting the regressive ef-
fects of increased energy costs is a crucial first step, it is far from suffi-
cient to guard against those effects.  As the abundant critics of social-
welfare programs never tire of reminding us, many existing programs 
suffer from serious design limitations.  Even if legislation sets aside an 
appropriate amount for aid to low-income people, if it lacks an ap-
propriate delivery mechanism, that aid either will fail to survive the 
political process or will be misdirected. 
This subsection offers three principles to guide the design of a 
low-income subsidy program.  These principles reflect a combination 
of political, administrative, and aspirational considerations.  This sub-
section begins by identifying the basic features of a low-income ener-
gy-cost-offset program that are necessary for the enactment and future 
survival of such a program.  Next, this subsection focuses on how to 
match subsidy funds both with their specific purpose and with the gen-
eral goals of climate change legislation.  This subsection concludes by 
addressing the administration of the new offset program.  This is cru-
 
281 See, e.g., West v. Sullivan, 973 F.2d 179, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1992) (permitting the 
limitation of food-stamp SUA benefits to households whose utility costs exceeded the 
rebated portions of their PHA utility allowances); Rodriguez v. Cuomo, 953 F.2d 33, 
42-44 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding a state regulation that made recipients of utility allow-
ances ineligible for LIHEAP benefits); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1130-32 (3d Cir. 
1989) (prohibiting the inclusion of PHA utility allowances in income for the purpose 
of determining food-stamp benefits); Dep’t of Health & Welfare, Idaho v. Block, 784 
F.2d 895, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering vendor-paid energy costs under the 
LIHEAP when computing the food-stamp shelter deduction); Clifford v. Janklow, 733 
F.2d 534, 538-40 (8th Cir. 1984) (disallowing consideration of HUD subsidies when 
computing LIHEAP benefits); cf. Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 976 
F.2d 1462, 1470-73 (4th Cir. 1992) (permitting the inclusion of state energy assistance 
in computing food-stamp benefits). 
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cial because administrative shortcomings have been major sources of 
both substantive failure and political attacks in existing social-welfare 
programs. 
a.  Political Efficiency 
The challenges of winning a program’s initial enactment and of 
preserving it over time are quite different.  Conventional political 
science emphasizes the advantage flowing to the party defending the 
status quo on an issue:  it is easier to block changes than to initiate 
them.  This lesson is only partially applicable to spending programs, 
whose supporters require continual government action.  At each junc-
ture, the program’s health depends on leveraging funds with available 
political support.  Initiating a program requires a great deal of fund-
ing, but it also comes at a time when attention to and support for the 
program’s mission are at their apogee.  The amounts of funding at is-
sue in any particular battle over preserving a program’s effectiveness 
are far smaller—absent a political sea change, not many programs lose 
more than a few percentage points of their nominal funding in any 
given year—but bringing political support to bear is far more difficult.  
This is particularly true of programs whose support depends on the 
general public’s altruism:  maintaining the public’s consistent focus 
on most issues, certainly including low-income people’s well-being, is 
difficult to impossible.  These programs rarely have natural support 
from powerful interest groups and must compete with programs that 
do.  Thus, a program’s designers must consider both what they can 
enact initially and what they can maintain under very different politi-
cal conditions in the future. 
i.  Initiating a Program 
The keys to converting strong but transient public sympathy into 
legislation are speed and simplicity.  Speed is crucial because the pub-
lic’s altruism will not remain focused on a particular cause for long.  
Although altruistic concerns are not wholly fungible, if delays prevent 
public-spirited voters from achieving satisfaction through addressing 
one social ill, they are likely to move on to another.282  Antipoverty ad-
vocates discovered this in the 1970s when they helped to defeat first 
 
282 In economic terms, one can conceive of the public-spirited electorate as seek-
ing to trade attention and funding for satisfaction.  If votes cannot close the deal with 
one “vendor”—one social cause—a competitor is likely to enter the market, offering a 
better “price”—requiring less sustained attention—to achieve a sense of accomplishment.  
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President Nixon’s welfare-reform plan and then President Carter’s:  in 
each case, they imagined that they would advance to a better deal but 
in fact received no deal at all. 
Simplicity, in turn, is important because an altruistic electorate is 
unlikely to have the inclination or capacity to engage in detailed poli-
cy analysis.  If voters cannot easily understand the proposal, they may 
either doubt that it addresses the identified problem or suspect that 
their good will is being manipulated for unclear ends.  The greatest 
weakness of President Clinton’s proposed 1993 health care plan was 
not any particular design defect but rather the fact that, at more than 
1500 pages and built to defy simple explanations, the public could not 
understand it.  Aside from policy wonks, people had no basis on which 
to distinguish the Clinton plan from its competitors or to judge the 
merits of the many accusations regarding its contents.  The health 
care reform plans that the House and Senate recently passed have 
similar shortcomings. 
 A proposal need not be simple on its face as long as the public 
can be given a clear and credible version of what the legislation does.  
The need to present such a picture explains the appeal of bipartisan-
ship even when the majority party does not immediately need the op-
position’s votes:  voters seeing supporters from both parties are more 
likely to accept that a simple account of the proposal is an accurate one. 
Speed and simplicity are closely related.  The more time a propos-
al lingers, the more opportunities interest groups have to lobby for 
provisions increasing its complexity (or cost), and the more opportun-
ities critics have to raise doubts about the simple explanation its spon-
sors have offered.  Simpler proposals, in turn, can be drafted, costed, 
and negotiated more quickly.283 
ii.  Maintaining a Program 
A program’s designers can pursue several different strategies for 
ensuring its future durability.  One is to try to develop a self-interested 
constituency that can defend the program when the public’s attention 
wanes.  For a variety of reasons, social welfare programs’ front-line 
administrative staff have not proven formidable champions of the 
programs’ funding.284  Utility companies have lent some political sup-
 
283 Simpler proposals also can be implemented more quickly, reducing the dan-
gers of a quick repeal. 
284 See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE 
L.J. 1198, 1260-69 (1983) (noting that the interests of those who work for benefits pro-
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port to LIHEAP and the earned-income tax credit (EITC) because 
they help recipients pay bills.  Once climate change regulation begins, 
however, those companies’ political agendas are likely to fill with mat-
ters more central to their profitability. 
Providing benefits to higher-income people, who tend to be more 
politically active, is another oft-discussed approach.  Certainly the 
strength of the most important single redistributive program in this 
country—Social Security—springs from its strong self-interested sup-
port from middle-income voters.  Medicaid, too, may have avoided be-
ing block-granted in 1995 and 1996 because its long-term-care com-
ponent serves large numbers of middle-income families. 
Nonetheless, designing programs to be universal—to provide 
benefits without regard to claimants’ means—faces several obstacles.  
Middle-income Americans are very selective about which benefits they 
want to receive from the government.  If they do not feel a strong 
need for a benefit, they are likely to resent the taxes that fund it more 
than they appreciate the benefit itself.  The fate of the all-too-aptly 
named “catastrophic health care” plan of 1988—public insurance 
against the otherwise unreimbursed costs of a major illness that Con-
gress quickly repealed after Medicare beneficiaries rebelled against 
the required premiums285—shows the divergent political valences of 
taxes and benefits.  Many regard cash and near-cash transfers as ac-
ceptable only if they can be understood as social insurance.  Ongoing 
offsets for higher prices resulting from carbon-emissions regulation fit 
that model badly and thus cannot be expected to win strong middle-
income support. 
A common response both to the political weakness of low-income 
people and to the middle-income people’s disdain for wealth transfers 
is to rely on the tax system.  Tax expenditures receive far less analyti-
cal and political scrutiny than spending programs.286  The tax system, 
however, tends to be a rather inefficient tool for these purposes.  First, 
most devices for transferring wealth to low-income people also spend 
significant sums on higher-income individuals.  As a result, they re-
duce the subsidies that can be provided at any given funding level.  
 
grams and the beneficiaries of such programs often have divergent interests, partially as a 
result of the two groups coming from different economic and ethnic backgrounds). 
285 David Dahl, Catastrophic Coverage:  Lawmaking Gone Awry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 1989, at 1D (describing the many flaws in the Catastrophic Coverage Act, includ-
ing the fact that it funded the health care of seniors with a surtax on other seniors). 
286 See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 11 (2002) (noting that tax 
expenditures, although equivalent to government spending, receive very little public 
scrutiny). 
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Because these amounts are spread across large numbers of people, 
even a badly leaking tax preference is unlikely to benefit any particu-
lar middle-income taxpayer enough to increase its political support 
appreciably.  Second, the IRS’s administrative structure limits the abil-
ity to effectively target benefits to need.287  Third, the most prominent 
device for offsetting costs through the tax code—the deduction—is 
regressive.  A $1,000 deduction translates into far more tax savings for 
an affluent person in a high tax bracket than for a family of modest 
means.288  Finally, reaching low-income people through tax policy re-
quires an additional, often difficult, political step:  making the prefe-
rence refundable for those with no net tax liability.  This largely rules 
out deductions, but even redistributive credits are often not fully re-
fundable.  For example, the child tax credit (CTC) is only partially re-
fundable,289 and the dependent-care tax credit is not refundable at 
all.290  House Republicans harshly criticized efforts to accelerate por-
tions of the 2001 tax cuts that primarily benefited households through 
refundability. 
With little realistic prospect of enlisting politically powerful self-
interested backers, the preservation of any low-income offset program 
will depend on mobilizing altruistic public opinion.  Because the elec-
torate’s future responsiveness is uncertain—some other cause may be 
occupying its attention at the pivotal juncture—minimizing the num-
ber of challenges is far more important for this sort of program than 
for those with reliable rent-seeking constituencies.  Thus, establishing 
the program as a budgetary entitlement291 independent of annual ap-
propriations battles is pivotal:  few discretionary programs for low-
 
287 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 564-89 (1995) (discussing the consequences of 
the IRS’s institutional limitations in administering a tax-and-transfer benefit program); 
David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393, 434 
(2008) (describing institutional limitations of the IRS, including the fact that “[t]he 
IRS has no system of local offices to help claimants apply, to answer their questions 
about the program’s rules, or to examine verification of their eligibility”); see also infra 
subsection III.B.2.b (describing how benefits might be targeted more efficiently). 
288 See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives:  The Case for Refundable 
Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (proposing a uniform refundable tax credit). 
289 See 26 U.S.C. § 24(d) (2006) (providing for the partial refundability of the child 
tax credit); Batchelder et al., supra note 288 at 36-37 (describing the history and re-
fundability of the credit). 
290 Batchelder et al., supra note 288, at 55. 
291 See Super, supra note 277, at 652-53 (describing a budgetary entitlement as a 
program “whose funding level is not ordinarily determined through the annual com-
petitive appropriations process”). 
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income people have avoided steady erosion.292  Similarly, if the pro-
gram is not designed to adjust automatically for inflation, its suppor-
ters are unlikely to mobilize effectively for annual battles to protect its 
real value.293 
To mobilize sympathetic voters to help fend off periodic chal-
lenges, simplicity of concept is almost as important to preserving a 
program as it is to creating one.  A gangly program with many features 
whose interrelationships are difficult to fathom can be dismembered 
piece by piece without the public comprehending what is happening.  
These silent reductions can affect either the number of people receiv-
ing benefits or the amount of assistance beneficiaries receive.  By far 
the best security against the former danger is to design a program as a 
responsive entitlement:  a program in which participation depends 
solely on the number of applicants meeting eligibility criteria, not the 
amount appropriated.294  A responsive entitlement requires that any 
reductions in eligibility be achieved through relatively transparent de-
signations of those affected.  A program’s architects can guard against 
benefit erosion by establishing it as a functional entitlement, specify-
ing its benefits not as an arbitrary amount but as whatever is sufficient 
to accomplish some specific function.295  Thus, for example, a carbon-
regulation offset established in dollar terms is likely to become frozen, 
thus causing its real value to erode over time.296  By contrast, basing 
 
292 The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Child-
ren (WIC) is an exception, but the extraordinary qualities that have allowed it to do so 
highlight the difficulty of this task.  WIC delivers an exceptionally appealing commodi-
ty (high-nutrition foods) to exceptionally sympathetic people, competes for funding in 
an exceptionally unsympathetic appropriations bill (agriculture), and is one of the few 
social programs with compelling research evidence that it is cost-beneficial even under 
a stringent definition of that term.  See PETER H. ROSSI, FEEDING THE POOR 51-63 
(1998) (discussing WIC’s effectiveness).  Some other programs, such as LIHEAP, 
erode in most years but occasionally regain prominence and receive one-time increases 
only to begin to shrink again.  See supra notes 250-252. 
293 The cost of adding adjustments for inflation compounds in future years, mak-
ing it very difficult to offset.  Even a proposal as popular as adjusting the threshold for 
the alternative minimum tax (AMT) has so far proven impossible to pass on an ongo-
ing basis.  See AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EXTENDING 
THE PRESIDENT’S TAX CUTS AND AMT RELIEF WOULD COST $4.4 TRILLION THROUGH 
2018, at 3 (2008) available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-31-07tax.pdf (discussing the 
extraordinary cost of extending relief from the AMT). 
294 See Super, supra note 277. 
295 A functional entitlement is an entitlement that includes a guarantee that it will 
meet some conceptually defined need of its beneficiaries.  Medicaid, for example, as-
sures access to necessary health care services.  See Super, supra note 277, at 655-58, 678-80. 
296 Even if this amount is indexed in the initial legislation, indices in low-income 
benefits programs have proven politically easy to repeal, perhaps due to the electo-
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benefits on the estimated cost increase for the average family of a spe-
cified type would allow benefit levels to adapt automatically to changes 
in the regulatory regime.297  It also would force those who would cut 
benefits to explain why that principle should no longer apply, in turn 
triggering a debate that should be relatively transparent to the news 
media and voters. 
b.  Target Efficiency 
One of the most common criticisms of public programs is that 
they waste public resources by failing to deliver them where they are 
most needed.  Another common complaint is that legislation creates 
perverse incentives.  Unfortunately, these problems are very difficult 
to avoid simultaneously:  measures taken to address targeting con-
cerns often create at least the appearance of undesirable incentives, 
and vice versa.  This subsection begins by considering this trade-off as 
it applies to legislation offsetting the effects of higher carbon costs on 
low-income people. 
In several important respects, however, targeting can be improved 
without seriously undermining either the practical or the expressive 
effects of incentives.  The remainder of this subsection explores these 
possibilities. 
i.  Balancing Targeting and Incentives 
Debates about the design of major means-tested programs in this 
country long have been dominated by the conflict between the goals 
of targeting and incentives.  Unlike many debates in antipoverty law, 
this one does not break down on left/right grounds:  Ronald Reagan 
 
rate’s lack of quantitative sophistication and indices’ lack of dramatic impact in any 
given year.  See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution:  Resurrecting the Food Stamp 
Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1373 (2004) (de-
scribing the difficulty of reinserting inflation adjustments into the Food Stamp Pro-
gram after the 1996 welfare law removed them). 
297 See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(o) (2006) (defining the maximum food-stamp benefit in 
such terms).  To be sure, an unsympathetic and determined administration could at-
tempt to change the formula by which carbon regulation’s impact is estimated.  This, 
however, is vulnerable to being portrayed as “cooking the books”:  the Reagan Admin-
istration’s attempt to reduce school-meal subsidies while counting ketchup as a vegeta-
ble collapsed at considerable political cost to that administration.  See DOUGLAS R. 
IMIG, POVERTY AND POWER 18 (1996) (describing the liberal backlash to Reagan’s at-
tempt to cut school-lunch programs). 
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and Daniel Patrick Moynihan advocated targeting;298 Newt Gingrich 
and David Ellwood focused on incentives.299  Targeters maintain that 
the limited public funds available for social programs can be spent 
most efficiently—i.e., can do the most good—if concentrated on those 
in greatest need.300  Some conservatives also emphasize targeting by 
disputing the appropriateness of public interventions absent any but 
the direst deprivations and by arguing that receipt of direct public aid 
is demeaning and should be confined to as few people as possible.  
Thus, President Reagan justified his sweeping cuts of low-income pro-
grams as an effort to limit them to the “truly needy,” who, he said, 
would retain a “safety net.”301  Pragmatic progressives may see target-
ing as protection against critics’ efforts to induce taxpayers’ jealousy 
by portraying recipients of benefits as better off than those whose tax-
es fund that aid.  Those with direct experience working in low-income 
communities may favor targeting both because such a practice elimi-
nates the most wrenching crises and because they are skeptical that 
incentives built into public-benefits-program rules have much practic-
al effect. 
Incentivizers, by contrast, see public benefits programs in more 
economic terms, taking a dynamic view of low-income people’s rela-
tionships with those programs.302  They want to give more aid to those 
engaged in certain socially desirable activities.  To the extent that 
these activities make the claimant better off financially, rules that re-
ward the activities produce results precisely opposite to those target-
ing benefits based on need.  Work has long been the main, although 
 
298 See R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 238 (2000) (describing 
Moynihan’s endorsement of prioritizing aid for the lowest-income families); Martin 
Anderson, The Objectives of the Reagan Administration’s Social Welfare Policy (describing 
Reagan’s policy of targeting the poorest people with social welfare programs), in THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT REVISITED:  AIMS AND OUTCOMES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S SOCIAL 
WELFARE POLICY 15, 23 (D. Lee Bawden ed., 1984). 
299 See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 19-25 (1988) (supporting an incentive-
based approach to welfare); RON HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE 59-81 (2006) (de-
scribing Gingrich’s focus in incentives in designing welfare policy).  
300 See Anderson, supra note 298, at 23 (noting that Reagan’s policies targeted 
those most in need “so that the available resources [could] be focused on those least 
able to take care of themselves”). 
301 Id. at 17-18; see also Robert B. Carleson & Kevin R. Hopkins, Whose Responsibility 
Is Social Responsibility?  The Reagan Rationale, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1981, at 8, 9 (present-
ing Reagan’s views on welfare reform). 
302 See ELLWOOD, supra note 299, at 81-104 (discussing the relationship between 
low-income two-parent families and social policies). 
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not the exclusive, focus of incentives in public benefits programs.303  
David Ellwood advocated making work pay better than welfare by in-
creasing supports to the working poor;304 Newt Gingrich sought to 
achieve the same goal by cutting welfare.305  Even where evidence calls 
into question recipients’ actual responsiveness to programs’ incen-
tives, incentivizers may dislike the expressive effects of a program 
treating people engaged in desirable behavior better than those that 
are not.  Conservatives that see financial poverty as a consequence of 
behavioral poverty favor strong incentives; some suggest that eliminat-
ing means-based programs altogether provides the strongest possible 
work incentive.  Pragmatic progressives may prefer programs with 
strong behavioral incentives because they attract recipients whose ac-
tions arouse more sympathy among middle-class voters distrustful of 
the poor. 
The tension between targeting and incentives takes on an addi-
tional dimension in remedying the distributional effects of climate 
change policy.  High energy costs are both an important determinant 
of need for subsidies and sometimes the result of behavior the policy 
seeks to discourage.  Price increases cause the sharpest reductions in 
consumption among low-income families,306 who lack the means to ab-
sorb those costs.  These reductions are just what climate change policy 
desires, but they can cause severe hardship if the families cannot afford 
alternative, more energy-efficient ways of meeting their basic needs. 
In addition, the income effects of subsidies on low-income people 
can be difficult to predict.  At the margins, it would seem that more 
income would allow low-income people to spend more on energy and 
emit more.  Sufficient energy price increases, however, could make 
many forms of energy usage an inferior good—one whose consump-
tion declines with rising incomes.  Specifically, as low-income families 
gain modest amounts of discretionary income, they may apply that in-
come to reducing their need for energy consumption by weatherizing, 
purchasing a more fuel-efficient car, or paying the higher rents re-
quired to live near work or public transit lines. 
 
303 See, e.g., HASKINS, supra note 299, at 48-54 (“As with all our bills, the heart of 
Santorum’s welfare reform agenda was the work requirement.”). 
304 See ELLWOOD, supra note 299, at 237-38 (recommending welfare reforms de-
signed to encourage work, such as increasing the earned-income tax credit and raising 
the minimum wage). 
305 See HASKINS, supra note 299, at 27-31 (describing Gingrich’s support of a wel-
fare bill with strong work requirements). 
306 C-SNAP, supra note 38, at 2. 
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Incentives in public-benefits programs inevitably are crude in-
struments.307  They almost always fall on some individuals who lack the 
capacity to act in the preferred manner, such as work incentives ap-
plied to households in which all members are children or adults hav-
ing to care for seriously infirm individuals.308 
Any system of incentives implies a judgment about which condi-
tions should be taken as givens and which should be treated as the re-
sult of individual choice.  Badly insulated dwellings have higher heat-
ing and cooling costs, which increase the need for subsidies.  Many 
badly insulated units have relatively affordable rents, due to ill-repair 
or simply because of the higher expected utility bills.  Thus, low-
income people probably live disproportionately in such units.  Yet ad-
justing subsidies on this basis would undermine conservation incentives. 
A more difficult question is whether to adjust for the household’s 
location.  Urban areas have dramatically lower per capita fuel con-
sumption than rural areas.309  Various federal subsidies help keep alive 
many rural communities that experience harsh winters on the Great 
Plains.  Significant savings thus could be achieved if more people 
moved to cities.  Nostalgia for rural America and the strong representa-
tion of those states in the Senate ensure that concept will never gain 
traction in U.S. politics.  Whether a low-income offset program would 
need to adjust its benefits for higher rural costs, however, is less clear. 
Still more compelling is the claim of low-wage workers, many of 
whom must consume significant amounts of energy to commute.  
Failure to adjust the subsidies for these costs could reduce incentives 
to work.  On the other hand, these costs encourage people to seek 
work near their residences, or at least on public transit lines, a conse-
quence which is consistent with the goal of energy conservation.  Ad-
justments for the cause of increased costs, rather than for the costs 
themselves, can avoid work disincentives while maintaining incentives 
to take jobs with modest or no commuting costs. 
 
307 See Alstott, supra note 287, at 545 (“Economic theory can establish the existence 
of disincentives to work or to marry, but empirical study is needed to establish whether 
and how those disincentives actually affect people’s decisions to work or to marry.”). 
308 See, e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he idea of im-
posing a work-incentive benefits cut on individuals whose disabilities preclude work 
can only be called absurd.”). 
309 Light, supra note 64, at 22-23. 
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ii.  Temporal Targeting 
Separate targeting and incentive issues arise on very different di-
mensions:  horizontal and temporal.310  Horizontal targeting compares 
different claimants and seeks to get more benefits to those in greatest 
need.311  Horizontal incentives, similarly, compare claimants and re-
ward those acting in a more desired manner than their peers.  Tem-
poral targeting, by contrast, seeks to help claimants during their 
greatest periods of need rather than wait until the worst of a crisis has 
passed.312  Temporal incentives, by extension, activate or deactivate 
additional benefits whenever a claimant begins or ends compliance 
with desired norms. 
Temporal targeting is especially important to low-income house-
holds because impaired access to credit markets prevents low-income 
households from moving funds cheaply from periods of relative plenty 
backward to those of exceptional deprivation.  No comparable reason 
exists for matching incentives as closely with need:  most people work 
for wages that are received substantially after the fact.  Because incen-
tive payments are not tied specifically to need, even low-income fami-
lies will be better able to await receipt of those payments if they can-
not obtain their present value.  The expressive value of incentives is 
almost always perceived horizontally, separating “good” from “bad” 
individuals rather than tracking individuals over time.  Thus, whatever 
balance is struck between targeting and incentives in the basic struc-
ture of the low-income offset program, every reason exists to endeavor 
to deliver those offsets as close as possible to the time a household ex-
periences increased costs.  The failure of PHA utility allowances to ad-
just to seasonal swings in households’ energy costs illustrates the dan-
gers of weak temporal targeting. 
This raises serious concerns about proposals to deliver relief from 
higher energy prices through the tax system.313  At present, a full-time, 
 
310 See Super, supra note 296, at 1327-29 (discussing horizontal and temporal  
targeting). 
311 Id. at 1327. 
312 Id.  
313 See, e.g., ROBERT GREENSTEIN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
DESIGNING CLIMATE-CHANGE LEGISLATION THAT SHIELDS LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
FROM INCREASED POVERTY AND HARDSHIP 12-13 (rev. ed. 2008), available at http:// 
www.cbpp.org/10-25-07climate.pdf (noting that a purely tax-based assistance program 
would not serve around half of the low-income population); GILBERT E. METCALF, 
BROOKINGS INST. & WORLD RES. INST., A GREEN EMPLOYMENT TAX SWAP:  USING A 
CARBON TAX TO FINANCE PAYROLL TAX RELIEF 2-3, 6 tbl.6 (2007), available at 
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year-round, minimum-wage worker supporting a family of four derives 
more than twenty-six percent of her annual income from the earned 
income tax credit (EITC) and refunds of the child tax credit.314  Thus, 
a family goes through the year living about seventeen percent below 
the poverty line only to receive a lump sum a few months after the 
year is over.  Analysts commonly add this delayed payment retroactive-
ly to the household’s prior year’s income when comparing the house-
hold to the poverty line.  About half the states have their own EITCs, 
many adding between 3.5 and 35 percent to the federal credit.315  
Moreover, the fraction of annual income that low-income families re-
ceive through the tax system is likely to rise if important tax expendi-
tures benefiting middle-income families are extended to low-income 
families through conversion to refundable credits. 
In practice, EITC recipient families commonly run up debts dur-
ing the year, often incurring onerous interest payments, and then try 
to dig themselves out when their tax refund arrives the following 
spring.  Regulators in some northern states prohibit utility companies 
from terminating service during the winter months;316 many families 
with large arrearages anxiously await their tax refunds, hoping they 
will arrive before the year’s moratorium comes to an end.  The tem-
poral mismatch in PHA utility allowances is far less severe than that in 
an annual tax refund, yet it has resulted in many households falling 
seriously behind on their utilities and facing shutoffs. 
In sum, the tax system is an inefficient method of delivering ener-
gy assistance.  To the extent that we can increase the share of low-
 
http://pdf.wri.org/Brookings-WRI_GreenTaxSwap.pdf (discussing the distributional 
effects of a carbon tax). 
314 Author’s calculations are for tax and fiscal years 2009.  These calculations as-
sume that the worker is paid for fifty weeks of work (a realistic assumption given the 
scarcity of paid leave in minimum-wage jobs), that the family pays the federal withhold-
ing tax but no state or local income taxes, and that the household receives food 
stamps, which are calculated with a typical excess-shelter-cost deduction for a working 
family.  See WOLKWITZ & TRIPPE, supra note 272, at 41 tbl.10 (reporting the average 
excess-shelter-cost deduction values for fiscal year 2008).  The combined value of earn-
ings less withholding, EITC, and food stamps leaves the hypothetical family thirteen 
percent above the poverty line, in part as a result of temporary increases enacted as 
part of the stimulus legislation.  See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. I, § 101, 123 Stat. 115, 120 (codified in scattered sections 
of U.S.C.). 
315 JASON LEVITIS & JEREMY KOULISH, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A 
MAJORITY OF STATES WITH INCOME TAXES HAVE ENACTED STATE EARNED INCOME TAX 
CREDITS 1, 5 tbl.1 (2007). 
316 See e.g., 52 PA. CODE § 56.100 (2009) (preventing the termination of heat-
related service between December 1st and March 31st). 
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income families’ annual income derived from the tax system, we 
should do so to reduce those families’ implicit marginal tax rates.  
The tax system should be assigned new non-tax-related functions only 
as a last resort. 
iii.  Reaching All Affected Low-Income People 
Trying to design a system for offsetting the increased costs of 
energy to low-income people highlights how severely damaged our so-
cial safety net has become.  Because of this country’s heavy reliance on 
the private sector for social provision317 and its sharply moralistic ap-
proach to public provision,318 several large categories of low-income 
people have no contact with any major federal or federal-state means-
tested public benefits program. 
One large excluded group consists of nonelderly, childless adults 
who do not have a disability sufficiently severe to qualify for Social Secu-
rity.  These people never qualified for federal cash assistance or Medica-
id, but they were eligible to receive modest state cash aid—commonly 
called “general assistance” or “general relief”—in many states until 
these programs were abolished as states struggled to cope with the re-
cessions of the early 1980s and the early 1990s.319  Most also have been 
unable to receive federal food stamps since the 1996 welfare law.320 
 
317 See HACKER, supra note 286, at 16 (“American social welfare practice is excep-
tional . . . not because social spending is distinctly low in comparative perspective, but 
because so much of that spending comes from the private sector.”). 
318 See David A. Super, The New Moralizers:  Transforming the Conservative Legal Agen-
da, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2066-72 (2004) (describing and critiquing the moralistic 
approach to regulation). 
319 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE:  A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 283-85 (1986). 
320 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 
and 42 U.S.C.).  In theory, the welfare law allowed them to receive food stamps for 
three months every three years while unemployed and for additional months while 
working at least twenty hours a week or working off their benefits in a workfare pro-
gram.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2006) (imposing a three-month time limit for receiving 
food stamps but exempting children, those over fifty years of age, those certified as 
physically or mentally unfit, and parents of dependent children).  In fact, the law did 
not require states to establish workfare programs, and most did not, despite strong fi-
nancial incentives.  See id. § 2025(h)(1) (reimbursing state costs incurred by providing 
work slots to persons affected by the three-month time limit); Super, supra note 296, at 
1344-47 (describing unsuccessful efforts to persuade states to allow childless adults to 
work in exchange for continued food stamps).  Because most are single or only have a 
spouse, childless adults qualify for relatively few benefits while employed, and they sel-
dom bother to apply.  Denying this group assistance during periods of unemployment 
effectively removes them from the program.  Today, nonelderly childless adults partic-
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Some may receive unemployment compensation; however, the 
unemployment-compensation system is ill-equipped to administer a 
low-income offset program because it does not collect information on 
individuals’ or households’ incomes.321  Thus, someone with large un-
earned income, or someone in a household with a high-salaried work-
er, can nonetheless collect unemployment compensation.  Conversely, 
the unemployment-compensation system’s coverage of relatively low-
income workers has been declining steadily for decades as the low-end 
labor market has become increasingly contingent and ineligible for 
unemployment-compensation benefits.322  Unemployment compensa-
tion therefore does not offer a viable mechanism for reaching low-
income families in need of subsidies. 
iv.  Preventing Supplantation 
Whatever funds can be secured for low-income offsets will provide 
a low return on the political capital invested to secure them if other 
entities can effectively divert these funds.  The most likely method for 
diversion is supplantation, in which the intermediary reduces its own 
contributions apace with the infusion of offset funds.  Funneling offset 
funds into a discretionary program such as LIHEAP or Section 8 invites 
appropriators to reduce the contributions they otherwise would have 
provided.323  Similarly, block grants such as LIHEAP and TANF allow 
states sufficient flexibility to divert increased federal funding to replace 
their own spending, releasing money back to their general funds.324 
 
ipate in food stamp programs in substantial numbers only in areas where states have 
won waivers of the time limit due to exceptionally high unemployment.  The conclu-
sions here are based on a comparison of the data in WOLKWITZ & TRIPPE, supra note 272, 
at 67 tbl.B-5, with copies of waiver approval letters obtained from USDA. 
321 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 110TH CONG., 2008 GREEN BOOK:  
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, at sec. 4, at 4-6 to 4-11 (Comm. Print 2008), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=10490 (discussing eligibility 
requirements for unemployment compensation benefits that take only earned income 
into account). 
322 See CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, ADDRESSING 
LONGSTANDING GAPS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE 1-2 (2007) (describing 
gaps in the coverage of unemployment compensation such as the denial of compensa-
tion for those who experience prolonged periods of unemployment). 
323 See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.  No doubt a promise could be 
extracted from appropriators not to do so immediately.  After a year or two, however, it 
will become impossible to know how they would have acted absent the offset program.  
Moreover, fashioning a remedy for such a breach would be most challenging. 
324 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM:  CHALLENGES IN 
MAINTAINING A FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL PARTNERSHIP 16 (2001), available at http:// 
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Proposals to pay utility companies to aid low-income customers 
face a similar likelihood of leakage.  The uncompensated-care re-
quirement of the Hill-Burton Act provides a useful caution in this re-
gard.  The Hill-Burton Act conditioned federal funds for hospitals’ 
major capital investments on recipient institutions providing uncom-
pensated care to low-income patients in specified amounts.325  Al-
though some hospitals took this requirement to heart and welcomed 
uninsured low-income patients, others continued to rebuff patients 
who appeared unable to pay.  These hospitals treated Hill-Burton as a 
bookkeeping requirement and charged off their unanticipated bad 
debt.  Similarly, separating actions the utility companies would have 
taken in the ordinary course of business from subsidies motivated by 
the carbon-regulation-offset program will be impossible.  The reliance 
of the House bill and other proposals on having utility companies dis-
tribute energy assistance326 is thus misguided:  few of those funds are 
likely to serve their intended purpose. 
c.  Administrative Efficiency 
Administrative simplicity is important for several reasons.  Most 
directly, funds spent on program administration are unavailable for 
benefits.  In addition, an arduous or simply unfamiliar administrative 
process can compel claimants to spend a significant portion of their 
benefits on establishing and maintaining their eligibility.327  A pro-
gram’s administration is a relatively vulnerable political target for crit-
ics who may fear a backlash if they attack the program’s core mission.  
Finally, a complex administrative structure delays a program’s imple-
mentation, which is both a substantive and a political problem:  pro-
 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01828.pdf (“The programmatic and fiscal flexibility afforded 
states through the block grant increases the opportunity to use federal funds to replace 
state funding in welfare-related programs.”); MILDRED REIN, DILEMMAS OF WELFARE 
POLICY 145 (1982) (maintaining that the AFDC’s “open-ended federal funding” 
created the incentive for states to spend more money on social services with federal 
rather than state funds). 
325 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2006). 
326 See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., § 321 (2009) (providing emission allowances for 
electrical, natural gas, home-heating oil, and propane consumers).  
327 See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand:  The Rise of the Personal Choice Mod-
el for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 832-35 (2004) (exemplifying how re-
quired contacts with agencies may drive up the costs of applying for benefits, therefore 
discouraging some claimants from seeking those benefits in the first place); Super, su-
pra note 287, at 434-38 (discussing the effects of administrative costs on those applying 
to government programs for benefits). 
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grams are politically easiest to cancel before anyone has begun receiv-
ing aid. 
A low-income offset program for emissions regulation therefore 
should operate through a single agency, to avoid requiring duplicative 
applications and eligibility determinations.328  Ideally, it would rely as 
much as possible on determinations already being made by existing 
programs.  The major federal-state entitlement programs’ administra-
tive spending is relatively modest.  In recent years, the food-stamp 
program’s administration has never reached 15% of overall program 
costs.329  Medicaid’s administrative costs in 2007 were 5.2% of the total 
program’s costs.330 
3.  How to Offset the Regressive Effects of Higher Energy Costs 
Large components of the pending climate change legislation’s re-
sponse to its impact on low-income consumers fare badly on all of 
these criteria.  Their attempt to assist consumers through subsidies to 
utility companies are unlikely to be well-targeted, are likely to under-
mine incentives to conserve (to the extent that they are allocated on 
the basis of usage rather than need), will require utility companies to 
develop bureaucracies duplicating those operating public means-
tested programs, and will require enormous political capital to reform 
once the utility companies and middle-income consumers become ac-
customed to receiving these subsidies.  A well-designed public pro-
gram should be able to do much better. 
No existing program for assisting low-income people provides a 
workable platform for offsetting carbon-emissions controls’ impact on 
low-income people’s budgets.  Cash-assistance programs lack broad 
coverage and, in the case of the EITC, have horrific temporal target-
 
328 See Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare:  How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and 
Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 660 (2004) (ex-
plaining how dividing responsibility through devolution can sabotage substantive goals). 
329 Author’s calculations are based on data provided by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s website, Food and Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Supplemental Nu-
trition Assistance Program Participation and Costs (2009), http://www.fns.usda.gov/ 
pd/SNAPsummary.htm.  In 2009, administration consumed 10.7 percent of the pro-
gram’s spending. 
330 Author’s calculations are based on data found in EARL DIRK HOFFMAN, JR. ET 
AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID:  
TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 25 (2008), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/downloads/2008Brief 
Summaries.pdf.  This ratio is dramatically lower than that in the Food Stamp Program 
in part because Medicaid spends almost ten times as much on benefits:  the cost of 
many administrative functions does not vary with the value of the benefits delivered. 
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ing.  Housing-assistance programs form a crazy patchwork; short of 
the mammoth sums needed to convert Section 8 vouchers to a res-
ponsive entitlement, these programs either lack the coverage to reach 
most of those in need or, in the case of the food-stamp shelter deduc-
tion, provide aid in a form that likely would skew households’ spend-
ing decisions and leave the households still badly exposed to most of 
the effects of higher energy prices.  Well-fed homeless people should 
not be the objective. 
Creating a new program is a possibility.  The more antipoverty 
programs we establish, however, the more difficulty the public has in 
assessing what resources genuinely are available to low-income 
people.331  With middle-class voters having demonstrated a strong ten-
dency to overestimate these programs’ extent in the case of uncertain-
ty, further multiplication endangers the political future of all of these 
programs, new and old.332 
A superior approach would be to consolidate the existing housing 
assistance programs to the greatest extent possible and then increase 
that program’s funding.  Much of the legal structure, administrative 
base, and funding for the consolidated program can be found in the 
food-stamp shelter deduction.  Instead of reducing households’ coun-
table incomes in the amount by which their shelter costs exceed half 
of their incomes (net of work and child care expenses and other com-
pelling costs), the program would give households electronic vouch-
ers that could be spent on rent, mortgage or land contract payments, 
or utility bills.  Households could apply through the same state offices 
that operate the Food Stamp Program, subject to the same rules, defi-
nitions, nonfinancial eligibility conditions, and procedures for estab-
lishing eligibility.  Although all sides—claimants’ advocates, state ad-
ministrators, and conservative critics of the program—dislike aspects 
of these rules, as a whole the rules have broad legitimacy. 
The same electronic benefit transfer (EBT) systems that manage 
electronic food-stamp benefits could maintain households’ accounts.  
Utility companies and mortgage-servicing companies presumably 
could easily accept payments through such systems.  Many landlords 
 
331 See Super, supra note 277, at 705 (noting that the presence of many programs 
can make it difficult for the public to make policy judgments about those programs). 
332 Recognizing the problems with each of these approaches, the Center on Budg-
et and Policy Priorities proposes combining them:  a new cash or near-cash benefit, an 
expansion of the EITC, and more funding for LIHEAP.  GREENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 
313, at 12-13.  Although diversifying the low-income offset’s portfolio of political and 
operational risks surely is superior to relying solely on any one of these methods, there 
is nothing inconsistent about all of these negative effects occurring simultaneously.   
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and land-contract vendors likely would find the prospect of more reli-
able payments ample motivation to develop the capacity to do so as 
well; for those that did not, with relatively modest effort states should 
be able to develop the capacity to issue checks to landlords and land-
contract vendors based on the tenants’ and vendees’ swipes of their 
EBT cards. 
The immediate effect of converting the food-stamp shelter deduc-
tion into a freestanding program would be to significantly increase 
benefits for the very poorest households.  As is true in the tax system, 
the deduction mechanism regressively offers no benefit to those 
whose incomes are so low they have nothing against which to apply it.  
Thirty percent of food-stamp households lose some or all of their shel-
ter deductions in this way.333  Thus, the proposal here to create a free-
standing program is analogous to proposals to convert tax deductions 
into refundable credits:  it would make the food-stamp shelter deduc-
tion “refundable” against the household’s nonfood expenses. 
For all eligible households, the housing subsidy that would result 
from only converting the food-stamp shelter deduction into a free-
standing program would be quite modest.  The existing deduction 
provides thirty additional cents of food stamps for every dollar by 
which shelter costs exceed half of a household’s net income, subject 
to a cap of $459 per month.334  The average household claiming the 
shelter deduction receives $69 in additional monthly benefits, which 
offsets fifteen percent of the average food-stamp household’s shelter 
costs.335  Moreover, if food-stamp eligibility rules applied, this subsidy 
would be limited to households with net incomes below the federal 
poverty income guidelines, which are currently $1838 per month for a 
family of four.336 
Partly as a result of its modest benefit levels, the resulting pro-
gram’s targeting and incentive structure would be quite appealing.  It 
would provide the largest subsidies for the poorest households, yet it 
would only increase the effective marginal tax rate on earnings by 
 
333 WOLKWITZ & TRIPPE, supra note 272, at 40 tbl.A-9. 
334 Food & Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FY 2010 Allotments and Deduction 
Information,  http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/government/FY10_Allot_Deduct.htm (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
335 Author’s calculations based on WOLKWITZ & TRIPPE, supra note 272, at 32 tbl.A-
2, 41 tbl.A-10. 
336 Food & Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FY 2010 Income Eligibility Stan-
dards,  http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/government/FY10_Income_Standards.htm (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
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twelve percent.337  It also would require recipients to pay seventy per-
cent of their marginal shelter costs, which would be a powerful incen-
tive to conserve. 
To cover the cost of providing shelter-cost assistance to the poor-
est households—those households too poor to fully benefit from the 
existing food-stamp shelter deduction—and to begin to deepen and 
possibly broaden the subsidy, funds from other programs could be 
merged into this program.  The most obvious candidate is LIHEAP, 
which, as a block grant, has little content except its funding. 
More contentious, but more important, would be incorporating 
some of the major HUD rental-assistance programs.  Section 8 hous-
ing vouchers’ purpose and function closely resemble the new pro-
gram.  Section 8 vouchers differ from similar programs largely in that 
they provide much deeper subsidies to tenants, supporting somewhat 
higher rent levels to landlords, and that they leverage these more ge-
nerous rents to impose some housing quality standards on landlords.  
Whatever one’s view of the general merits of housing-code enforce-
ment,338 having the federal government direct PHAs to duplicate the 
work of local housing inspectors for a small fraction of rental units 
seems rather awkward.  With so many low-income families hard-
pressed by housing costs,339 providing such deep subsidies to a hapha-
zardly chosen minority seems difficult to defend when the resources 
could benefit equally impoverished people receiving only the thinnest 
 
337 Author’s calculations based on food-stamp-benefit computation formula.  The 
Food Stamp Program’s earned income deduction leaves only eighty percent of earn-
ings to be counted.  Only half of those earnings are counted as available to pay for 
shelter costs.  Of the resulting excess shelter costs, only thirty percent are reimbursed. 
338 Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the 
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 
1093, 1095 (1971) (arguing that government subsidies combined with stricter en-
forcement of housing codes may lead to higher-quality housing for low-income people 
without a corresponding increase in rent), and Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the War-
ranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing:  “Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 485, 485 (1987) (arguing, contrary to the popular view, that warranties of habita-
bility can “benefit low income tenants at the expense of their landlords”), with Neil K. 
Komesar, Return to Slumville:  A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforce-
ment and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1188-91 (1973) (criticizing Ackerman’s methodol-
ogy and conclusions). 
339 Stephen Malpezzi and Richard Green argue that unaffordability has replaced 
defective conditions as the chief malady in the low-income housing market.  Stephen 
Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, What Has Happened to the Bottom of the US Housing Mar-
ket?, 33 URB. STUD. 1807, 1807 (1996) (“Two central facts about the bottom of the 
[U.S.] housing market are easy to characterise:  housing quality has improved dramati-
cally for most low-income households, but they are paying much larger shares of their 
income for it.”).   
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subsidies under the current system.  In the particular context of cli-
mate change, the more market-reliant structure proposed here would 
provide better temporal and horizontal targeting to need as well as 
better incentives to conserve energy than the Section 8 utility-
allowance system can. 
Section 8 project-based subsidies could not be converted as quick-
ly because they are committed by multiyear contracts.  As those con-
tracts expire, however, the considerable challenges this program has 
faced340 suggest that converting its resources to strengthen the new 
voucher program would be wise.  Converting those resources directly 
into increased purchasing power for low-income families should pro-
duce results that are at least as positive. 
On the other hand, terminating operating subsidies for public 
housing would cause an immediate, dramatic reduction in the low-
cost housing stock and would waste those assets.  Further, the weathe-
rization program’s mission is both distinct from and important to on-
going housing-cost assistance.  The program seems best left as is.341 
Expanding this new voucher program, initially with funds from 
LIHEAP and Section 8 and then with the proceeds of carbon-
emissions regulation, could take several paths.  First, the fraction of 
subsidized costs could be increased above thirty percent.  That would 
not expand eligibility and would provide the same percentage in-
crease in benefits for all recipients.  Any affordable increase would be 
likely both to retain strong incentives for conservation and to raise ef-
fective marginal tax rates only a few percentage points. 
 
340 In particular, the program has been unable to capture the value of the de facto 
options it grants landlords.  If the market value of the development has declined over 
the length of a contract, the landlord generally can count on the PHA to renew it.  
With tenants rendered largely insensitive to the amount of rents and HUD regulating 
permissible charges across metropolitan areas, the landlord need absorb relatively little 
of the decline in property value.  On the other hand, if the value of the property has 
risen—perhaps with gentrification occurring closer—the landlord can decline to re-
new, evict the low-income tenants, and raise rents or convert to condominiums.  As 
Congress has required PHAs to enter into shorter contracts to meet targets for lower-
ing budget authority, this problem has worsened.  
341 In principle, folding the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) into the 
new program would make roughly $6 billion per year in additional funding available.  
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007–2011, at 28 (Comm. Print 2007).  Enhancing 
low-income families’ power in the housing market likely would stimulate the crea-
tion—and upkeep—of affordable housing far more efficiently than having the gov-
ernment pick winners, as the LIHTC does.  In practice, because that money goes di-
rectly to a relatively small, well-organized group of developers, collective action 
problems likely would doom any such attempt. 
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Second, the threshold above which the subsidy applies could be 
reduced below half of net income.  It would reduce further the pro-
gram’s already-modest work disincentives and leave incentives to con-
serve largely unchanged.  The resulting increase in benefits would ac-
crue overwhelmingly to less-poor households (some of whom would 
newly qualify).  It would also skew benefits toward those with more 
modest shelter costs, although less dramatically.342 
Finally, income eligibility limits could be raised from those that 
apply to the Food Stamp Program.  This would probably be largely 
symbolic:  likely, relatively few of those individuals made eligible 
would apply.  Because they would receive smaller benefits and because 
they have more alternatives, households at the higher reaches of the 
Food Stamp Program’s income eligibility range consistently partici-
pate at low rates.  Nonetheless, allowing potential recipients to make 
that decision for themselves is likely to result in better targeting than a 
rigid financial-eligibility limit.343 
The housing-voucher program proposed here would not directly 
address the higher prices low-income families pay for transportation 
and for other goods and services.  Because housing consumes such a 
large fraction of a low-income household’s budget, however, reducing 
those costs would allow household members to spend more on other 
things. 
Creating this program could give rise to jurisdictional problems in 
two respects.  First, assuming that the new housing-subsidy program 
would fall under the banking committees’ jurisdictions—as existing 
HUD programs have—it would transfer billions of dollars of mandato-
ry and discretionary spending to those committees both from the 
agriculture committees and from the committees with jurisdiction 
over LIHEAP.  Both as a matter of pride and because of the flexibility 
that comes from the ability to transfer funds between programs, 
committees tend to resist losses of jurisdiction over spending, especial-
ly in mandatory programs.  The common solution is some sort of a 
swap:  with many specialized financial institutions now serving the 
 
342 Dividing incremental funding evenly between the two kinds of changes—
consideration of shelter costs that exceed less than half of household income and 
reimbursement of a higher fraction of those that do—would also have a regressive ef-
fect. 
343 See Super, supra note 327, at 830-32 (describing how the administrative burdens 
of participation can target program benefits to those who will gain most from them). 
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agricultural and educational sectors, it seems possible such a trade 
could be worked out.344 
Second, folding discretionary funding from LIHEAP and HUD 
rental-assistance programs into a mandatory housing-voucher pro-
gram would move funds across an important barrier in the federal 
budget process.  Discretionary spending is controlled with caps in the 
Congressional Budget Act345 and allocations in the annual budget res-
olution.346  Mandatory (“entitlement”) spending and revenues are 
controlled substantively with the pay-as-you-go requirement347 and 
procedurally through reconciliation legislation.348  Thus, in the ordi-
nary course of events, the budget rules would not count elimination of 
a discretionary-spending program as producing any savings that could 
be applied to pay for more mandatory spending.  This is because 
merely eliminating LIHEAP or some HUD programs would leave ap-
propriators free to spend more on other discretionary programs un-
der their discretionary caps and annual allocations.  Here, too, the so-
lution is a sort of swap:  to reflect the programs’ transfer to the 
mandatory side of the ledger, OMB could lower the discretionary 
baseline and caps, which would likely induce the budget committees 
to do the same with their allocations.349  Such a transfer would have 
the effect of reducing appropriators’ jurisdiction, making it politically 
perilous.  On the other hand, the climate change legislation as a 
whole is likely to be moving significant sums across the same divide 
but in the opposite direction:  funding research and other prototypi-
cally discretionary activities through the new system’s revenues. 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change is no ordinary policy problem.  Its regulation cer-
tainly is no ordinary policy initiative.  No one should be surprised, 
therefore, that making principled choices about its substantive scope 
 
344 Possibly complicating this bargaining is the fact that these antipoverty pro-
grams all have relatively low political profiles within these committees.  Devising a 
commensurate trade of peripheral pieces of one committee’s jurisdiction for core 
elements of another’s could be challenging, especially because five trades across the 
two chambers would have to be negotiated simultaneously.   
345 See 2 U.S.C. § 901(c) (2006) (setting discretionary spending limits).  For now, 
Congress has allowed the multiyear caps that prevailed in the 1990s to expire. 
346 Id. § 633(a)(1). 
347 See id. § 902 (requiring sequestration of government spending when certain 
kinds of enacted direct spending or revenue legislation increase the deficit). 
348 Id. § 641. 
349 See id. § 901(b)(1)(A). 
SUPER FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  9:53 PM 
2010] Carbon-Emissions Control and Legislative Joinder 1197 
requires more than routine policy analysis.  A purely political calculus 
will likely result in legislation that undervalues urgent human needs 
while providing environmentally counterproductive subsidies to exist-
ing polluters.  On the other hand, a purely sentimental approach will 
also prove unavailing, wasting large sums on projects that, while ap-
pealing, are likely to receive adequate funding from elsewhere.  Yet 
even if policymakers can resist these temptations, they nonetheless will 
face many more legitimately worthy and important claims than availa-
ble funds can possibly satisfy.  Policy-analysis tools designed to assess 
each proposal’s cardinal merit, or at best compare a handful of similar 
approaches to a similar problem, offer little hope of sorting through 
this blizzard of policy proposals.  No rational response is possible 
without effective, defensible principles for determining which ancil-
lary claims ought to be joined with climate change legislation. 
Reasonable principles can be derived from a combination of ex-
perience and widely accepted norms.  Application of those principles 
suggests a strong case for including both distributional and fiscal con-
cerns in climate change debates.  Once this occurs, fiscal progress will 
depend, as it always does, on political will.  The challenges of design-
ing a program to offset the impoverishing effects of carbon-emissions 
regulation without undermining its incentives to conserve is a formid-
able challenge at which policymakers have failed in the past.  This 
problem is not, however, insuperable. 
Scientists tell us we have little time.  To date, however, we have 
had a still-greater shortage of political will both to face the daunting 
challenges of designing sound climate change legislation and to im-
pose the pain required to achieve meaningful emissions reductions.  
To be sure, taking the steps this Article recommends would require 
considerable political will.  If such will remains in as short supply as it 
has been to date, however, we have no chance of slowing climate 
change meaningfully—or maintaining the environment we have come 
to take for granted. 
The cost of climate change reform cannot be shouldered by the 
weakest among us.  Fortunately, it does not have to be. 
 
